of ； there is included a manifest repugnance
and inconsistency。 But this cannot be said of the notion of
Spirit。 That ideas should exist in what doth not perceive； or be
produced by what doth not act； is repugnant。 But； it is no
repugnancy to say that a perceiving thing should be the subject
of ideas； or an active thing the cause of them。 It is granted we
have neither an immediate evidence nor a demonstrative knowledge
of the existence of other finite spirits； but it will not thence
follow that such spirits are on a foot with material substances：
if to suppose the one be inconsistent； and it be not inconsistent
to suppose the other； if the one can be inferred by no argument；
and there is a probability for the other； if we see signs and
effects indicating distinct finite agents like ourselves； and see
no sign or symptom whatever that leads to a rational belief of
Matter。 I say； lastly； that I have a notion of Spirit； though I
have not； strictly speaking； an idea of it。 I do not perceive it
as an idea； or by means of an idea； but know it by reflexion。
。 Notwithstanding all you have said； to me it seems
that； according to your own way of thinking； and in consequence
of your own principles； it should follow that are only a
system of floating ideas； without any substance to support them。
Words are not to be used without a meaning。 And； as there is no
more meaning in than in ； the one is to be exploded as well as the other。
。 How often must I repeat； that I know or am conscious
of my own being； and that am not my ideas； but
somewhat else； a thinking； active principle that perceives；
knows； wifls； and operates about ideas。 I know that I； one ｛234｝
and the same self； perceive both colours and sounds： that a
colour cannot perceive a sound； nor a sound a colour： that I am
therefore one individual principle； distinct from colour and
sound； and； for the same reason； from aft other sensible things
and inert ideas。 But； I am not in like manner conscious either of
the existence or essence of Matter。 On the contrary； I know that
nothing inconsistent can exist； and that the existence of Matter
implies an inconsistency。 Farther； I know what I mean when I
affirm that there is a spiritual substance or support of ideas；
that is； that a spirit knows and perceives ideas。 But； I do not
know what is meant when it is said that an unperceiving substance
hath inherent in it and supports either ideas or the archetypes
of ideas。 There is therefore upon the whole no parity of case
between Spirit and Matter。＇＇8＇
。 I own myself satisfied in this point。 But； do you in
earnest think the real existence of sensible things consists in
their being actually perceived？ If so； how comes it that all
mankind distinguish between them？ Ask the first man you meet； and
he shall tell you； is one thing； and
is another。
。 am content； Hylas； to appeal to the common sense
of the world for the truth of my notion。 Ask the gardener why he
thinks yonder cherry…tree exists in the garden； and he shall tell
you； because he sees and feels it； in a word； because he
perceives it by his senses。 Ask him why he thinks an orange…tree
not to be there； and he shall tell you； because he does not
perceive it。 What he perceives by sense； that he terms a real；
being； and saith it ； but； that which is not
perceivable； the same； he saith； hath no being。
。 Yes； Philonous； I grant the existence of a sensible
thing consists in being perceivable； but not in being actually
perceived。
。 And what is perceivable but an idea？ And can an idea
exist without being actually perceived？ These are points long
since agreed between us。
。 But； be your opinion never so true； yet surely you
will not deny it is shocking； and contrary to the common sense of
men。 ｛235｝ Ask the fellow whether yonder tree hath an existence
out of his mind： what answer think you he would make？
。 The same that I should myself； to wit； that it doth
exist out of his mind。 But then to a Christian it cannot surely
be shocking to say； the real tree； existing without his mind； is
truly known and comprehended by （that is ） the
infinite mind of God。 Probably he may not at first glance be
aware of the direct and immediate proof there is of this；
inasmuch as the very being of a tree； or any other sensible
thing； implies a mind wherein it is。 But the point itself he
cannot deny。 The question between the Materialists and me is not；
whether things have a existence out of the mind of this or
that person； but whether they have an existence；
distinct from being perceived by God； and exterior to all minds。
This indeed some heathens and philosophers have affirmed； but
whoever entertains notions of the Deity suitable to the Holy
Scriptures will be of another opinion。
。 But； according to your notions； what difference is
there between real things； and chimeras formed by the
imagination； or the visions of a dream since they are all
equally in the mind？
。 The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and
indistinct； they have； besides； an entire dependence on the will。
But the ideas perceived by sense； that is； real things； are more
vivid and clear； and； being imprinted on the mind by a spirit
distinct from us； have not the like dependence on our will。 There
is therefore no danger of confounding these with the foregoing：
and there is as little of confounding them with the visions of a
dream； which are dim； irregular； and confused。 And； though they
should happen to be never so lively and natural； yet； by their
not being connected； and of a piece with the preceding and
subsequent transactions of our lives； they might easily be
distinguished from realities。 In short； by whatever method you
distinguish on your scheme； the same； it
is evident； will hold also upon mine。 For； it must be； I presume；
by some perceived difference； and I am not for depriving you of
any one thing that you perceive。
。 But still； Philonous； you hold； there is nothing in
the world but spirits and ideas。 And this； you must needs
acknowledge； sounds very oddly。
。 I own the word ； not being commonly used for
； sounds something out of the way。 My reason for using it
was； because a necessary relation to the mind is understood to
｛236｝ be implied by that term； and it is now commonly used by
philosophers to denote the immediate objects of the
understanding。 But； however oddly the proposition may sound in
words； yet it includes nothing so very strange or shocking in its
sense； which in effect amounts to no more than this； to wit； that
there are only things perceiving； and things perceived； or that
every unthinking being is necessarily； and from …the very nature
of its existence； perceived by some mind； if not by a finite
created mind； yet certainly by the infinite mind of God； in whom
〃we five； and move； and have our being。〃 Is this as strange as to
say； the sensible qualities are not on the objects： or that we
cannot be sure of the existence of things； or know any thing of
their real natures though we both see and feel them； and
perceive them by all our senses？
。 And； in consequence of this； must we not think there
are no such things as physical or corporeal causes； but that a
Spirit is the immediate cause of all the phenomena in nature？ Can
there be anything more extravagant than this？
。 Yes； it is infinitely more extravagant to say a
thing which is inert operates on the mind； and which is
unperceiving is the cause of our perceptions； ＇without any regard
either to consistency； or the old known axiom； ＇。＇9＇ Besides； that
which to you； I know not for what reason； seems so extravagant is
no more than the Holy Scriptures assert in a hundred places。 In
them God is represented as the sole and immediate Author of all
those effects which some heathens and philosophers are wont to
ascribe to Nature； Matter； Fate； or the like unthinking
principle。 This is so much the constant language of Scripture
that it were needless to confirm it by citations。
。 You are not aware； Philonous； that in making God the
immediate Author of all the motions in nature； you make Him the
Author of murder； sacrilege； adultery； and the like heinous sins。
。 In answer to that； I observe； first； that the
imputation of guilt is the same； whether a person commits an
action with or without an instrument。 In case therefore you
suppose God to act by the mediation of an instrument or occasion；
called ； you as truly make Him the author of sin as I；
who think Him the immediate agent in all those operations
vulgarly ascribed to Nature。 I farther observe that sin or moral
turpitude ｛237｝ doth not consist in the outward physical action
or motion； but in the internal deviation of the will from the
laws of reason and religion。 This is plain； in that the killing
an enemy in a battle； or putting a criminal legally to death； is
not thought sinful； though the outward act be the very same with
that in the case of murder。 Since； therefore； sin doth not
consist in the physical action； the making God an immediate cause
of all such actions is not making Him the Author of sin。 Lastly；
I have nowhere said that God is the only agent who produces all
the motions in bodies。 It is true I have denied there are any
other agents besides spirits； but this is very consistent with
allowing to thinking rational beings； in the production of
motions； the use of limited powers； ultimately indeed derived
from God； but immediately under the direction of their own wills；
which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their
actions。
。 But the denying Matter； Philonous； or corporeal
Substance； there is the point。 You can never persuade me that
this is not repugnant to the universal sense of mankind。 Were our
dispute to be determined by most voices； I am confident y