vill2- 第6部分

　and　Bracton　himself。*　In　short；　if　we　accept　them；　we　can　hardly　get　out　of　confusion。　Were　our　text　of　Bracton　much　more　definitely　and　satisfactorily　settled　than　it　is；*　one　would　still　feel　tempted　to　strike　them　out；　as　it　is　we　have　a　text　studded　with　interpolations　and　errors；　and　it　seems　quite　certain　that　'sibi　et　heredibus　suis'　has　got　into　it　simply　because　the　compositor　of　Tottell's　edition　repeated　it　from　the　conclusion　of　the　sentence　immediately　preceding；　and　so　mixed　up　two　cases；　which　were　to　be　distinguished　by　this　very　qualification。　The　four　words　are　missing　in　all　the　MSS。　of　the　British　Museum；　the　Bodleian　and　the　Cambridge　University　Library；*　I　have　no　doubt　that　further　verification　will　only　confirm　my　opinion。　On　my　assumption　Bracton　clearly　distinguishes　between　two　possibilities。　In　one　case　the　deed　simply　binds　the　lord　as　to　a　particular　person；　in　the　other　it　binds　him　in　perpetuity；　and　in　this　latter　case；　as　there　ought　not　to　be　any　heirs　of　a　bondman　but　the　lord；　bondage　is　annihilated　by　the　deed。　It　is　not　annihilated　when　one　person　is　granted　a　certain　privilege　as　to　a　particular　piece　of　land；　and　in　every　other　respect　the　grantee　and　all　his　descendants　remain　unfree：*　　he　has　no　freehold；　but　he　has　a　special　covenant　to　fall　back　upon。　This　seems　to　lie　at　the　root　of　what　Bracton　calls　privileged　villainage　by　covenant　as　distinguished　from　villain　socage。*　　　　　The　reader　may　well　ask　whether　there　are　any　traces　of　such　an　institution　in　practice；　as　it　is　not　likely　that　Bracton　would　have　indulged　in　mere　theoretical　disquisitions　on　such　an　important　point。　Now　it　would　be　difficult　to　find　very　many　instances　in　point；　the　line　between　covenant　and　enfranchisement　was　so　easily　passed；　and　an　incautious　step　would　have　such　unpleasant　consequences　for　landlords；　that　they　kept　as　clear　as　possible　of　any　deeds　which　might　indirectly　destroy　their　claims　as　to　the　persons　of　their　villains。*　On　the　other　hand；　even　privileged　serfs　would　have　a　great　difficulty　in　vindicating　their　rights　on　the　basis　of　covenant　if　they　remained　at　the　same　time　under　the　sway　of　the　lord　in　general。　The　difficulties　on　both　sides　explain　why　Fleta　and　Britton　endorse　only　the　chief　point　of　Bracton's　doctrine；　namely；　the　implied　manumission；　and　do　not　put　the　alternative　as　to　a　covenant　when　heirs　are　not　mentioned。　Still　I　have　come　across　some　traces　in　legal　practice*　of　contracts　in　the　shape　of　the　one　discussed。　A　very　interesting　case　occurred　in　Norfolk　in　1227；　before　Martin　Pateshull　himself。　A　certain　Roger　of　Sufford　gave　a　piece　of　land　to　one　of　his　villains；　William　Tailor；　to　hold　freely　by　free　services；　and　when　Roger　died；　his　son　and　heir　William　of　Sufford　confirmed　the　lease。　When　it　pleased　the　lord　afterwards　to　eject　the　tenant；　this　latter　actually　brought　an　assize　of　novel　disseisin　and　recovered　possession。　Bracton's　marginal　note　to　the　case　runs　thus：　'Note；　that　the　son　of　a　villain　recovered　by　an　assize　of　novel　disseisin　a　piece　of　land　which　his　father　had　held　in　villainage；　because　the　lord　of　the　villain　by　his　charter　gave　it　to　the　son　＇i。e。　to　the　plaintiff＇；　even　without　manumission。'*　The　court　went　in　this　case　even　further　than　Bracton's　treatise　would　have　warranted：　the　villain　was　considered　as　having　the　freehold；　and　an　assize　of　novel　disseisin　was　granted；　but　although　such　a　treatment　of　the　case　was　perhaps　not　altogether　sound；　the　chief　point　on　which　the　contention　rested　is　brought　out　clearly　enough。　There　was　a　covenant；　and　in　consequence　an　action；　although　there　was　no　manumission；　and　it　is　to　this　point　that　the　marginal　note　draws　special　attention。*　　　　　Again；　we　find　in　the　beginning　of　Bracton's　treatise　a　remark*　which　is　quite　out　of　keeping　with　the　doctrine　that　the　villain　had　no　property　to　vindicate　against　his　lord；　it　is　contradicted　by　other　passages　in　the　same　book；　and　deserves　to　be　considered　the　more　carefully　on　that　account。　Our　author　is　enumerating　the　cases　in　which　the　serf　has　an　action　against　his　lord。　He　follows　Azo　closely；　and　mentions　injury　to　life　or　to　limb　as　one　cause。　Azo　goes　on　to　say　that　a　plaint　may　be　originated　by　intollerabilis　injuria；　in　the　sense　of　corporeal　injury。　Bracton　takes　the　expression　in　a　very　different　sense；　he　thinks　that　economic　ruin　is　meant；　and　adds；　'Should　the　lord　go　so　far　as　to　take　away　the　villain's　very　waynage；　i。e。　plough　and　plough…team；　the　villain　has　an　action；'　It　is　true　that　Bracton's　text；　as　printed　in　existing　editions；　contains　a　qualification　of　this　remark；　it　is　said　that　only　serfs　on　ancient　demesne　land　are　possessed　of　such　a　right。　But　the　qualification　is　meaningless；　the　right　of　ancient　demesne　tenants　was　quite　different；　as　we　shall　see　by…and…by。　The　qualifying　clause　turns　out　to　be　inserted　only　in　later　MSS。　of　the　treatise；　is　wanting　in　the　better　MSS。；　and　altogether　presents　all　the　characters　of　a　bad　gloss。*　When　the　gloss　is　removed；　we　come　in　sight　of　the　fact　that　Bracton　in　the　beginning　of　his　treatise　admits　a　distinct　case　of　civil　action　on　the　part　of　a　villain　against　his　lord。　The　remark　is　in　contradiction　with　the　Roman　as　well　as　with　the　established　English　doctrine；　it　is　not　supported　by　legal　practice　in　the　thirteenth　century；　it　is　omitted　by　Bracton　when　he　comes　to　speak　again　of　the　'persona　standi　in　judicio　contra　dominum。'*　But　there　it　is；　and　it　cannot　be　explained　otherwise　than　as　a　survival　of　a　time　when　some　part　of　the　peasantry　at　least　had　not　been　surrendered　to　the　lord's　discretion；　but　was　possessed　of　civil　rights　and　of　the　power　to　vindicate　them。　The　notion　that　the　peasant　ought　to　be　specially　protected　in　the　possession　of　instruments　of　agricultural　labour　comes　out；　singularly　enough；　in　the　passage　commented　upon；　but　it　is　not　a　singular　notion　in　itself。　It　occurs；　as　every　one　knows；　in　the　clause　of　the　Great　Charter；　which　says　that　the　villain　who　falls　into　the　king's　mercy　is　to　be　amerced　'saving　his　waynage。'　We　come　across　it　often　enough　in　Plea　Rolls　in　cases　against　guardians　accused　of　having　wasted　their　ward's　property。　One　of　the　special　points　in　such　cases　often　is；　that　a　guardian　or　his　steward　has　been　ruining　the　villains　in　the　ward's　manors　by　destroying　their　waynage。*　Of　course；　the　protection　of　the　peasant's　prosperity；　guaranteed　by　the　courts　in　such　trials；　is　wholly　due　to　a　consideration　of　the　interests　of　the　ward；　and　the　care　taken　of　villains　is　exactly　parallel　to　the　attention　bestowed　upon　oaks　and　elms。　Still；　the　notion　of　waynage　is　in　itself　a　peculiar　and　an　important　one；　and　whatever　its　ultimate　origin　may　be；　it　points　to　a　civil　condition　which　does　not　quite　fall　within　the　lines　of　feudal　law。　　　　　Another　anomaly　is　supplied　by　Britton。　After　putting　the　case　as　strongly　as　possible　against　serfs；　after　treating　them　as　mere　chattels　to　be　given　and　sold；　he　adds；　'But　as　bondmen　are　annexed　to　the　freehold　of　the　lord；　they　are　not　devisable　by　testament；　and　therefore　Holy　Church　can　take　no　cognisance　of　them　in　Court　Christian；　although　devised　in　testament。'　（I。　197）　The　exclusion　of　villains　is　not　peculiar　to　them；　they　share　it　with　the　greater　part　of　landed　possessions。'　As　all　the　courts　of　civil　jurisdiction　had　been　prohibited　from　holding　jurisdiction　as　to　testamentary　matters；　and　the　Ecclesiastical　Courts　were　not　permitted　to　exercise　jurisdiction　as　to　any　question　relating　to　freehold；　there　was　no　court　which　could　properly　take　cognisance　of　a　testamentary　gift　of　land　as　such。'*　The　point　to　be　noted　is；　that　villains　are　held　to　be　annexed　to　the　freehold；　although　in　theory　they　ought　to　be　treated　as　chattels。　The　contradiction　gives　us　another　instance　of　the　peculiar　modification　of　personal　servitude　by　the　territorial　element。　The　serf　is　not　a　colonus；　he　is　not　bound　up　with　any　particular　homestead　or　plot　of　land；　but　he　is　considered　primarily　as　a　cultivator　under　manorial　organisation；　and　for　this　reason　there　is　a　limitation　on　the　lord's　power　of　alienating　him。　Let　it　be　understood；　however；　that　the　limitation　in　this　case　does　not　come　before　us　as　a　remnant　of　independent　rights　of　the　peasant。　It　is　imposed　by　those　interests　of　the　feudal　suzerain　and　of　the　kin　which　precluded　the　possibility　of　alienating　land　by　devise。*　　　　　An　inquiry　into　the　condition　of　villains　would　be　altogether　incomplete；　if　it　did　not　touch　on　the　questions　of　villain　tenure　and　villain　services。　Both　are　intimately　connected　with　personal　status；　as　may　be　seen　from　the　very　names；　and　both　have　to　be　very　carefully　distinguished　from　it。　I　have　had　to　speak　of　prescription　as　a　source　of　villainage。　Opinions　were　very　uncertain　in　this　respect；　and　yet；　from　the　mere　legal　point　of　view；　there　ought　not　to　have　been　any　difficulty　about　the　matter。　Bracton　takes　his　stand　firmly　on　the　fundamental　difference　between　status　and　tenure　in　order　to　distinguish　clearly　between　serfs　and　free　men　in　a　servile　position。*　The　villain　is　a　man　belonging　to　his　lord　personally；　a　villain　holding　（villenagium）　is　land　held　at　the　will　of　the　lord；　without　any　certainty　as　to　title　or　term　of　enjoyment；　as　to　kind　or　amount　of　services。　Serfs　are　mostly；　though　not　necessarily；　found　on　villain　land；　it　does　not　follow　that　all　those　seated　on　villain　land　are　serfs。　Free　men　are　constantly　seen　taking　up　a　villenagium；　they　do　not　lose　by　it　in　personal　condition；　they　have　no　protection　against　the　lord；　if　he　choose　to　alter　their　services　or　oust　them　from　the　holding；　but；　on　the　other　hand；　they　are　free　to　go　when　they　please。　There　is　still　less　reason　to　treat　as　serfs　such　free　peasants　as　are　subjected　to　base　services；　i。e。　to　the　same　kind　of　services　and　payments　as　the　villains；　but　on　certain　conditions；　not　more　and　not　less。　Whatever　the　customs　may　be；　if　they　are　certain；　not　only　the　person　holding　by　them　but　the　plot　he　is　using　are　free；　and　the　tenure　may　be　defended　at　law。*　　　　　Such　are　the　fundamental　positions　in　Bracton's　treatise；　and　there　can　be　no　doubt　that　they　are　borne　out　in　a　general　way　by　legal　practice。　But　if　from　the　general　we　turn　to　the　particul