this is not repugnant to the universal sense of mankind。 Were our
dispute to be determined by most voices； I am confident you would
give up the point； without gathering the votes。
。 I wish both our opinions were fairly stated and
submitted to the judgment of men who had plain common sense；
without the prejudices of a learned education。 Let me be
represented as one who trusts his senses； who thinks he knows the
things he sees and feels； and entertains no doubts of their
existence； and you fairly set forth with all your doubts； your
paradoxes； and your scepticism about you； and I shall willingly
acquiesce in the determination of any indifferent person。 That
there is no substance wherein ideas can exist beside spirit is to
me evident。 And that the objects immediately perceived are ideas；
is on all hands agreed。 And that sensible qualities are objects
immediately perceived no one can deny。 It is therefore evident
there can be no of those qualities but spirit； in
which they exist； not by way of mode or property； but as a thing
perceived in that which perceives it。 I deny therefore that there
is … of the objects of sense； and that there is any material substance。 But if by
is meant only ； which
is seen and felt （and the unphilosophical part of the world； I
dare say； mean no more） then I am more certain of matter's
existence than you or any other philosopher pretend to be。 If
there be anything which makes ；die generality of mankind ｛238｝
averse from the notions I espouse； it is a misapprehension that I
deny the reality of sensible things。 But； as it is you who are
guilty of that； and not 1； it follows that in truth their
aversion is against your notions and not mine。 I do therefore
assert that I am as certain as of my own being； that there are
bodies or corporeal substances （meaning the things I perceive by
my senses）； and that； granting this； the bulk of mankind will
take no thought about； nor think themselves at all concerned in
the fate of those unknown natures； and philosophical quiddities；
which some men are so fond of。
。 What say you to this？ Since； according to you； men
judge of the reality of things by their senses； how can a man be
mistaken in thinking the moon a plain lucid surface； about a foot
in diameter； or a square tower； seen at a distance； round； or an
oar； with one end in the water； crooked？
。 He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he
actually perceives； but in the inference he makes from his
present perceptions。 Thus； in the case of the oar； what he
immediately perceives by sight is certainly crooked； and so far
he is in the right。 But if he thence conclude that upon taking
the oar out of the water he shall perceive the same crookedness；
or that it would affect his touch as crooked things are wont to
do： in that he is mistaken。 In like manner； if he shall conclude
from what he perceives in one station； that； in case he advances
towards the moon or tower； he should still be affected with the
like ideas； he is mistaken。 But his mistake lies not in what he
perceives immediately； and at present； （it being a manifest
contradiction to suppose he should err in respect of that） but in
the wrong judgment he makes concerning the ideas he apprehends to
be connected with those immediately perceived： or； concerning the
ideas that； from what he perceives at present； he imagines would
be perceived in other circumstances。 The case is the same with
regard to the Copernican system。 We do not here perceive any
motion of the earth： but it were erroneous thence to conclude；
that； in case we were placed at as great a distance from that as
we are now from the other planets； we should not then perceive
its motion。
。 I understand you； and must needs own you say things
plausible enough。 But； give me leave to put you in mind of ｛239｝
one thing。 Pray； Philonous； were you not formerly as positive
that Matter existed； as you are now that it does not？
。 I was。 But here lies the difference。 Before； my
positiveness was founded； without examination； upon prejudice；
but now； after inquiry； upon evidence。
。 After all； it seems our dispute is rather about words
than things。 We agree in the thing； but differ in the name。 That
we are affected with ideas is evident； and it is
no less evident that there must be （I will not say archetypes；
but） Powers without the mind； corresponding to those ideas。 And；
as these Powers cannot subsist by themselves； there is some
subject of them necessarily to be admitted； which I call
； and you call 。 This is all the difference。
。 Pray； Hylas； is that powerful Being； or subject of
powers； extended？
。 It hath not extension； but it hath the power to raise
in you the idea of extension。
。 It is therefore itself unextended？
。 I grant it。
。 Is it not also active？
。 Without doubt。 Otherwise； how could we attribute
powers to it？
。 Now let me ask you two questions： ； Whether
it be agreeable to the usage either of philosophers or others to
give the name to an unextended active being？ And；
； Whether it be not ridiculously absurd to misapply
names contrary to the common use of language？
。 Well then； let it not be called Matter； since you
will have it so； but some distinct from Matter and
Spirit。 For what reason is there why you should call it Spirit？
Does not the notion of spirit imply that it is thinking； as well
as active and unextended？
。 My reason is this： because I have a mind to have
some notion of meaning in what I say： but I have no notion of any
action distinct from volition； neither。 can I conceive volition
to be anywhere but in a spirit： therefore； when I speak of an
active being； I am obliged to mean a Spirit。 Beside； what can be
plainer than that a thing which hath no ideas in itself cannot
impart them to me； and； if it hath ideas； surely it must be a
Spirit。 To make you comprehend the point still more ｛240｝ clearly
if it be possible； I assert as well as you that； since we are
affected from without； we must allow Powers to be without； in a
Being distinct from ourselves。 So far we are agreed。 But then we
differ as to the kind of this powerful Being。 I will have it to
be Spirit； you Matter； or I know not what （I may add too； you
know not what） Third Nature。 Thus； I prove it to be Spirit。 From
the effects I see produced； I conclude there are actions； and；
because actions； volitions； and； because there are volitions；
there must be a 。 Again； the things I perceive must have an
existence； they or their archetypes； out of mind： but； being
ideas； neither they nor their archetypes can exist otherwise than
in an understanding； there is therefore an 。 But
will and understanding constitute in the strictest sense a mind
or spirit。 The powerful cause； therefore； of my ideas is in
strict propriety of speech a 。
。 And now I warrant you think you have made the point
very clear； little suspecting that what you advance leads
directly to a contradiction。 Is it not an absurdity to imagine
any imperfection in God？
。 Without a doubt。
。 To suffer pain is an imperfection？
。 It is。
。 Are we not sometimes affected with pain and
uneasiness by some other Being？
。 We are。
。 And have you not said that Being is a Spirit； and is
not that Spirit God？
。 I grant it。
。 But you have asserted that whatever ideas we perceive
from without are in the mind which affects us。 The ideas；
therefore； of pain and uneasiness are in God； or； in other words；
God suffers pain： that is to say； there is an imperfection in the
Divine nature： which； you acknowledged； was absurd。 So you are
caught in a plain contradiction。
。 That God knows or understands all things； and that
He knows； among other things； what pain is； even every sort of
painful sensation； and what it is for His creatures to suffer
pain； I make no question。 But； that God； though He knows and
sometimes causes painful sensations in us； can Himself suffer
pain； I positively deny。 We； who are limited and dependent
spirits； are liable to impressions of sense； the effects of an
｛241｝ external Agent； which； being produced against our wills；
are sometimes painful and uneasy。 But God； whom no external being
can affect； who perceives nothing by sense as we do； whose will
is absolute and independent； causing all things； and liable to be
thwarted or resisted by nothing： it is evident； such a Being as
this can suffer nothing； nor be affected with any painful
sensation； or indeed any sensation at all。 We are chained to a
body： that is to say； our perceptions are connected with
corporeal motions。 By the law of our nature； we are affected upon
every alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body； which
sensible body； rightly considered； is nothing but a complexion of
such qualities or ideas as have no existence distinct from being
perceived by a mind。 So that this connexion of sensations with
corporeal motions means no more than a correspondence in the
order of nature； between two sets of ideas； or things immediately
perceivable。 But God is a Pure Spirit； disengaged from all such
sympathy； or natural ties。 No corporeal motions are attended with
the sensations of pain or pleasure in His mind。 To know
everything knowable； is certainly a perfection； but to endure； or
suffer； or feel anything by sense； is an imperfection。 The
former； I say； agrees to God； but not the latter。 God knows； or
hath ideas； but His ideas are not conveyed to Him by sense； as
ours are。 Your not distinguishing； where there is so manifest a
difference； makes you fancy you see an absurdity where there is
none。
。 But； all this while you have not considered that the
quantity of Matter has been demonstrated to be proportioned to
the gravity of bodies。 And what can withstan