on； however； depended on the Union； not the Union on it。 His Proclamation was ready in the summer of '62。 But to publish it in the midst of defeat would make it look like an act of despair。 In September； when the Confederates had to recross the Potomac after Antietam； the Proclamation was given to the world。 Its first effect was greater abroad than at home； for now no foreign government could say； and rightly say； that the war； not being fought on account of slavery； might leave that issue still unsettled。 This was a most important point in Lincoln's foreign policy； a policy which had been haunted by the fear of recognition for the South or the possibility of war with either the French or British； or even both together。
Lincoln's Cabinet was composed of two factions； one headed by Seward； the Secretary of State； the other by Chase； the Secretary of the Treasury。 Both the fighting services were under War Democrats： the Army under Stanton； the Navy under Welles。 All these ministers began by thinking that Lincoln had the least ability among them。 Seward and Welles presently learnt better。 Stanton's exclamation at Lincoln's death speaks for itself 〃Now he belongs to the ages！〃 But Chase never believed that Lincoln could even be his equal。 Chase and the Treasury were a thorn in the side of the Government； Chase because it was his nature； the Treasury because its notes fell to thirty…nine cents in the dollar during the summer of '64。 Welles； hard…working and upright； was guided by an expert assistant。 Stanton； equally upright and equally hardworking； made many mistakes。 And yet； when all is said and done； Stanton was a really able patriot who worked his hardest for what seemed to him the best。
Such were the four chief men in that Cabinet with which Lincoln carried out his Union policy and over which he towered in what became transcendent statesmanshipthe head； the heart； the genius of the war。 He never； for one moment； changed his course； but kept it fixed upon the Union； no matter what the winds and tides； the currents and cross…currents were。 Thus； while so many lesser minds were busy with flotsam and jetsam of the controversial storm； his own serener soul was already beyond the far horizon； voyaging toward the one sure haven for the Ship of State。
But Lincoln was more than the principal civilian war statesman： he was the constitutional Commander…in…Chief of all the Union forces； afloat and ashore。 He was responsible not only for raising； supplying； and controlling them； but for their actual command by men who； in the eyes of the law； were simply his own lieutenants。 The problem of exercising civil control without practicing civilian interference； always and everywhere hard； and especially hard in a civil war； was particularly hard in his case； in view of public opinion； the press； his own war policy； and the composition of his Cabinet。 His solution was by no means perfect； but the wonder is that he reached it so well in spite of such perverting factors。 He began with the mere armed mob that fought the First Bull Run beset with interference。 He ended with Farragut； Grant； and Sherman； combined in one great scheme of strategy that included Mobile； Virginia； and the lower South； and that； while under full civil control； was mostly free from interference with its naval and military workexcept at the fussy hands of Stanton。
The fundamental difference between civil control； which is the very breath of freedom； and civilian interference； which means the death of all efficiency； can be quite simply illustrated by supposing the proverbial Ship of State to be a fighting man…of…war。 The People are the owners； with all an owner's rights； while their chosen Government is their agent； with all an agent's delegated power。 The fighting Services； as the word itself so properly implies； are simply the People's servants； though they take their orders from the Government。 So far； so good； within the limits of civil control； under which； and which alone； any national resourcesin men； money； or materialcan lawfully be turned to warlike ends。 But when the ship is fitting out； still more when she is out at sea； and most of all when she is fighting； then she should be handled only by her expert captain with his expert crew。 Civilian interference begins the moment any inexpert outsider takes the captain's place； and this interference is no less disastrous when the outsider remains at home than when he is on the actual spot。
Lincoln and Stanton were out of their element in the strategic fight with Lee and Stonewall Jackson； as the next chapter abundantly proves。 But they will bear； and more than bear； comparison with Davis and Benjamin； their own special 〃opposite numbers。〃 Benjamin； when Confederate Secretary of War in '62； nearly drove Jackson out of the service by ordering him to follow the advice of some disgruntled subordinates who objected to being moved about for strategic reasons which they could not understand。 To make matters worse； Benjamin sent this precious order direct to Jackson without even informing his immediate superior； 〃Joe〃 Johnston； or even Lee himself。 Thus discipline； the very soul of armies； was attacked from above and beneath by the man who should have been its chief upholder。 Luckily for the South things were smoothed over； and Benjamin learnt something he should have known at first。 Davis had none of Lincoln's diffidence about his own capacity for directing the strategy of armies。 He had passed through West Point and commanded a battalion in Mexico without finding out that his fitness stopped there。 He interfered with Lee and Jackson； sometimes to almost a disabling extent。 He forced his enmity on 〃Joe〃 Johnston and superseded him at the very worst time in the final campaign。 He interfered more than ever just when Lee most required a free hand。 And when he did make Lee a real Commander…in…Chief the Southern cause had been lost already。 Lincoln's war statesmanship grew with the war。 Davis remained as he was。
Lincoln had to meet the difficulties that always occur when professionals and amateurs are serving together。 How much Lincoln； Stanton； professionals； and amateurs had to do with the system that was evolved under great stress is far too complex for discussion here。 Suffice it to say this： Lincoln's clear insight and openness of mind enabled him to see the universal truth； that； other things being equal； the trained and expert professional must excel the untrained and inexpert amateur。 But other things are never precisely equal； and a war in which the whole mass…manhood is concerned brings in a host of amateurs。 Lincoln was as devoid of prejudice against the regular officers as he was against any other class of men； and he was ready to try and try again to find a satisfactory commander among them； in spite of many failures。 The plan of campaign proposed by General Winfield Scott （and ultimately carried out in a modified form） was dubbed by wiseacre public men the 〃Anaconda policy〃； witlings derided it； and the people were too impatient for anything except 〃On to Richmond！〃 Scott； unable to take the field at seventyfive； had no second…in…command。 Halleck was a very poor substitute later on。 In the meantime McDowell was chosen and generously helped by Lincoln and Stanton。 But after Bull Run the very people whose impatience made victory impossible howled him down。
Then the choice fell on McClellan； whose notorious campaign fills much of our next chapter。 There we shall see how refractory circumstances； Stanton's waywardness among them； forced Lincoln to go beyond the limits of civil control。 Here we need only note McClellan's personal relations with the President。 Instead of summoning him to the White House Lincoln often called at McClellan's for discussion。 McClellan presently began to treat Lincoln's questions as intrusions； and one day sent down word that he was too tired to see the President。 Lincoln had told a friend that he would hold McClellan's stirrups for the sake of victory。 But he could not abdicate in favor of McClellan or any one else。
It was none of Lincoln's business to be an actual Commander…in…Chief。 Yet night after weary night he sat up studying the science and art of war； groping his untutored way toward those general principles and essential human facts which his native genius enabled him to reach； but never quite understandinghow could he？their practical application to the field of strategy。 His supremely good common sense saved him from going beyond his depth whenever he could help it。 His Military Orders were forced upon him by the extreme pressure of impatient public opinion。 He told Grant 〃he did not know but they were all wrong； and he did know that some of them were。〃
McClellan was not the only failure in Virginia。 Burnside and Hooker also failed against Lee and Jackson。 All three suffered from civilian interference as well as from their own defects。 At last； in the third year of the war； a victor appeared in Meade； a good； but by no means great； commander。 In the fourth year Lincoln gave the chief command to Grant； whom he had carefully watched and wisely supported through all the ups and downs of the river campaigns。
Grant's account of his first conference alone with Lincoln is eloquent of Lincoln's wise war statesmanship
〃He stated that he had never professed to be a military man or to know how campaigns should be conducted； and never wanted to interfere in them 。 。 。 。 All he wanted was some one who would take the responsibility and act； and call on him for all the assistance needed； pledging himself to use all the power of the government in rendering such assistance 。 。 。 。 He pointed out on the map two streams which empty into the Potomac； and suggested that the army might be moved on boats and landed between the mouths of these streams。 We would then have the Potomac to bring our supplies and the tributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out。 I listened respectfully； but did not suggest that the same streams would protect Lee's flanks while he was shutting us up。 I did not communicate my plans to the President； nor did I to the Secretary of War or to General Halleck。〃
Trust begot trust； and some months later Grant showed war statesmanship of the same magnificent