observation； as in all other natural events and in the
operation of external objects。 Our authority over our
sentiments and passions is much weaker than that over our
ideas； and even the latter authority is circumscribed within
very narrow boundaries。 Will any one pretend to assign the
ultimate reason of these boundaries； or show why the power
is deficient in one case； not in another。
； This self…command is very different at
different times。 A man in health possesses more of it than
one languishing with sickness。 We are more master of our
thoughts in the morning than in the evening： Fasting； than
after a full meal。 Can we give any reason for these
variations； except experience？ Where then is the power； of
which we pretend to be conscious？ Is there not here； either
in a spiritual or material substance； or both； some secret
mechanism or structure of parts； upon which the effect
depends； and which； being entirely unknown to us； renders
the power or energy of the will equally unknown and
incomprehensible？
Volition is surely an act of the mind； with which we
are sufficiently acquainted。 Reflect upon it。 Consider it on
all sides。 Do you find any thing in it like this creative
power； by which it raises from nothing a new idea； and with
a kind of F/IAT； imitates the omnipotence of its Maker； if
I may be allowed so to speak； who called forth into
existence all the various scenes of nature？ So far from
being conscious of this energy in the will； it requires as
certain experience as that of which we are possessed； to
convince us that such extraordinary effects do ever result
from a simple act of volition。
The generality of mankind never find any difficulty in
accounting for the more common and familiar operations of
nature such as the descent of heavy bodies； the growth of
plants； the generation of animals； or the nourishment of
bodies by food： But suppose that； in all these cases； they
perceive the very force or energy of the cause； by which it
is connected with its effect； and is for ever infallible in
its operation。 They acquire； by long habit； such a turn of
mind； that； upon the appearance of the cause； they
immediately expect with assurance its usual attendant； and
hardly conceive it possible that any other event could
result from it。 It is only on the discovery of extraordinary
phaenomena； such as earthquakes； pestilence； and prodigies
of any kind； that they find themselves at a loss to assign a
proper cause； and to explain the manner in which the effect
is produced by it。 It is usual for men； in such difficulties
to have recourse to some invisible intelligent principle＇18＇
as the immediate cause of that event which surprises them；
and which； they think； cannot be accounted for from the
common powers of nature。 But philosophers； who carry their
scrutiny a little farther； immediately perceive that； even
in the most familiar events； the energy of the cause is as
unintelligible as in the most unusual； and that we only
learn by experience the frequent C/ONJUNCTION of objects；
without being ever able to comprehend any thing like
C/ONNEXION between them。 Here； then； many philosophers
think themselves obliged by reason to have recourse； on all
occasions； to the same principle； which the vulgar never
appeal to but in cases that appear miraculous and
supernatural。 They acknowledge mind and intelligence to be；
not only the ultimate and original cause of all things； but
the immediate and sole cause of every event which appears in
nature。 They pretend that those objects which are commonly
denominated ； are in reality nothing but
； and that the true and direct principle of every
effect is not any power or force in nature； but a volition
of the Supreme Being； who wills that such particular objects
should for ever be conjoined with each other。 Instead of
saying that one billiard…ball moves another by a force which
it has derived from the author of nature； it is the Deity
himself； they say； who； by a particular volition； moves the
second ball； being determined to this operation by the
impulse of the first ball； in consequence of those general
laws which he has laid down to himself in the government of
the universe。 But philosophers advancing still in their
inquiries； discover that； as we are totally ignorant of the
power on which depends the mutual operation of bodies； we
are no less ignorant of that power on which depends the
operation of mind on body； or of body on mind； nor are we
able； either from our senses or consciousness； to assign the
ultimate principle in one case more than in the other。 The
same ignorance； therefore； reduces them to the same
conclusion。 They assert that the Deity is the immediate
cause of the union between soul and body； and that they are
not the organs of sense； which； being agitated by external
objects； produce sensations in the mind； but that it is a
particular volition of our omnipotent Maker； which excites
such a sensation； in consequence of such a motion in the
organ。 In like manner； it is not any energy in the will that
produces local motion in our members： It is God himself； who
is pleased to second our will； in itself impotent； and to
command that motion which we erroneously attribute to our
own power and efficacy。 Nor do philosophers stop at this
conclusion。 They sometimes extend the same inference to the
mind itself； in its internal operations。 Our mental vision
or conception of ideas is nothing but a revelation made to
us by our Maker。 When we voluntarily turn our thoughts to
any object； and raise up its image in the fancy； it is not
the will which creates that idea： It is the universal
Creator； who discovers it to the mind； and renders it
present to us。
Thus； according to these philosophers； every thing is
full of God。 Not content with the principle； that nothing
exists but by his will； that nothing possesses any power but
by his concession： They rob nature； and all created beings；
of every power； in order to render their dependence on the
Deity still more sensible and immediate。 They consider not
that； by this theory； they diminish； instead of magnifying；
the grandeur of those attributes； which they affect so much
to celebrate。 It argues surely more power in the Deity to
delegate a certain degree of power to inferior creatures
than to produce every thing by his own immediate volition。
It argues more wisdom to contrive at first the fabric of the
world with such perfect foresight that； of itself； and by
its proper operation； it may serve all the purposes of
providence； than if the great Creator were obliged every
moment to adjust its parts； and animate by his breath all
the wheels of that stupendous machine。
But if we would have a more philosophical confutation
of this theory； perhaps the two following reflections may
suffice：
； it seems to me that this theory of the
universal energy and operation of the Supreme Being is too
bold ever to carry conviction with it to a man； sufficiently
apprized of the weakness of human reason； and the narrow
limits to which it is confined in all its operations。 Though
the chain of arguments which conduct to it were ever so
logical； there must arise a strong suspicion； if not an
absolute assurance； that it has carried us quite beyond the
reach of our faculties； when it leads to conclusions so
extraordinary； and so remote from common life and
experience。 We are got into fairy land； long ere we have
reached the last steps of our theory； and there we have no
reason to trust our common methods of argument； or to think
that our usual analogies and probabilities have any
authority。 Our line is too short to fathom such immense
abysses。 And however we may flatter ourselves that we are
guided； in every step which we take； by a kind of
verisimilitude and experience； we may be assured that this
fancied experience has no authority when we thus apply it to
subjects that lie entirely out of the sphere of experience。
But on this we shall have occasion to touch afterwards。＇19＇
； I cannot perceive any force in the
arguments on which this theory is founded。 We are ignorant；
it is true； of the manner in which bodies operate on each
other： Their force or energy is entirely incomprehensible：
But are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force by
which a mind； even the supreme mind； operates either on
itself or on body？ Whence； I beseech you； do we acquire any
idea of it？ We have no sentiment or consciousness of this
power in ourselves。 We have no idea of the Supreme Being but
what we learn from reflection on our own faculties。 Were our
ignorance； therefore； a good reason for rejecting any thing；
we should be led into that principle of denying all energy
in the Supreme Being as much as in the grossest matter。 We
surely comprehend as little the operations of one as of the
other。 Is it more difficult to conceive that motion may
arise from impulse than that it may arise from volition？ All
we know is our profound ignorance in both cases。＇20＇
* * * *
PART II。
B/UT to hasten to a conclusion of this argument； which
is already drawn out to too great a length： We have sought
in vain for an idea of power or necessary connexion in all
the sources from which we could suppose it to be derived。 It
appears that； in single instances of the operation of
bodies； we never can； by our utmost scrutiny； discover any
thing but one event following another； without being able to
comprehend any force or power by which the cause operates；
or any connexion between it and its supposed effect。 The
same difficulty occurs in contemplating the operations of
mind on body where we observe the motion of the latter to
follow upon the volition of the former； but are not able to
observe or conceive the tie which binds together the motion
and volition； or the energy by which the mind produces this
effect。 The authority of the will over its own faculties and
ideas is not a whit more comprehensible： So that； upon the
whole； there appears not； throughout all na