the affections of the body would not be in God； in so far as He constitutes our mind； but the idea
of another thing： that is to say； the ideas of the affections of our body would not be likewise in our
mind。” What is perplexing to understand in Spinoza's system is； on the one hand； the absolute
identity of thought and Being； and； on the other hand； their absolute indifference to one another；
because each of them is a manifestation of the whole essence of God。 The unity of the body and
consciousness is； according to Spinoza； this； that the individual is a mode of the absolute
substance； which； as consciousness； is the representation of the manner in which the body is
affected by external things； all that is in consciousness is also in extension； and conversely。 “Mind
knows itself only in so far as it perceives the ideas of the affections of body；” it has only the idea
of the affections of its body； this idea is synthetic combination； as we shall immediately see。 “The
ideas； whether of the attributes of God or of individual things； do not recognize as their efficient
cause their objects themselves； or the things perceived； but God Himself； in so far as He is that
which thinks。”（9） Buhle （Geschichte der neuern Philos。 Vol。 III。 Section II。 p。 524） sums up these
propositions of Spinoza thus： “Thought is inseparably bound up with extension； therefore all that
takes place in extension must also take place in consciousness。” Spinoza； however； also accepts
both in their separation from one another。 The idea of body； he writes （Epistol。 LXVI。 p。 673）；
includes only these two in itself； and does not express any other attributes。 The body which it
represents is regarded under the attribute of extension； but the idea itself is a mode of thought。
Here we see a dividing asunder； mere identity； the undistinguishable nature of all things in the
Absolute； is insufficient even for Spinoza。
The individuum； individuality itself； is thus defined by Spinoza （Ethic。 P。 11。 Prop。 XIII。 Defin。 p。
92）： “When several bodies of the same or of different magnitudes are so pressed together that they
rest on one another； or when； moving with like or different degrees of rapidity； they communicate
their movement to one another in a certain measure； we say that such bodies are united to one
another； and that all together they form one body or individuum； which by this union distinguishes
itself from all the other bodies。〃 Here we are at the extreme limit of Spinoza's system； and it is here
that his weak point appears。 Individuation； the one； is a mere synthesis； it is quite a different thing
from the Ichts or self…hood of Boehme （supra； pp。 205…207）； since Spinoza has only universality；
thought； and not self…consciousness。 If； before considering this in reference to the whole； we take
it from the other side； namely from the understanding； the distinction really falls under that head it is
not deduced； it is found。 Thus； as we have already seen （p。 270） “the understanding in act
（intellectus actu）； as also will； desire； love； must be referred to natura naturata； not to natura
naturans。 For by the understanding； as recognized for itself； we do not mean absolute thought；
but only a certain mode of thought — a mode which is distinct from other modes like desire； love；
etc。； and on that account must be conceived by means of absolute thought； i。e。； by means of an
attribute of God which expresses an eternal and infinite essentiality of thought； without which the
understanding； as also the rest of the modes of thought； could neither be nor be conceived to be。”
（Spinoza； Ethices； P。 1。 Propos。 XXXI。 pp。 62； 63）。 Spinoza is unacquainted with an infinity of
form； which would be something quite different from that of rigid； unyielding substance。 What is
requisite is to recognize God as the essence of essences； as universal substance； identity； and yet
to preserve distinctions。
Spinoza goes on to say： “What constitutes the real （actuale） existence of the human mind is nothing
else than the idea of a particular” （individual） “thing； that actually exists；” not of an infinite thing。
“The essence of man involves no necessary existence； i。e。； according to the order of nature a man
may just as well be as not be。” For the human consciousness； as it does not belong to essence as
an attribute； is a mode — a mode of the attribute of thought。 But neither is the body； according to
Spinoza； the cause of consciousness； nor is consciousness the cause of the body； but the finite
cause is here only the relation of like to like； body is determined by body； conception by
conception。 “The body can neither determine the mind to thought； nor can the mind determine the
body to motion； or rest； or anything else。 For all modes of thought have God as Cause； in so far as
He is a thinking thing； and not in so far as He is revealed by means of another attribute。 What
therefore determines the mind to thought； is a mode of thought and not of extension； similarly
motion and rest of the body must be derived from another body。”（10） I might quote many other
such particular propositions from Spinoza； but they are very formal； and a continual repetition of
one and the same thing。
Buhle （Gesch。 d。 neuern Phil。 Vol。 III。 Section 2； pp。 525…528）； attributes limited conceptions to
Spinoza： “The soul experiences in the body all the 'other' of which it becomes aware as outside of
the body； and it becomes aware of this 'other' only by means of the conceptions of the qualities
which the body perceives therein。 If； therefore； the body can perceive no qualities of a thing； the
soul also can come to no knowledge of it。 On the other hand； the soul is equally unable to arrive at
the perception of the body which belongs to it； the soul knows not that the body is there； and
knows itself even in no other way than by means of the qualities which the body perceives in things
which are outside of it； and by means of the conceptions of the same。 For the body is an individual
thing； determined in a certain manner； which can only gradually； in association with and amidst
other individual things； attain to existence； and can preserve itself in existence only as thus
connected； combined and associated with others；” i。e。； in infinite progress； the body can by no
means be conceived from itself。 “The soul's consciousness expresses a certain determinate form of
a Notion； as the Notion itself expresses a determinate form of an individual thing。 But the individual
thing； its Notion； and the Notion of this Notion are altogether and entirely one and the same thing；
only regarded under different attributes。 As the soul is nothing else than the immediate Notion of
the body； and is one and the same thing with this； the excellence of the soul can never be anything
else than the excellence of the body。 The capacities of the understanding are nothing but the
capacities of the body； if they are looked at from the corporeal point of view； and the decisions of
the will are likewise determinations of the body。 Individual things are derived from God in an
eternal and infinite manner” （i。e。； once and for all）； “and not in a transitory； finite and evanescent
manner； they are derived from one another merely inasmuch as they mutually produce and destroy
each other； but in their eternal existence they endure unchangeable。 All individual things mutually
presuppose each other； one cannot be thought without the other； that is to say they constitute
together an inseparable whole； they exist side by side in one utterly indivisible； infinite Thing； and in
no other way whatever。
3。 We have now to speak of Spinoza's system of morals； and that is a subject of importance。 Its
great principle is no other than this； that the finite spirit is moral in so far as it has the true Idea； i。e。；
in so far as it directs its knowledge and will on God； for truth is merely the knowledge of God。 It
may be said that there is no morality loftier than this； since its only requisite is to have a clear idea
of God。 The first thing Spinoza speaks of in this regard is the affections： “Everything strives after
self…preservation。 This striving is the actual essence of the thing； and involves only indefinite time；
when referred exclusively to mind； it is termed will； when referred to both mind and body together；
it is called desire。 Determination of the will （volitio） and Idea are one and the same thing。 The
sense of liberty rests on this； that men do not know the determining causes of their actions。 The
affection is a confused Idea； the more clearly and distinctly； therefore； we know the affection； the
more it is under our control。”（11） The influence of the affections； as confused and limited
（inadequate） ideas； upon human action； constitutes therefore； according to Spinoza； human
slavery； of the passionate affections the principal are joy and sorrow； we are in suffering and
slavery in so far as we relate ourselves as a part。（12）
“Our happiness and liberty consist in an enduring and eternal love to God； this intellectual love
follows from the nature of mind in so far as it is regarded as eternal truth through the nature of
God。 The more a man recognizes God's existence and loves Him； the less does he suffer from evil
affections and the less is his fear of death。”（13） Spinoza requires in addition the true kind of
knowledge。 There are； according to him； three kinds of knowledge； in the first； which he calls
opinion and imagination； he includes the knowledge which we obtain from an individual object
through the senses — a knowledge fragmentary and ill…arranged — also knowledge drawn from
signs； pictorial conceptions and memory。 The second kind of knowledge is for Spinoza that which
we derive from general conceptions and adequate ideas of the properties of things。 The third is
intuitive knowledge （scientia intuitiva） which rises from the adequate idea of the formal essence
of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things。”（14） Regarding
this last he then says： “The nature of reason is not to contemplate things as contingent； but as
necessary 。 。 。 to think of all things under a certain form of eternity （sub quadam specie
？ternitati