Spinoza for thus annihilating them。 Those who defame him in such a way as this are therefore not
aiming at maintaining God； but at maintaining the finite and the worldly； they do not fancy their own
extinction and that of the world。 Spinoza's system is absolute pantheism and monotheism elevated
into thought。 Spinozism is therefore very far removed from being atheism in the ordinary sense； but
in the sense that God is not conceived as spirit； it is atheism。 However； in the same way many
theologians are also atheists who speak of God only as the Almighty Supreme Being； etc。； who
refuse to acknowledge God； and who admit the validity and truth of the finite。 They are many
degrees worse than Spinoza。
The second point to be considered is the method adopted by Spinoza for setting forth his
philosophy； it is the demonstrative method of geometry as employed by Euclid； in which we find
definitions； explanations； axioms； and theorems。 Even Descartes made it his starting…point that
philosophic propositions must be mathematically handled and proved； that they must have the very
same evidence as mathematics。 The mathematical method is considered superior to all others； on
account of the nature of its evidence； and it is natural that independent knowledge in its
re…awakening lighted first upon this form； of which it saw so brilliant an example。 The mathematical
method is； however； ill…adapted for speculative content； and finds its proper place only in the finite
sciences of the understanding。 In modern times Jacobi has asserted （Werke； Vol。 IV。 Section I。
pp。 217…223） that all demonstration； all scientific knowledge leads back to Spinozism； which alone
is a logical method of thought； and because it must lead thither； it is really of no service whatever；
but immediate knowledge is what we must depend on。 It may be conceded to Jacobi that the
method of demonstration leads to Spinozism； if we understand thereby merely the method of
knowledge belonging to the understanding。 But the fact is that Spinoza is made a testing…point in
modern philosophy； so that it may really be said： You are either a Spinozist or not a philosopher at
all。 This being so； the mathematical and demonstrative method of Spinoza would seem to be only a
defect in the external form； but it is the fundamental defect of the whole position。 In this method the
nature of philosophic knowledge and the object thereof； are entirely misconceived； for
mathematical knowledge and method are merely formal in character and consequently altogether
unsuited for philosophy。 Mathematical knowledge exhibits its proof on the existent object as such；
not on the object as conceived； the Notion is lacking throughout； the content of Philosophy；
however； is simply the Notion and that which is comprehended by the Notion。 Therefore this
Notion as the knowledge of the essence is simply one assumed； which falls within the philosophic
subject； and this is what represents itself to be the method peculiar to Spinoza's philosophy。 Of
this demonstrative manner we have already seen these examples： The definitions from which
Spinoza takes his start — as in geometry a commencement is made with the line； triangle； &c。 —
concern universal determinations； such as cause of itself； the finite； substance； attribute； mode； and
so on； which are solely and simply accepted and assumed； not deduced； nor proved to be
necessary； for Spinoza is not aware of how he arrives at these individual determinations。 He
further speaks of axioms； for instance （Ethic。 P。 I。 Ax。 I。 p。 36）： “What is； is either in itself or in
another。” The determinations “in itself” and “in another” are not shown forth in their necessity：
neither is this disjunction proved； it is merely assumed。 The propositions have； as such； a subject
and predicate which are not similar。 When the predicate is proved of the subject and necessarily
combined with it； the discrepancy remains that the one as universal is related to the other as
particular： therefore even although the relation is proved； there is present at the same time a
secondary relation。 Mathematical science； in its true propositions respecting a whole； escapes
from the difficulty by proving also the converse of the propositions； in this way obtaining for them a
special definiteness by proving each proposition in both ways。 True propositions may； therefore；
be looked on as definitions； and the conversion is the proof of the proposition in the form in which
it is expressed。 But this means of escaping the difficulty Philosophy cannot well employ； since the
subject of which something is proved is itself only the Notion or the universal； and the proposition
form is therefore quite superfluous and out of place。 What has the form of the subject is in the form
of an existent thing； as contrasted with the universal； the content of the proposition。 The existent
thing is taken as signifying existent in the ordinary sense； it is the word which we use in every…day
life； and of which we have a conception that has nothing of the Notion in it。 The converse of a
proposition would simply read like this： The Notion is that which is thus popularly conceived。 This
proof from the usage of language — that we also understand this to be the meaning in every…day
life； or in other words that the name is correct — has no philosophic significance。 But if the
proposition is not one like this； but an ordinary proposition； and if the predicate is not the Notion；
but some general term or other； a predicate of the subject； such propositions are really not
philosophic： we might instance the statement that substance is one and not several； but only that in
which substance and unity are the same。 Or； in other words； this unity of the two moments is the
very thing which the proof has to demonstrate； it is the Notion or the essence。 In this case it looks
as if the proposition were the matter of chief importance； the truth。 But if in these really only
so…called propositions； subject and predicate are in truth not alike； because one is individual and
the other universal； their relation is essential； i。e。； the reason for which they are one。 The proof has
here a false position indeed； as if that subject were implicit or in itself； whereas subject and
predicate are； fundamentally even； moments in separation； in the judgment “God is One；” the
subject itself is universal； since it resolves itself into unity。 On the other side it is implied in this false
position that the proof is brought in from outside merely； as in mathematics from a preceding
proposition； and that the proposition is not therefore conceived through itself； thus we see the
ordinary method of proof take its middle term； the principle； from anywhere it can； in the same
way as in classification it takes its principle of classification。 The proposition is then； as it were； a
secondary affair； but we must ask if this proposition is true。 The result as proposition ought to be
truth； but is only knowledge。 The movement of knowledge； as proof； falls therefore； in the third
place； outside of the proposition； which ought to be the truth。 The essential moments of the system
are really already completely contained in the pre…suppositions of the definitions； from which all
further proofs have merely to be deduced。 But whence have we these categories which here
appear as definitions？ We find them doubtless in ourselves； in scientific culture。 The existence of
the understanding； the will； extension； is therefore not developed from infinite substance； but it is
directly expressed in these determinations； and that quite naturally； for of a truth there exists the
One into which everything enters； in order to be absorbed therein； but out of which nothing comes。
For as Spinoza has set up the great proposition； all determination implies negation （supra； p。 267）；
and as of everything； even of thought in contrast to extension； it may be shown that it is determined
and finite； what is essential in it rests upon negation。 Therefore God alone is the positive； the
affirmative； and consequently the one substance； all other things； on the contrary； are only
modifications of this substance； and are nothing in and for themselves。 Simple determination or
negation belongs only to form； but is quite another thing from absolute determinateness or
negativity； which is absolute form； in this way of looking at it negation is the negation of negation；
and therefore true affirmation。 This negative self…conscious moment； the movement of knowledge；
which pursues its way in the thought which is present before us； is however certainly lacking to the
content of Spinoza's philosophy； or at least it is only externally associated with it； since it falls
within self…consciousness。 That is to say； thoughts form the content； but they are not self…conscious
thoughts or Notions： the content signifies thought； as pure abstract self…consciousness； but an
unreasoning knowledge； into which the individual does not enter： the content has not the
signification of 'I。' Therefore the case is as in mathematics； a proof is certainly given； conviction
must follow； but yet the matter fails to be understood。 There is a rigid necessity in the proof； to
which the moment of self…consciousness is lacking； the 'I' disappears； gives itself altogether up；
merely withers away。 Spinoza's procedure is therefore quite correct； yet the individual proposition
is false； seeing that it expresses only one side of the negation。 The understanding has
determinations which do not contradict one another； contradiction the understanding cannot suffer。
The negation of negation is； however； contradiction； for in that it negates negation as simple
determination； it is on the one hand affirmation； but on the other hand also really negation； and this
contradiction； which is a matter pertaining to reason； is lacking in the case of Spinoza。 There is
lacking the infinite form； spirituality and liberty。 I have already mentioned before this （pp。 93； 94；
129…137） that Lullus and Bruno attempted to draw up a system of form； which should embrace
and comprehend the one substance which organizes itself into the universe； this attempt Spinoza
did not make。
Because negation was thus