or abrogates its subjectivity； i。e。； how by means of thought God is to be again brought about； who
at an earlier time and at the beginning of this period was recognized as alone the true。 This is what
we have to consider in the last period； in dealing with Kant； Fichte； and Schelling。
1。 S？mmtliche Schriften； Vol。 XXXIX。 （Berlin u。 Stettin； 1828）； pp。 111； 112。
2。 Lessing's S？mmtliche Schriften； Vol。 XXIX。 pp。 122； 123。
Section Three： Recent German Philosophy
A。 Jacobi。
In connection with Kant we must here begin by speaking of Jacobi； whose philosophy is
contemporaneous with that of Kant； in both of these the advance beyond the preceding period is
very evident。 The result in the two cases is much the same； although both the starting point and the
method of progression are somewhat different。 In Jacobi's case the stimulus was given mainly by
French philosophy； with which he was very conversant； and also by German metaphysics； while
Kant began rather from the English side； that is； from the scepticism of Hume。 Jacobi； in that
negative attitude which he preserved as well as Kant； kept before him the objective aspect of the
method of knowledge； and specially considered it； for he declared knowledge to be in its content
incapable of recognizing the Absolute： the truth must be concrete； present； but not finite。 Kant
does not consider the content； but took the view of knowledge being subjective； and for this
reason he declared it to be incapable of recognizing absolute existence。 To Kant knowledge is
thus a knowledge of phenomena only； not because the categories are merely limited and finite； but
because they are subjective。 To Jacobi； on the other hand； the chief point is that the categories are
not merely subjective； but that they themselves are conditioned。 This is an essential difference
between the two points of view； even if they both arrive at the same result。
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi； born at Düsseldorf in 1743； held office first in the Duchy of Berg； and
then in Bavaria。 He studied in Geneva and Paris； associating in the former place with Bonnet and
in the latter with Diderot。 Jacobi was a man of the highest character and culture。 He was long
occupied with State affairs； and in Düsseldorf he held a public office which was connected with
the administration of the finance department in the State。 At the time of the French Revolution he
was obliged to retire。 As a Bavarian official he went to Munich； there became President of the
Academy of Sciences in 1804； which office he； however； resigned in 1812； for in the Napoleonic
period Protestants were decried as demagogues。 He lived at Munich till the end of his life； and
died at the same place on the 10th of March； 1819。（1）
In the year 1785； Jacobi published Letters on Spinoza； which were written in 1783； on the
occasion of the dispute with Mendelssohn above…mentioned （p。 406）； for in none of his writings
did Jacobi develop his philosophy systematically； he set it forth in letters only。 When Mendelssohn
wished to write a life of Lessing； Jacobi sent to ask him if he knew that “Lessing was a Spinozist”
（Jacobi's Werke； Vol。 IV。 Sec。 1； pp。 39； 40）。 Mendelssohn was displeased at this； and it was the
occasion of the correspondence。 In the course of the dispute it was made evident that those who
held themselves to be professed philosophers and possessed of a monopoly of Lessing's
friendship； such as Nicolai； Mendelssohn； &c。； knew nothing about Spinozism； not only was there
manifested in them the superficial character of their philosophic insight； but ignorance as well； with
Mendelssohn； for instance； this was shown respecting even the outward history of the Spinozistic
philosophy； and much more regarding the inward （Jacobi's Werke； Vol。 IV。 Sec。 1； p。 91）。 That
Jacobi asserted Lessing to be a Spinozist； and gave a high place to the French — this serious
statement came to these good men as a thunderbolt from the blue。 They — the self…satisfied；
self…possessed； superior persons — were quite surprised that he also made pretensions to
knowledge； and of such a “dead dog” as Spinoza （ibidem； p。 68）。 Explanations followed upon
this； in which Jacobi further developed his philosophic views。
Mendelssohn is directly opposed to Jacobi； for Mendelssohn took his stand on cognition； placed
true existence immediately in thought and conception； and maintained： “What I cannot think as true
does not trouble me as doubt。 A question which I do not understand； I cannot answer； it is for me
as good as no question at all。〃（2） He continued to argue on these same lines。 His proof of the
existence of God thus carries with it this necessity of thought； viz。 that actuality must plainly be in
thought； and a thinker must be pre…supposed； or the possibility of the actual is in the thinker。 “What
no thinking Being conceives as possible is not possible； and what is thought by no thinking creature
as actual cannot be actual in fact。 If we take away from anything whatsoever the conception
formed by a thinking Being that that thing is possible or actual； the thing itself is done away with。”
The Notion of the thing is thus to man the essence of the same。 “No finite Being can think the
actuality of a thing in its perfection as actual； and still less can he perceive the possibility and
actuality of all present things。 There must thus be a thinking Being or an understanding which in the
most perfect way thinks the content of all possibilities as possible； and the content of all actualities
as actual； i。e。 there must be an infinite understanding； and this is God。〃（3） Here on the one hand
we see a unity of thought and Being； on the other the absolute unity as infinite understanding — the
former is the self…consciousness which is apprehended as finite merely。 Actuality； Being； has its
possibility in thought； or its possibility is thought； it is not a process from possibility to actuality； for
the possibility remains at home in the actuality。
Jacobi maintains against these demands of thought — and this in one view is the chief thought in his
philosophy — that every method of their demonstration leads to fatalism； atheism； and
Spinozism；（4） and presents God as derived and founded upon something else； for comprehending
Him signifies demonstrating His dependence。 Jacobi thus asserts that mediate knowledge consists
in giving a cause of something which has in its turn a finite effect； and so on； so that a knowledge
such as this can all through relate to the finite only。
Jacobi further states upon this subject； in the first place； that 〃Reason〃 — later on when he
distinguished reason and understanding （of which more hereafter（5））； he altered it to
understanding（6） … 〃can never bring to light more than the conditions of what is conditioned；
natural laws and mechanism。 We comprehend a thing when we can deduce it from its proximate
causes；” and not from the remoter causes； the most remote and quite universal cause is always
God。 “Or” we know the thing if we “perceive its immediate conditions as they come in due
succession。 Thus； for instance； we comprehend a circle when we can clearly represent to
ourselves the mechanism of its origination or its physical conditions； we know the syllogistic
formul？ when we have actually come to know the laws to which the human understanding is
subject in judgment and conclusion； its physical nature and its mechanism。 For this reason we have
no conceptions of qualities as such； but only intuitions。 Even of our present existence we have a
feeling only； but no conceptions。 Genuine conceptions we have merely of figure； number； position；
movement and the forms of thought； qualities are known and understood； if they are traced back
to these and objectively annulled。” This is undoubtedly really finite knowledge； which is to give
the determinate conditions of anything determinate； to demonstrate it as resulting from another
cause； in such a way that each condition is again conditioned and finite。 Jacobi continues： “The
business of reason is really progressive union and connection； and its speculative business is union
and connection in accordance with the known laws of necessity； i。e。 of identity。 Everything that
reason can bring forth by means of analysis； combination； judgment； conclusion； and
re…conception； consists in nothing but things of nature” （i。e。 finite things）； “and reason itself； as a
limited existence； belongs to these things。 But the whole of nature； the sum of all conditioned
existence； cannot reveal more to the investigating understanding than what is contained in it；
namely； manifold existence； changes； a succession of forms” （the conditioned）； “and not an actual
beginning” （of the world）； “nor a real principle of any objective existence。〃（7）
But Jacobi in the second place here accepts reason in a wider sense and says： “If we understand
by reason the principle of knowledge generally； it is the mind from which the whole living nature of
man is constituted； through it man arises； he is a form which it has adopted。” With this Jacobi's
view of the attempt to know the unconditioned is connected。 “I take the whole human being and
find that his consciousness is composed of two original conceptions； the conceptions of the
conditioned and the unconditioned。 Both are inseparably bound up with one another； and yet in
such a way that the conception of the conditioned presupposes the conception of the
unconditioned； and can be given in this alone。 We are just as certain of its existence as we are of
our own conditioned existence； or even more so。 Since our conditioned existence rests on an
infinitude of mediations； there is opened up to our investigation a vast field which； for the sake of
our preservation even； we are forced to work upon。” It would； however； be quite another thing
to wish to know the unconditioned apart from this practical end。 However Jacobi here remarks；
“To try to discover the conditions of the unconditioned； to find a possibility for absolute necessity；
and to construct this last in order to be able to comprehend it； is what we undertake when we
endeavour to make nature an existence comprehensible to u