claim to an absolute universal content。 For every specific determination which the simple substance
（and its very nature consists in being simple） might obtain is inadequate to its nature。 The command
itself in its simple absoluteness expresses immediate ethical existence； the distinction appearing in it
is a specific determinate element； and thus a content standing under the absolute universality of this
simple existence。 Since； then； an absolute content must thus be renounced； formal universality is
the only kind that is possible and suitable； and this means merely that it is not to contradict itself。
For universality devoid of content is formal； and an absolute content amounts to a distinction which
is no distinction； i。e。 means absence of content。（2）
In default of all content there is thus nothing left with which to make a law but the bare form of
universality； in fact； the mere tautology of consciousness； a tautology which stands over against the
content； and consists in a knowledge； not of the content actually existing； the content proper； but
of its ultimate essence only； a knowledge of its self…identity。
The ethical inner essence is consequently not itself ipso facto a content； but only a standard for
deciding whether a content is capable of being a law or not； i。e。 whether the content does not
contradict itself。 Reason as law…giver is reduced to being reason as criterion； instead of laying
down laws reason now only tests what is laid down。
1。 Cp。 Kant； Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals： Sect。 1 Critique of Practical Reason：
Analytic c。 3。
2。 The above criticism applies to Kant's 〃categorical imperative〃。
c
Reason as Testing Laws
A DIFFERENCE within the bare and simple ethical substance is for it an accident； which； in the
case of determinate commands； as we saw； appeared as contingency in the knowledge of the
circumstances and contingency in action。 The comparison of that simple existence with the
determinateness which was inadequate to its nature took place in us； and the simple substance was
then seen to be formal universality or pure consciousness which holds itself free from and in
opposition to the content； and is a knowledge of that content as something determinate。 The
universality in this way remains the same as what the objectified intent was。 But in consciousness
this universality is something different； it is no longer the genus； inert and void of thought； but is
related to the particular and valid as its force and truth。
This consciousness at first seems the same process of testing which formerly we carried on； and its
action seems unable to be anything else than has already taken place — a comparison of the
universal with the determinate particular which would yield as formerly their mutual incongruity。
But the relation of content to universal is different here； since this universal has got another
significance。 It is formal universality； of which the specific consent is capable； for in that
universality the content is considered merely in relation to itself。 When we were applying the test；
the universal solid substance stood over against that specificity； which proved to be a contingent
element of the consciousness into which the substance entered。 Here one term of the comparison
has vanished； the universal is no longer the existing substance with a value all its own； is no longer
substantive right per se； but simple knowledge or form； which compares a content merely with
itself； and looks at it to see if it is a tautology。 Laws are no longer given； but examined and tested；
and for that consciousness which applies the test the laws are already given。 It picks up their
content as simply there； without going into the consideration （as was done before） of the
particularity and contingency attaching to its reality； instead of this it takes its stand by the
command as command； and takes up an attitude towards this command just as direct and simple
as ＇the fact of＇ its being a standard and criterion for criticizing it。
For that reason； however； this process of testing does not get very far。 Just because the standard
is a tautology and indifferent to the content； it accepts one content just as readily as the opposite。
Suppose the question is： — ought it to be a law without qualification （an und für sich） that there
should be property？ Without qualification； and not because of utility for other ends： — the essential
ethical truth consists just in the fact that the law should be merely a self…consistent whole （sich
selbst gleiche）； and through being identical with itself have its ground in its own essential nature；
and not be something conditioned。 Property per se does not contradict itself。 It is a specifically
determinate isolated element； or merely self…identical （sich selbst gleich）。 Absence of property；
absence of ownership of things； or again； community of goods； contradicts itself just as little。 That
something belong to nobody at all； or to the first best man who puts himself in possession； or；
again； to all together； and to each according to his need or in equal portions — that is a simple
characteristic； a formal thought； like its opposite； property。
If indeed no one is master of a thing and it is looked at as a necessary object for human
requirement； then it is necessary that it should become the possession of some particular individual；
and the contradiction would rather lie in making a law out of the freedom of the thing。 By the thing
being without an owner is meant； however； not absolute freedom from ownership； but that it shall
come into someone's possession according to the need of the individual； and； moreover； not in
order to be kept but directly to be used。 But to make provision for need in such an entirely
haphazard manner is contradictory to the nature of the conscious being； with whom alone we have
here to do。 For such a being has to think of his need in a universal way； to look to his existence in
its entirety； and procure himself a permanent lasting good。 This being so； the idea that a thing is to
become by chance the possession of the first self…conscious individual （Leben） who happens to
need it； is inconsistent with itself。
In a communistic society； where provision would be made in a way which is universal and
permanent； either each comes to have as much as he requires…in which case there is a
contradiction between this inequality and the essential nature — of consciousness； whose principle
is the equality of individuals…or； acting on this last principle； there is an equal division of goods； and
in this case the share each gets has no relation to his needs； and yet this is solely what 〃share〃； i。e。
fair share； really means。
But if when taken in this way absence of property seems contradictory； this is only because it has
not been left in the form of a simple determinate characteristic。 The same result is found in the case
of property if this is resolved into separate moments。 The particular thing which is my property has
by being so the value of something universal； established； and permanent。 This； how。 ever；
contradicts its nature； which consists in its being used and passing away。 At the same time its
value lies in being mine； which all others acknowledge and keep themselves away from。 But just in
my being acknow… ledged lies rather my equality； my identify； with every one — the opposite of
exclusion。
Again； what I possess is a thing； i。e。 an existence； which is there for others in general； quite
universally and without any condition that it is for me alone。 That I possess it contradicts the
general nature of its thinghood。 Property therefore contradicts itself on all hands just as much as
absence of property； each has within it both these opposite and self…contradictory moments；
universality and particularity。
But each of these determinate characteristics； presented simply as property or absence of
property without further developing its implications； is as simple as the other； i。e。 is not
self…contradictory。 The standard of law which reason has within itself therefore fits every case in
the same way； and is in point of fact no standard at all。 It would； too； turn out rather strange； if
tautology； the principle of contradiction； which is allowed to be merely a formal criterion for
knowledge of theoretical truth； i。e。 something which is quite indifferent to truth and untruth alike；
were to be more than this for knowledge of practical truth。
In both the above moments of what fills up the previous emptiness of spiritual reality （geistigen
Wesen） the attempt to establish immediate determinate characteristics within the substance of the
ethical life； and then to know whether these determinations are laws； has cancelled itself。 The
outcome； then； seems to be that neither determinate laws nor a knowledge of these can be
obtained。 But the substance in question is the consciousness of itself as absolute essentiality
（Wesenheit）； a consciousness therefore which can give up neither the difference falling within that
substance； nor the knowledge of this difference。 That giving laws and testing laws have turned out
futile indicates that both； taken individually and in isolation； are merely unstable moments of the
ethical consciousness； and the process in which they appear has the formal significance； that the
substance of ethical life thereby expresses itself as consciousness。
So far as both these moments are more precise determinations of the consciousness of the real
intent （Sache selbst） they can be looked on as forms of that honesty of nature （Ehrlichkeit） which
now； as always with its formal moments； is much occupied with a content which 〃ought to be〃
good and right； and with testing definite fixed truth of this sort； and supposes itself to possess in
healthy reason and intelligent insight the force and validity of ethical commands。
Without this honesty of nature； however； laws do not have validity as essential realities of
consciousness； and the process of testing likewise does not hold good as an activity inside
consciousness。 Rather； these moments； when they appear directly as a reality e