science of quantity。＇39＇
The sceptical objections to evidence； or to the
reasonings concerning matter of fact； are either
or 。 The popular objections are derived from
the natural weakness of human understanding； the
contradictory opinions； which have been entertained in
different ages and nations； the variations of our judgement
in sickness and health； youth and old age； prosperity and
adversity； the perpetual contradiction of each particular
man's opinions and sentiments； with many other topics of
that kind。 It is needless to insist farther on this head。
These objections are but weak。 For as； in common life； we
reason every moment concerning fact and existence； and
cannot possibly subsist； without continually employing this
species of argument； any popular objections； derived from
thence； must be insufficient to destroy that evidence。 The
great subverter of or the excessive principles
of scepticism is action； and employment； and the occupations
of common life。 These principles may flourish and triumph in
the schools； where it is； indeed； difficult； if not
impossible； to refute them。 But as soon as they leave the
shade； and by the presence of the real objects； which
actuate our passions and sentiments； are put in opposition
to the more powerful principles of our nature； they vanish
like smoke； and leave the most determined sceptic in the
same condition as other mortals。
The sceptic； therefore； had better keep within his
proper sphere； and display those objections；
which arise from more profound researches。 Here he seems to
have ample matter of triumph； while he justly insists； that
all our evidence for any matter of fact； which lies beyond
the testimony of sense or memory； is derived entirely from
the relation of cause and effect； that we have no other idea
of this relation than that of two objects； which have been
frequently together； that we have no argument to
convince us； that objects； which have； in our experience；
been frequently conjoined； will likewise； in other
instances； be conjoined in the same manner； and that nothing
leads us to this inference but custom or a certain instinct
of our nature； which it is indeed difficult to resist； but
which； like other instincts； may be fallacious and
deceitful。 While the sceptic insists upon these topics； he
shows his force； or rather； indeed； his own and our
weakness； and seems； for the time at least； to destroy all
assurance and conviction。 These arguments might be displayed
at greater length； if any durable good or benefit to society
could ever be expected to result from them。
For here is the chief and most confounding objection to
scepticism； that no durable good can ever result
from it； while it remains in its full force and vigour。 We
need only ask such a sceptic； ？ He is
immediately at a loss； and knows not what to answer。 A
C/OPERNICAN or P/TOLEMAIC； who supports each his different
system of astronomy； may hope to produce a conviction； which
will remain constant and durable； with his audience。 A
S/TOIC or E/PICUREAN displays principles； which may not be
durable； but which have an effect on conduct and behaviour。
But a P/YRRHONIAN cannot expect； that his philosophy will
have any constant influence on the mind： Or if it had； that
its influence would be beneficial to society。 On the
contrary； he must acknowledge； if he will acknowledge any
thing； that all human life must perish； were his principles
universally and steadily to prevail。 All discourse； all
action would immediately cease； and men remain in a total
lethargy； till the necessities of nature； unsatisfied； put
an end to their miserable existence。 It is true； so fatal an
event is very little to be dreaded。 Nature is always too
strong for principle。 And though a P/YRRHONIAN may throw
himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion
by his profound reasonings； the first and most trivial event
in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples； and
leave him the same； in every point of action and
speculation； with the philosophers of every other sect； or
with those who never concerned themselves in any
philosophical researches。 When he awakes from his dream； he
will be the first to join in the laugh against himself； and
to confess； that all his objections are mere amusement； and
can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical
condition of mankind； who must act and reason and believe；
though they are not able； by their most diligent enquiry； to
satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these
operations； or to remove the objections； which may be raised
against them。
* * * *
PART III。
T/HERE is； indeed； a more scepticism or
philosophy； which may be both durable and
useful； and which may； in part； be the result of this
P/YRRHONISM； or scepticism； when its
undistinguished doubts are； in some measure； corrected by
common sense and reflection。 The greater part of mankind are
naturally apt to be affirmative and dogmatical in their
opinions； and while they see objects only on one side； and
have no idea of any counterpoising argument； they throw
themselves precipitately into the principles； to which they
are inclined； nor have they any indulgence for those who
entertain opposite sentiments。 To hesitate or balance
perplexes their understanding； checks their passion； and
suspends their action。 They are； therefore； impatient till
they escape from a state； which to them is so uneasy： And
they think； that they could never remove themselves far
enough from it； by the violence of their affirmations and
obstinacy of their belief。 But could such dogmatical
reasoners become sensible of the strange infirmities of
human understanding； even in its most perfect state； and
when most accurate and cautious in its determinations； such
a reflection would naturally inspire them with more modesty
and reserve； and diminish their fond opinion of themselves；
and their prejudice against antagonists。 The illiterate may
reflect on the disposition of the learned； who； amidst all
the advantages of study and reflection； are commonly still
diffident in their determinations： And if any of the learned
be inclined； from their natural temper； to haughtiness and
obstinacy； a small tincture of P/YRRHONISM might abate
their pride； by showing them； that the few advantages； which
they may have attained over their fellows； are but
inconsiderable； if compared with the universal perplexity
and confusion； which is inherent in human nature。 In
general； there is a degree of doubt； and caution； and
modesty； which； in all kinds of scrutiny and decision； ought
for ever to accompany a just reasoner。
Another species of scepticism which may be
of advantage to mankind； and which may be the natural result
of the P/YRRHONIAN doubts and scruples； is the limitation
of our enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the
narrow capacity of human understanding。 The of
man is naturally sublime； delighted with whatever is remote
and extraordinary； and running； without control； into the
most distant parts of space and time in order to avoid the
objects； which custom has rendered too familiar to it。 A
correct observes a contrary method； and avoiding
all distant and high enquiries； confines itself to common
life； and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and
experience； leaving the more sublime topics to the
embellishment of poets and orators； or to the arts of
priests and politicians。 To bring us to so salutary a
determination； nothing can be more serviceable； than to be
once thoroughly convinced of the force of the P/YRRHONIAN
doubt； and of the impossibility； that any thing； but the
strong power of natural instinct； could free us from it。
Those who have a propensity to philosophy； will still
continue their researches； because they reflect； that；
besides the immediate pleasure attending such an occupation；
philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of
common life； methodized and corrected。 But they will never
be tempted to go beyond common life； so long as they
consider the imperfection of those faculties which they
employ； their narrow reach； and their inaccurate operations。
While we cannot give a satisfactory reason； why we believe；
after a thousand experiments； that a stone will fall； or
fire burn； can we ever satisfy ourselves concerning any
determination； which we may form； with regard to the origin
of worlds； and the situation of nature； from； and to
eternity？
This narrow limitation； indeed； of our enquiries； is；
in every respect； so reasonable； that it suffices to make
the slightest examination into the natural powers of the
human mind and to compare them with their objects； in order
to recommend it to us。 We shall then find what are the
proper subjects of science and enquiry。
It seems to me； that the only objects of the abstract
science or of demonstration are quantity and number； and
that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of
knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and
illusion。 As the component parts of quantity and number are
entirely similar； their relations become intricate and
involved； and nothing can be more curious； as well as
useful； than to trace； by a variety of mediums； their
equality or inequality； through their different appearances。
But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different
from each other； we can never advance farther； by our utmost
scrutiny； than to observe this diversity； and； by an obvious
reflection； pronounce one thing not to be another。 Or if
there be any difficulty in these decisions； it proceeds
entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words； which is
corrected by juster definitions。 That ；
cannot be known； let the terms be ever s