Handbuch d。 Geschichte d。 Philosophie； Vol。 III。 § 157； p。 349。
Section Three： Recent German Philosophy
D。 Schelling。
It was Schelling； finally； who made the most important； or； from a philosophic point of view； the
only important advance upon the philosophy of Fichte； his philosophy rose higher than that of
Fichte； though undoubtedly it stood in close connection with it； indeed； he himself professes to be
a Fichtian。 Now the philosophy of Schelling from the first admitted the possibility of a knowledge
of God； although it likewise started from the philosophy of Kant； which denies such knowledge。
At the same time Schelling makes Jacobi's principle of the unity of thought and Being fundamental；
although he begins to determine it more closely。（1） To him concrete unity is this； that the finite is no
more true than the infinite； the subjective idea no more than objectivity； and that combinations in
which both untruths are brought together in their independence in relation to one another； are
likewise combinations of untruths merely。 Concrete unity can only be comprehended as process
and as the living movement in a proposition。 This inseparability is in God alone； the finite； on the
other hand； is that which has this separability within it。 In so far as it is a truth it is likewise this
unity； but in a limited sphere； and for that reason in the separability of both moments。
Frederick Wilhelm Joseph Schelling； born on the 27th January； 1775； at Schorndorf（2） in
Würtemberg； studied in Leipzig and Jena； where he came to be on terms of great intimacy with
Fichte。 In the year 1807 he became secretary of the Academy of Science in Munich。 We cannot
with propriety deal fully with his life； for he is still living。（3）
Schelling worked out his philosophy in view of the public。 The series of his philosophic writings
also represents the history of his philosophic development and the gradual process by which he
raised himself above the Fichtian principle and the Kantian content with which he began。 It does
not thus contain a sequence of separately worked out divisions of Philosophy； but only successive
stages in his own development。 If we ask for a final work in which we shall find his philosophy
represented with complete definiteness none such can be named。 Schelling's first writings are still
quite Fichtian； and it is only by slow degrees that he worked himself free of Fichte's form。 The
form of the ego has the ambiguity of being capable of signifying either the absolute Ego or God； or
ego in my particularity；（4） this supplied the first stimulus to Schelling。 His first and quite short work
of four sheets which he wrote in 1795 at Tübingen； while still at the university； was called； “On the
Possibility of any Form of Philosophy” ； it contains propositions respecting the Fichtian
philosophy only。 The next work； “Of the Ego as principle of Philosophy； or on the Unconditioned
in Human Knowledge” （Tübingen； 1795）； is likewise quite Fichtian； in this case； however； it is
from a wider and more universal point of view； since the ego is therein grasped as an original
identity。（5） We find； however； a summary of the Fichtian principle and the Kantian mode of
presentation： “It is only by something being originally set in opposition to the ego； and by the ego
being itself posited as the manifold （in time）； that it is possible for the ego to get beyond the unity
which belongs to it of merely being posited； and that； for example； it posits the same content on
more than one occasion。” （6） Schelling then passed on to natural philosophy； adopted Kantian
forms and reflective determinations； such as those of repulsion and attraction； from Kant's
“Metaphysics of Nature；” and likewise dealt with quite empirical phenomena in expressions taken
from Kant。 All his first works on this subject come under this category； viz。” “Ideas towards a
Philosophy of Nature；” 1797； “On the World…Soul；” 1798； the second edition of which
possesses appendices which are entirely inconsistent with what goes before。 In the writings of
Herder and Kielmeyer（7） we find sensibility； irritability； and reproduction dealt with； as also their
laws； such as that the greater the sensibility the less the irritability； &c。 — just as the powers or
potencies were dealt with by Eschenmayer。 It was only later on in relation to these that Schelling
first apprehended nature in the categories of thought； and made general attempts of a more definite
character in the direction of greater scientific development。 It was only through what had been
accomplished by these men that he was enabled to come into public notice so young。 The spiritual
and intellectual side； morality and the state； he represented on the other hand purely in accordance
with Kantian principles： thus in his “Transcendental Idealism；” although it was written from a
Fichtian point of view； he goes no further than Kant did in his “Philosophy of Rights” and his
work “On Eternal Peace。” Schelling； indeed； later on published a separate treatise on Freedom；
deeply speculative in character； this； however； remains isolated and independent； and deals with
this one point alone； in Philosophy； however； nothing isolated can be worked out or developed。 In
the various presentations of his views Schelling on each occasion began again from the beginning；
because； as we may see； what went before did not satisfy him； he has ever pressed on to seek a
new form； and thus he had tried various forms and terminologies in succession without ever setting
forth one complete and consistent whole。 His principal works in this connection are the “First
Sketch of a System of Natural Philosophy；” 1799； the “System of Transcendental Idealism；”
1800； one of his most carefully throughout works； “Bruno； a Dialogue on the Divine and Natural
Principle of Things；” 1802； “Journal of Speculative Physics；” 1801； “New Journal of
Speculative Physics；” 1802 et seq。 In the second number of the second volume of his “Journal of
Speculative Physics；” Schelling made the commencement of a detailed treatment of the whole of
his philosophy。 Here he likewise starts to a certain measure； though unconsciously； from the
Fichtian form of construction； but the idea is already present that nature equally with knowledge is
a system of reason。
It is not feasible here to go into details respecting what is called the philosophy of Schelling； even if
time permitted。 For it is not yet a scientific whole organized in all its branches； since it rather
consists in certain general elements which do not fluctuate with the rest of his opinions。 Schelling's
philosophy must still be regarded as in process of evolution； and it has not yet ripened into fruit；（8）
we can hence give a general idea of it only。
When Schelling made his first appearance the demands put forward by Philosophy were as
follows。 With Descartes thought and extension were in some incomprehensible way united in God；
with Spinoza it was as motionless substance； and beyond this point of view neither of them ever
passed。 Later on we saw the form develop； partly in the sciences and partly in the Kantian
philosophy。 Finally； in the Fichtian philosophy； the form was subjectivity on its own account； from
which all determinations were held to develop。 What is thus demanded is that this subjectivity of
infinite form which we saw dying into irony or arbitrariness （pp。 507…510） should be delivered
from its one…sidedness in order to be united with objectivity and substantiality。 To put it otherwise；
the substance of Spinoza should not be apprehended as the unmoved； but as the intelligent； as a
form which possesses activity within itself of necessity； so that it is the forming power of nature；
but at the same time knowledge and comprehension。 This then is the object of Philosophy； it is not
the formal union of Spinoza that is demanded； nor the subjective totality of Fichte； but totality with
the infinite form。 We see this developing in the philosophy of Schelling。
1。 In one of his earlier writings； the “System of Transcendental Idealism；” which we shall
consider first of all； Schelling represented transcendental philosophy and natural philosophy as the
two sides of scientific knowledge。 Respecting the nature of the two； he expressly declared himself
in this work； where he once more adopts a Fichtian starting…point： “All knowledge rests on the
harmony of an objective with a subjective。” In the common sense of the words this would be
allowed； absolute unity； where the Notion and the reality are undistinguished in the perfected Idea；
is the Absolute alone； or God； all else contains an element of discord between the objective and
subjective。 “We may give the name of nature to the entire objective content of our knowledge； the
entire subjective content； on the other hand； is called the ego or intelligence。” They are in
themselves identical and presupposed as identical。 The relation of nature to intelligence is given by
Schelling thus： “Now if all knowledge has two poles which mutually presuppose and demand one
another； there must be two fundamental sciences； and it must be impossible to start from the one
pole without being driven to the other。” Thus nature is impelled to spirit； and spirit to nature；
either may be given the first place； and both must come to pass。 “If the objective is made the
chief；” we have the natural sciences as result； and “the necessary tendency；” the end； “of all
natural science thus is to pass from nature to intelligence。 This is the meaning of the effort to
connect natural phenomena with theory。 The highest perfection of natural science would be the
perfect spiritualization of all natural laws into laws of intuitive perception and thought。 The
phenomenal （the material element） must entirely disappear； and laws （the formal element） alone
remain。 Hence it comes to pass that the more that which is in conformity with law breaks forth in
nature itself； the more the outward covering disappears； the phenomena themselves become more
spiritual； and finally cease altogether。 The perfect theory of nature would be that by which the
whole of nature should be resolved i