no signs are given by which he can safely distinguish sleeping from waking。 We shall hereby
likewise doubt everything else； even mathematical propositions； partly because we have seen that
some err even in what we hold most certain； and ascribe value to what to us seems false； and
partly because we have heard that a God exists who has created us； and who can do everything；
so that He may have created us liable to err。 But if we conceive ourselves not to derive our
existence from God； but from some other source； perhaps from ourselves； we are all the more
liable； in that we are thus imperfect； to err。 But we have so far the experience of freedom within us
that we can always refrain from what is not perfectly certain and well founded。” （3） The demand
which rests at the basis of Descartes’ reasonings thus is that what is recognized as true should be
able to maintain the position of having the thought therein at home with itself。 The so…called
immediate intuition and inward revelation； which in modern times is so highly regarded； has its
place here。 But because in the Cartesian form the principle of freedom as such is not brought into
view； the grounds which are here advanced are for the most part popular。
b。 Descartes sought something in itself certain and true； which should neither be only true like the
object of faith without knowledge； nor the sensuous and also sceptical certainty which is without
truth。 The whole of Philosophy as it had been carried on up to this time was vitiated by the
constant pre…supposition of something as true； and in some measure； as in the Neo…Platonic
philosophy； by not giving the form of scientific knowledge to its matter； or by not separating its
moments。 But to Descartes nothing is true which does not possess an inward evidence in
consciousness； or which reason does not recognize so clearly and conclusively that any doubt
regarding it is absolutely impossible。 “Because we thus reject or declare to be false everything
regarding which we can have any doubt at all； it is easy for us to suppose that there is no God； no
heaven； no body — but we cannot therefore say that we do not exist； who think this。 For it is
contradictory to say that what thinks does not exist。 Hence the knowledge that ‘I think； therefore
I am；’ is what we arrive at first of all； and it is the most certain fact that offers itself to everyone
who follows after philosophy in an orderly fashion。 This is the best way of becoming acquainted
with the nature of spirit and its diversity from body。 For if we inquire who we are who can set
forth as untrue everything which is different from ourselves； we clearly see that no extension；
figure； change of position； nor any such thing which can be ascribed to body； constitutes our
nature； but only thought alone； which is thus known earlier and more certainly than any corporeal
thing。” （4） ‘I’ has thus significance here as thought； and not as individuality of
self…consciousness。 The second proposition of the Cartesian philosophy is hence the immediate
certainty of thought。 Certainty is only knowledge as such in its pure form as self…relating； and this is
thought； thus then the unwieldy understanding makes its way on to the necessity of thought。
Descartes begins； just as Fichte did later on； with the ‘I’ as indubitably certain； I know that
something is presented in me。 By this Philosophy is at one stroke transplanted to quite another
field and to quite another standpoint； namely to the sphere of subjectivity。 Presuppositions in
religion are given up； proof alone is sought for； and not the absolute content which disappears
before abstract infinite subjectivity。 There is in Descartes likewise a seething desire to speak from
strong feeling； from the ordinary sensuous point of view； just as Bruno and so many others； each in
his own fashion； express as individualities their particular conceptions of the world。 To consider
the content in itself is not the first matter； for I can abstract from all my conceptions； but not from
the ‘I。’ We think this and that； and hence it is — is to give the common would…be…wise argument
of those incapable of grasping the matter in point； that a determinate content exists is exactly what
we are forced to doubt — there is nothing absolutely fixed。 Thought is the entirely universal； but
not merely because I can abstract； but because ‘I’ is thus simple； self…identical。 Thought
consequently comes first； the next determination arrived at； in direct connection with it； is the
determination of Being。 The ‘I think’ directly involves my Being； this； says Descartes； is the
absolute basis of all Philosophy。 （5） The determination of Being is in my ‘I’； this connection is
itself the first matter。 Thought as Being and Being as thought — that is my certainty； ‘I’； in the
celebrated Cogito； ergo sum we thus have Thought and Being inseparably bound together。
On the one hand this proposition is regarded as a syllogism： from thought Being is deduced。 Kant
more especially has objected to this that Being is not contained in thinking； that it is different from
thinking。 This is true； but they are still inseparable； or constitute an identity； their difference is not to
the prejudice of their unity。 Yet this maxim of pure abstract certainty； the universal totality in which
everything implicitly exists； is not proved； （6） we must therefore not try to convert this proposition
into a syllogism。 Descartes himself says： “There is no syllogism present at all。 For in order that
there should be such； the major premise must have been ‘all that thinks exists’” — from which the
subsumption would have followed in the minor premise； ‘now I am。’ By this the immediacy
which rests in the proposition would be removed。 “But that major premise” is not set forth at all；
being “really in the first instance derived from the original ‘I think； therefore； I am’” （7） For
arriving at a conclusion three links are required — in this case we ought to have a third through
which thought and Being should have been mediated； and it is not to be found here。 The
‘Therefore’ which binds the two sides together is not the ‘Therefore’ of a syllogism； the
connection between Being and Thought is only immediately posited。 This certainty is thus the
prius； all other propositions come later。 The thinking subject as the simple immediacy of
being…at…home…with…me is the very same thing as what is called Being； and it is quite easy to
perceive this identity。 As universal； thought is contained in all that is particular； and thus is pure
relation to itself； pure oneness with itself。 We must not make the mistake of representing Being to
ourselves as a concrete content； and hence it is the same immediate identity which thought likewise
is。 Immediacy is； however； a one…sided determination； thought does not contain it alone； but also
the determination to mediate itself with itself； and thereby — by the mediation being at the same
time the abrogation of the mediation — it is immediacy。 In thought we thus have Being； Being is；
however； a poor determination； it is the abstraction from the concrete of thought。 This identity of
Being and Thought； which constitutes the most interesting idea of modern times； has not been
further worked out by Descartes； he has relied on consciousness alone； and for the time being
placed it in the forefront。 For with Descartes the necessity to develop the differences from the ‘I
think’ is not yet present； Fichte first applied himself to the deduction of all determinations from
this culminating point of absolute certainty。
Other propositions have been set against that of Descartes。 Gassendi； （8） for example； asks if we
might not just as well say Ludificor； ergo sum： I am made a fool of by my consciousness；
therefore I exist — or properly speaking； therefore I am made a fool of。 Descartes himself
recognized that this objection merited consideration； but he here repels it； inasmuch as it is the ‘I’
alone and not the other content which has to be maintained。 Being alone is identical with pure
thought； and not its content； be it what it may。 Descartes further says： “By thought I； however；
understand all that takes place in us within our consciousness； in as far as we are conscious of it；
thus will； conception； and even feeling are identical with thought。 For if I say ’ I see；’ or ‘I walk
out；’ and ‘therefore I am；’ and understand by this the seeing and walking which is
accomplished by the body； the conclusion is not absolutely certain； because； as often happens in a
dream； I may imagine that I can see or walk even if I do not open my eyes nor move from my
place； and I might also possibly do so supposing I had no body。 But if I understand it of the
subjective feeling or the consciousness of seeing or walking itself； because it is then related to the
mind that alone feels or thinks that it sees or walks； this conclusion is perfectly certain。” （9） “In a
dream” is an empirical mode of reasoning； but there is no other objection to it。 In willing； seeing；
hearing； &c。； thought is likewise contained； it is absurd to suppose that the soul has thinking in one
special pocket； and seeing； willing； &c。； in others。 But if I say ‘I see；’ ‘I walk out；’ there is
present on the one hand my consciousness ‘I；’ and consequently thought； on the other hand；
however； there is present willing； seeing； hearing； walking； and thus a still further modification of
the content。 Now because of this modification I cannot say ‘I walk； and therefore I am；’ for I
can undoubtedly abstract from the modification； since it is no longer universal Thought。 Thus we
must merely look at the pure consciousness contained in the concrete ‘I。’ Only when I
accentuate the fact that I am present there as thinking； is pure Being implied； for only with the
universal is Being united。
“In this it is implied；” says Descartes； “that thought is more certain to me than body。 If from the
fact that I touch or see the earth I judge that it exists； I must more certainly judge from this that my
thought exists。 For it may very well happen that I judge the earth to exist； even if it does not exist；
but it cannot be that I j