mention that the apprehension of a distant Deity naturally
disposes men to a negligence in their moral actions； which they
would be more cautious of； in case they thought Him immediately
present； and acting on their minds； without the interposition of
Matter； or unthinking second causes。 Then in ：
what difficulties concerning entity in abstract； substantial
forms； hylarchic principles； plastic natures； substance and
accident； principle of individuation； possibility of Matter's
thinking； origin of ideas； the manner how two independent
substances so widely different as ； should
mutually operate on each other？ what difficulties； I say； and
endless disquisitions； concerning these and innumerable other the
like points； do we escape； by supposing only Spirits and ideas？ …
… Even the themselves； if we take away the absolute
existence of extended things； become much more clear and easy；
the most shocking paradoxes and intricate speculations in those
sciences depending on the。 infinite divisibility of finite
extension； which depends on that supposition But what need is
there to insist on the particular sciences？ Is not that
opposition to all science whatsoever； that frenzy of the ancient
and modern Sceptics； built on the same foundation？ Or can you
produce so much as one argument against the reality of corporeal
things； or in behalf of that avowed utter ignorance of their
natures； which doth not suppose their reality to consist in an
external absolute existence？ Upon this supposition； indeed； the
objections from the change of colours in a pigeon's neck； or the
appearance of the broken oar in the water； must be allowed to
have weight。 But these and the like objections vanish； if we do
not maintain the being of absolute external originals； but place
the reality of things in ideas；。 fleeting indeed； and changeable；
however； not changed at random； but according to the fixed
order of nature。 For； herein consists that constancy and truth of
things which secures all the concerns of life； and distinguishes
that which is real from the the fancy。
｛259｝
。 I agree to all you have now said。； and must own that
nothing can incline me to embrace your opinion more than the
advantages I see it is attended with。 I am by nature lazy； and
this would be a mighty abridgment in knowledge。 What doubts； what
hypotheses； what labyrinths of amusement； what fields of
disputation； what an ocean of false learning； may be avoided by
that single notion of ！
。 After all； is there anything farther remaining to be
done？ You may remember you promised to embrace that opinion which
upon examination should appear most agreeable to Common Sense and
remote from Scepticism。 This； by your own confession； is that
which denies Matter； or the existence of corporeal
things。 Nor is this all； the same notion has been proved several
ways； viewed in different lights； pursued in its consequences；
and all objections against it cleared。 Can there be a greater
evidence of its truth？ or is it possible it should have all the
marks of a true opinion and yet be false？
。 I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in
all respects。 But； what security can I have that I shall still
continue the same full assent to your opinion； and that no
unthought…of objection or difficulty will occur hereafter？
。 Pray； Hylas； do you in other cases； when a point is
once evidently proved； withhold your consent on account of
objections or difficulties it may be liable to？ Are the
difficulties that attend the doctrine of incommensurable
quantities； of the angle of contact； of the asymptotes to curves；
or the like； sufficient to make you hold out against mathematical
demonstration？ Or will you disbelieve the Providence of God；
because there may be some particular things which you know not
how to reconcile with it？ If there are difficulties ； there are at the same time direct and evident
proofs of it。 But for the existence of Matter there is not one
proof； and far more numerous and insurmountable objections lie
against it。 But where are those mighty difficulties you insist
on？ Alas！ you know not where or what they are； something which
may possibly occur hereafter。 If this be a sufficient pretence
for withholding your full assent； you should never yield it to
any proposition； how free soever from exceptions； how clearly and
solidly soever demonstrated。
。 You have satisfied me； Philonous。
。 But； to arm you against all future objections； do
but consider： That which bears equally hard on two contradictory
｛260｝ opinions can be proof against neither。 Whenever； therefore；
any difficulty occurs； try if you can find a solution for it on
the hypothesis of the 。 Be not deceived by words；
but sound your own thoughts。 And in case you cannot conceive it
easier by the help of ； it is plain it can be no
objection against 。 Had you proceeded all along by
this rule； you would probably have spared yourself abundance of
trouble in objecting； since of all your difficulties I challenge
you to shew one that is explained by Matter： nay； which is not
more unintelligible with than without that supposition； and
consequently makes rather for it。 You should
consider； in each particular； whether the difficulty arises from
the …。 If it doth not； you might as
well argue from the infinite divisibility of extension against
the Divine prescience； as from such a difficulty against
。 And yet； upon recollection； I believe you will
find this to have been often； if not always； the case。 You should
likewise take heed not to argue on a 。 One is
apt to say The unknown substances ought to be esteemed real
things； rather than the ideas in our minds： and who can tell but
the unthinking external substance may concur； as a cause or
instrument； in the productions of our ideas？ But is not this
proceeding on a supposition that there are such external
substances？ And to suppose this； is it not begging the question？
But； above all things； you should beware of imposing on yourself
by that vulgar sophism which is called 。 You
talked often as if you thought I maintained the non…existence of
Sensible Things。 Whereas in truth no one can be more thoroughly
assured of their existence than I am。 And it is you who doubt； I
should have said； positively deny it。 Everything that is seen；
felt； heard； or any way perceived by the senses； is； on the
principles I embrace； a real being； but not on yours。 Remember；
the Matter you contend for is an Unknown Somewhat （if indeed it
may be termed ）； which is quite stripped of all
sensible qualities； and can neither be perceived by sense； nor
apprehended by the mind。 Remember I say； that it is not any
object which is hard or soft； hot or cold； blue or white； round
or square； &c。 For all these things I affirm do exist。 Though
indeed I deny they have an existence distinct from being
perceived； or that they exist out of all minds whatsoever。 Think
on these points； let them be attentively considered and still
kept in view。 Otherwise you will not comprehend the state of the
question； without which your objections ｛261｝ will always be wide
of the mark； and； instead of mine； may possibly be directed （as
more than once they have been） against your own notions。
。 I must needs own； Philonous； nothing seems to have
kept me from agreeing with you more than this same 。 In denying Matter；。 at first； glimpse I am tempted to
imagine you deny the things we see and feel： but； upon reflexion；
find there is no ground for it。 What think you； therefore； of
retaining the name ； and applying it to ？ This may be done without any change in your sentiments：
and； believe me； it would be a means of reconciling them to some
persons who may be more shocked at an innovation in words than in
opinion。
。 With all my heart： retain the word ； and
apply it to the objects of sense； if you please； provided you do
not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from their being
perceived。 I shall never quarrel with you for an expression。
； or ； are terms introduced by
philosophers； and； as used by them； imply a sort of independency；
or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a mind： but are
never used by common people； or； if ever； it is to signify the
immediate objects of sense。 One would think； therefore； so long
as the names of all particular things； with the ；
； ； ； and the like； are retained； the
word should be never missed in common talk。 And in
philosophical discourses it seems the best way to leave it quite
out： since there is not； perhaps； any one thing that hath more
favoured and strengthened the depraved bent of the mind towards
Atheism than the use of that general confused term。
。 Well but； Philonous； since I am content to give up
the notion of an unthinking substance exterior to the mind； I
think you ought not to deny me the privilege of using the word
as I please； and annexing it to a collection of sensible
qualities subsisting only in the mind。 I freely own there is no
other substance； in a strict sense； than 。 But I have
been so long accustomed to the that I know not how
to part with it： to say； there is no in the world； is
still shocking to me。 Whereas to say There is no ； if
by that term be meant an unthinking substance existing without
the mind； but if by is meant some sensible thing； whose
existence consists in being perceived； then there is ：
distinction gives it quite another turn； and men will come
into your notions with ｛262｝ small difficulty； when they are
proposed in that manner。 For； after all； the controversy about
in the strict acceptation of it； lies altogether between
you and the philosophers： whose principles