rst； by McClellan's hesitating strategy； and then by his failure to press the attack home at all costs； with every available man； in an unbroken succession of assaults。 He had over 80；000 men with 275 guns against barely 40；000 with 194 guns of inferior strength。 But though the Federals fought with magnificent devotion； and though the losses were very serious on both sides； the tactical result was a mutual checkmate。 The strategic result； however； was a Confederate defeat； for； with his few worn veterans； Lee had no chance whatever of keeping his precarious hold on a neutral Maryland。
October was a quiet month； each side reorganizing without much interference from the other； except for Stuart's second raid round the whole embattled army of McClellan。 This time Stuart took nearly two thousand men and four horse artillery guns。 Crossing the Potomac at McCoy's Ford on the tenth he reached Chambersburg that night； destroyed the Federal stores； took all the prisoners he wanted； cut the wires； obstructed the rails； and went on with hundreds of Federal horses。 Next day he circled the Federal rear toward Gettysburg； turned south through Emmitsburg； and crossed McClellan's line of communications with Washington at Hyattstown early on the twelfth。 By this time the Federal cavalry were riding themselves to exhaustion in vain pursuit； while many other forces were trying to close in and cut him off。 But he reached the mouth of the Monocacy and crossed White's Ford in safety； fighting off all interference。 The information he brought back was of priceless value。 Lee now learned that McClellan was not falling back on Washington but being reinforced from there； and that consequently no new Peninsula Campaign was to be feared at present。 This alone was worth the effort； risk； and negligible loss。 Stuart had marched a hundred and twenty…six miles on the Federal side of the Potomaceighty of them without a single halt； and he had been fifty…six hours inside the Federal lines； mostly within four riding hours of McClellan's own headquarters。
This second stinging raid roused the loyal North to fury； and by November a new invasion of Virginia was in full swing on the old ground； with McClellan at Warrenton； Lee at Culpeper； and Jackson in the Valley。
But McClellan's own last chance had gone。 Late at night on the seventh he was sitting alone in his tent； writing to his wife； when Burnside asked if he could come in with General C。P。 Buckingham； the confidential staff officer to the War Department。 After some forced conversation Buckingham handed McClellan a paper ordering his supersession by Burnside。 McClellan simply said： 〃Well； Burnside； I turn the command over to you。〃 The eighth and ninth were spent in handing over； and on the tenth McClellan made his official farewell。 Next day he was entraining at Warrenton Junction when the men； among whom he was immensely popular； broke ranks and swarmed round his car； cursing the Government and swearing they would follow no one but their 〃Old Commander。〃 McClellan； with all his faults in the field； was a good organizer； an extremely able engineer； a very brave soldier； a very sympathetic comrade in arms； and a regular father to his men； whose personal interests were always his first care。 The moment was critical。 McClellan； had he chosen； might have imitated the Roman generals who led the revolts of Praetorian Guards。 But he stepped out on the front platform of the car； held up his hand； and； amid tense silence； asked the men to 〃stand by General Burnside as you have stood by me。〃 The car they had uncoupled to prevent his departure was run up and coupled again； and then； amid cheers of mournful farewell； they let him go。
General Ambrose E。 Burnside was expected to smash Lee； take Richmond； and end the war at once。 He was a good subordinate； but quite unfit for supreme command； which he accepted only under protest。 Moreover； he was not supported as he should have been by the War Department； nor even by the Headquarter Staff。 While changing his position from Warrenton to Fredericksburg he was hampered by avoidable delays。 So when he reached Falmouth he found Lee had forestalled him on the opposing heights of Fredericksburg itself。
The disastrous thirteenth of December was dull； calm； and misty。 But presently the sun shone down with unwonted warmth； the mists rolled up like curtains； and there stood 200；000 men； arrayed in order of battle： 80；000 Confederates awaiting the onslaught of 120；000 Federals。
On came the solid masses of the Federals； eighty thousand strong； with forty in support； amid the thunder of five hundred attacking and defending guns。 The sunlight played upon the rising tide of Federal bayonets as on sea currents when they turn inshore。 The colors waved proudly as ever； and to the outward eye the attack seemed almost strong enough to drive the stern and silent gray Confederates clear off the crest。 But the indispensable morale was wanting。 For this was the end of a long campaign； full of drawn battles and terrible defeats。 Burnside was an unpopular substitute for McClellan； he was not in any way a great commander； and he was acting under pressure against his own best judgment。 His army knew or felt all this； and he knew they knew or felt it。 The Federals； for all their glorious courage； felt； when the two fronts met at Fredericksburg； that they were no more than sacrificial pawns in the grim game of war。 After much useless slaughter they reeled back beaten。 But they could and did retire in safety； skillfully 〃staffed〃 by their leaders and close to their unconquerable sea。
Lee could make no counterstroke。 The Confederate Government had not dared to let him occupy the far better position on the line of the North Anna； from which a vigorous counterstroke might have almost annihilated a beaten attacker； who would have been exposed on both flanks； beyond the sure protection of the sea。 Thus fear of an outcry against 〃abandoning〃 the country between Fredericksburg and the North Anna caused the Southern politicians to lose their chance at home。 But without a decisive victory they could not hope for foreign intervention。 So losing their chance at home made them lose it abroad as well。
Burnside was dazed by his defeat and the appalling loss of life in vain。 But after five weeks of most discouraging inaction he tried to surprise Lee by crossing the Rappahannock several miles higher up。 On the twentieth and twenty…first of that miserable January the Federal army ploughed its dreary way through sloughs of gluey mud under torrents of chilling rain。 Then； when the pace had slackened to a funereal crawl； and the absurdly little chance of surprising Lee had vanished altogether； this despairing 〃Mud March〃 came to its wretched end。 Four days later Burnside was superseded by one of his own subordinates； General Joseph Hooker； known to all ranks as 〃Fighting Joe Hooker。〃
Fredericksburg； the spell of relaxing winter quarters beside the fatal Rappahannock； and then the fatal 〃Mud March；〃 combined to lower Federal morale。 Yet the mass of the men； being composed of fine human material； quickly recovered under 〃Fighting Joe Hooker；〃 who knew what discipline meant。 Numbers and discipline tell。 But disciplined numbers were not the only or even the greatest menace to the South。 For here； as farther west； the Confederate Government was beginning to be foolish just as the Federal Government showed signs of growing wise。 Lincoln and Stanton were giving Joe Hooker a fairly free hand just when Davis and Seddon （his makeshift minister of war） were using Confederate forces as puppets to be pulled about by Cabinet strings from Richmond。 Here again （as later on at Chattanooga） Longstreet was sent away on a useless errand just when he was needed most by Lee。 Good soldier though he was in many ways he was no such man as Stonewall Jackson； and； in this one year； he failed his seniors thrice。
It is true enough that the April situation of 1863 might well shake governmental nerves； for Richmond was being menaced from three points north； southeast； and south： Fredericksburg due north； Suffolk southeast； Newbern south。 Newbern in North Carolina was a long way off。 But its possession by an active enemy threatened the rail connection from Richmond south to Wilmington； Charleston； and Savannah； the only three Atlantic ports through which the South could get supplies from overseas。 Suffolk was nearer。 It covered the landward side of Norfolk； which； with Fortress Monroe； might become the base of a new Peninsula Campaign。 But Fredericksburg was nearest； nearest to Richmond； nearest to Washington； nearest to the main Southern force； and not only nearest but strongest； in every way strongest and most to be feared。 〃Fighting Joe Hooker〃 was there； with a hundred and thirty thousand men； already stirring for the spring campaign that was to wipe out memories of Fredericksburg； make short work of Lee； and end the war at Richmond。
Yet Longstreet cheerfully marched off； pleased with his new command； to see what he could do to soothe the Government by winning laurels for himself at Suffolk。 On the seventeenth； just two weeks before the supreme test came on Lee's weakened army at Chancellorsville； Longstreet reported to Seddon that Suffolk would cost three thousand men； if taken by assault； or three days' heavy firing if subdued by bombardment。 Shrinking from such expenditure of life or ammunition； Davis； Seddon； and Longstreet fell back on a siege； which； preventing all junction with Lee； might well have cost the ruin of their cause。
Lee and Jackson then prepared to make the best of a bad business along the Rappahannock； and to snatch victory once more； if possible； from the very jaws of death。 The prospect was grimmer than before。 Hooker was a better fighter than McClellan and wiser than Burnside or Pope。 Moreover； after two years of war； the Union Government had at last found out that civilian detectives knew less about armies than expert staff officers know； and that cavalry which was something more than mere men on horses could collect a little information too。 Hooker knew Lee's strength as well as his own。 So he decided to hold Lee fast with one part of the big Federal army； turn his flank with another； and cut his line of supp