and becomes a universal； the best known example of this is to be found in positive and negative
electricity in so far as it is positive and negative。 There is another shortcoming of a formal nature；
and one of which all empiricists partake； — that is that they believe themselves to be keeping to
experience alone； it is to them an unknown fact that in receiving these perceptions they are
indulging in metaphysics。 Man does not stop short at the individual； nor can he do so。 He seeks
the universal； but thoughts； even if not Notions likewise； are what constitute the same。 The most
remarkable thought…form is that of force； we thus speak of the force of electricity； of magnetism；
of gravity。 Force； however； is a universal and not a perceptible； quite uncritically and
unconsciously the empiricists thus permit of determinations such as these。
3。 Bacon finally gives the objects with which Philosophy mainly has to deal。 These objects contrast
much with that which we derive from perception and experience。 “In the summary which Bacon
gives of what he conceives ought to be the objects of philosophical inquiry； are the following； and
we select those which he principally dwells upon in his works： ‘The prolongation of life； the
restitution of youth in some degree； the retardation of old age； and the altering of statures； the
altering of features； versions of bodies into other bodies； making of new species； impression of the
air and raising tempests； greater pleasures of the senses； &c。’” He likewise deals with objects
such as these； and he seeks to direct attention upon whether in their regard the means could not be
found to carry out their ends； in such powers we should be able to make some progress。 “He
complains that such investigations have been neglected by those whom be designates ignavi
regionum exploratores。 In his Natural History he gives formal receipts for making gold； and
performing many wonders。” （10） Bacon thus does not by any means take the intelligent
standpoint of an investigation of nature； being still involved in the grossest superstition； false magic；
&c。 This we find to be on the whole propounded in an intelligent way； and Bacon thus remains
within the conceptions of his time。 “The conversion of silver； quicksilver； or any other metal into
gold is a thing difficult to believe； yet it is far more probable that a man who knows clearly the
natures of weight； of the colour of yellow； of malleability； and extension； of volatility and fixedness；
and who has also made diligent search into the first seeds and menstruums of minerals； may at last
by much and sagacious endeavour produce gold； than that a few grains of an elixir may so do。 。 。 。
So again a man who knows well the nature of rarefaction； of assimilation； and of alimentation； shall
by diets； bathings； and the like prolong life； or in some degree renew the vigour of youth。” （11）
These assertions are thus not as crude as they at first appear。 In dealing with Medicine Bacon
speaks amongst other things of maceration （Malacissatio per exterius） （12） and so forth。
Bacon emphasizes what has reference to the formal aspect of investigation。 For he says； “Natural
philosophy is divided into two parts； the first consists in the investigation of causes； the second in
the production of effects； the causes to be investigated are either final or formal causes； or else
material or efficient causes。 The former constitutes metaphysics； the latter physics。 This last Bacon
looks upon as a branch of philosophy very inferior in point of dignity and importance to the other
and accordingly to ascertain the most probable means of improving our knowledge of metaphysics
is the great object of his Organon。〃 （13） He himself says： “It is a correct position that ‘true
knowledge is knowledge by causes。 And causes； again； are not improperly； distributed into four
kind： the material； the formal； the efficient； and the final。’” （14） （Vol。 I。 p。 174； Vol。 II。 p。 138。）
But in this connection an important point is that Bacon has turned against the teleological
investigation of nature； against the investigation into final causes。 “The investigation of final causes
is useless； they corrupt rather than advance the sciences except such as have to do with human
action。” （15） To Bacon the important matter is to investigate by the study of caus？ efficientes。
To the consideration of final causes such assertions as these belong： “That the hairs of the eyelids
are for a protection to the eyes； that the thick skins and hides of living creatures are to defend
them from heat and cold； that the trees have leaves so that the fruit may not suffer from sun and
wind” （16）： the hair is on the head on account of warmth； thunder and lightning are the
punishment of God； or else they make fruitful the earth； marmots sleep during the winter because
they can find nothing to eat； snails have a shell in order that they may be secure against attacks； the
bee is provided with a sting。 According to Bacon this has been worked out in innumerable
different ways。 The negative and external side of utility is turned round； and the lack of this
adaptation to end is likewise drawn within the same embrace。 It may； for example； be said that if
sun or moon were to shine at all times； the police might save much money； and this would provide
men with food and drink for whole months together。 It was right that Bacon should set himself to
oppose this investigation into final causes； because it relates to external expediency； just as Kant
was right in distinguishing the inward teleology from the outward。 As against the external end； there
is； in fact； the inward end； i。e。 the inward Notion of the thing itself； as we found it earlier in
Aristotle （Vol。 II。 pp。 166…163）。 Because the organism possesses an inward adaptation to its
ends； its members are indeed likewise externally adapted as regards one another； but the ends； as
external ends； are heterogeneous to the individual； are unconnected with the object which is
investigated。 Speaking generally； the Notion of nature is not in nature itself； which would mean that
the end was in nature itself； but as teleological； the Notion is something foreign to it。 It does not
have the end in itself in such a way that we have to accord respect to it — as the individual man
has his end in himself and hence has to be respected。 But even the individual man as individual has
only a right to respect from the individual as such； and not from the universal。 He who acts in the
name of the universal； of the state； as a general does for instance； does not require to respect the
individual at all； for the latter； although an end in himself； does not cease to be relative。 He is this
end in himself； not as excluding himself and setting himself in opposition； but only in so far as his
true reality is the universal Notion。 The end of the animal in itself as an individual is its own
self…preservation； but its true end in itself is the species。 Its self…preservation is not involved in this；
for the self…preservation of its individuality is disadvantageous to the species； while the abrogation
of itself is favourable thereto。
Now Bacon separates the universal principle and the efficient cause； and for that reason he
removes investigation into ends from physics to metaphysics。 Or he recognizes the Notion； not as
universal in nature； but only as necessity； i。e。 as a universal which presents itself in the opposition
of its moments； not one which has bound them into a unity — in other words he only
acknowledges a comprehension of one determinate from another determinate going on into infinity；
and not of both from their Notion。 Bacon has thus made investigation into the efficient cause more
general； and he asserts that this investigation alone belongs to physics； although be allows that both
kinds of investigation may exist side by side。 （17） Through that view he effected a great deal； and
in so far as it has counteracted the senseless superstition which in the Germanic nations far
exceeded in its horrors and absurdity that of the ancient world； it has the very merit which we met
with in the Epicurean philosophy。 That philosophy opposed itself to the superstitious Stoics and to
superstition generally — which last makes any existence that we set before ourselves into a cause
（a Beyond which is made to exist in a sensuous way and to operate as a cause）； or makes two
sensuous things which have no relation operate on one another。 This polemic of Bacon’s against
spectres； astrology； magic； &c。； （18） can certainly not be regarded exactly as Philosophy like his
other reflections； but it is at least of service to culture。
He also advises that attention should be directed to formal causes； the forms of things； and that
they should be recognized。 （19） “But to give an exact definition of the meaning which Bacon
attaches to the phrase formal causes is rather difficult； because his language upon this subject is
uncertain in a very remarkable degree。” （20） “It may be thought that he understood by this the
immanent determinations of things； the laws of nature； as a matter of fact the forms are none else
than universal determinations； species； &c。” （21） He says： “The discovery of the formal is
despaired of。 The efficient and the material （as they are investigated and received； that is as remote
causes； without reference to the latent process leading to the forms） are but slight and superficial；
and contribute little； if anything； to true and active science。 For though in nature nothing really
exists beside individual bodies； performing pure individual acts according to a fixed law； yet in
philosophy this very law； and the investigation； discovery and explanation of it； is the foundation as
well of knowledge as of operation。 And it is this law； with its clauses； that I mean when I speak of
Forms 。 。 。 Let the investigation of Forms which are eternal and immutable constitute metaphysics。
Whosoever is acquainted with Forms embraces the unity of nature in substances the most unlike。”
（22） He goes through this in detail； and quotes many examples to illustrate it； such as that of Heat。
“Mind must raise itself from differences to specie