concept of straightness contains nothing of size； but only a quality。 In this sense every definition is a
synthetic proposition。 What is defined； the straight line； is in the first place the intuition or
representation； and the determination that it is the shortest distance between two points constitutes
in the first place the concept （namely； as it appears in such definitions； cf。 § 110）。 That the
concept is not already given by the intuition constitutes precisely the difference between the two；
and is what calls for a definition。 That something seems to the representation to be a quality；
though its specificity rests on a quantitative determination； is something very simple； and also the
case for example with the right angle； the straight line； and so on。
§ 200。
（2） Negativity； which as point relates itself to space and in space develops its determinations as
line and plane； is； however； in the sphere of self…externality equally for itself and appearing
indifferent to the motionless coexistence of space。 Negativity； thus posited for itself is time。
§ 201。
Time； as the negative unity of being outside of itself； is just as thoroughly abstract； ideal being：
being which； since it is； is not； and since it is not； is。
Tune； like space； is a pure form of sensuousness； or intuition； but； as with space； the difference
between objectivity and a contrastingly subjective consciousness does not matter to time。 If these
determinations are applied to space and time； then space is abstract objectivity； whereas time is
abstract subjectivity。 Time is the same principle as the I = I of pure self…consciousness； but the
same principle or the simple concept still in its entire externality； intuited mere becoming； pure
being in itself as sheer coming out of itself。 Time is just as continuous as space； for it is abstract
negativity relating itself to itself and in this abstraction there is as yet no real difference。
In time； it is said； everything arises and passes away； or rather； there appears precisely the
abstraction of arising and falling away。 If abstractions are made from everything； namely； from the
fullness of time just as much as from the fullness of space； then there remains both empty time and
empty space left over； that is； there are then posited these abstractions of exteriority。…But time
itself is this becoming； this existing abstraction； the Chronos who gives birth to everything and
destroys his offspring。…That which is real； however； is just as identical to as distinct from time。
Everything is transitory that is temporal； that is； exists only in time or； like the concept； is not in
itself pure negativity。 To be sure； this negativity is in everything as its immanent； universal essence；
but the temporal is not adequate to this essence； and therefore relates to this negativity in terms of
its power。 Time itself is eternal； for it is neither just any time； nor the moment now； but time as time
is its concept。 The concept； however； in its identity with itself I= 1； is in and for itself absolute
negativity and freedom。 Time； is not； therefore； the power of the concept； nor is the concept in
time and temporal； on the contrary； the concept is the power of time； which is only this negativity
as externality。…The natural is therefore subordinate to time； insofar as it is finite； that which is true；
by contrast； the idea； the spirit； is eternal。 Thus the concept of eternity must not be grasped as if it
were suspended time； or in any case not in the sense that eternity would come after time； for this
would turn eternity into the future； in other words into a moment of time。 And the concept of
eternity must also not be understood in the sense of a negation of time； so that it would be merely
an abstraction of time。 For time in its concept is； like the concept itself generally； eternal； and
therefore also absolute presence。
§ 202。
The dimensions of time； the present； future； and past； are only that which is becoming and its
dissolution into the differences of being as the transition into nothingness； and of Nothingness as
the transition into being。 The immediate disappearance of these differences into individuality is the
present as now； which is itself only this disappearance of being into nothingness； and of
nothingness into being。
（1） The finite present is differentiated from the infinite in that the finite is the moment now and
hence as its abstract moments； as past and future； which is different from the infinite as from the
concrete unity。 Eternity as concept； h r； contains these moments in itself and its concrete unity is
therefore not the moment now； because it is motionless identity； concrete being as universal； and
not that which is disappearing into nothingness； as becoming。…Furthermore in nature； where time is
now； there does not occur the subsisting difference of these dimensions； they are necessarily only
in subjective representation； in memory； fear； or hope。 The abstract past； however； and future of
time is space； as the suspended space is at first the point and time。
（2） There is no science of time in opposition to the finite science of space； geometry； because the
differences of time do not have the indifference of being outside of itself which constitutes the
immediate determinacy of space； and therefore they can not be expressed as spatial
configurations。 The principle of time only reaches this ability when the understanding has paralysed
it and reduced its negativity to the unit。 This motionless unit； as the sheer carnality of thought； can
be used to form external combinations； and these； the numbers of arithmetic； can themselves be
brought under the categories of the truth as intuition or as understanding merely for itself because
the latter is only abstract； whereas the former is concrete。 This dead unit； now the highest
externality of thought； can be used to form external combinations； and these combinations； the
figures of arithmetic； can in turn be organised by the determination of the understanding in terms of
equality and inequality； identity and difference。 The science which has unity as its principle is
therefore constituted in opposition to geometry。
（3） The name of mathematics has moreover been used for the philosophical observation of space
and time； because it lies close to this observation； despite the fact that mathematics； as noted；
considers strictly the determinations of magnitude of its objects and not time itself but only the unit
in its configurations and connections。 To be sure； time becomes in the theory of movement an
object of science； but applied mathematics is generally not an immanent science； precisely because
it involves the application of pure mathematics to a given material and its determinations as derived
from experience。
（4） One could still； however； conceive the thought of a philosophical mathematics； namely； as a
science which would recognise those concepts which constitute what the conventional
mathematical science of the understanding derives from its presupposed determinations； and
according to the method of the understanding； without concepts。 However； since mathematics is
the science of the finite determinations of magnitude； which remain fixed in their finitude and valid；
and should not change in transit； thus it is essentially a science of the understanding。 And since it
has the ability to express spatial figures and numbers； which gives it an advantage over other
sciences of this kind； it ought to retain this ability for itself and to avoid contamination by either
concepts； like time； which are heterogeneous to it； or empirical purposes。 It therefore remains
open for the concept to establish a more fundamental consciousness than has hitherto been shown；
both in terms of the leading principles of the understanding and in terms of order and its necessity
in arithmetical operations； as well as in the theses of geometry。…If one wanted to treat the forms of
space and the unit philosophically； they would lose on these grounds their particular significance； a
philosophy of them would become a matter of logic； or would even assume the character of
another concrete philosophical science； according to the ways one imparted a more concrete
significance to the concepts。…
It would； however； be a superfluous and thankless task to try to use such an unmanageable and
inadequate medium as spatial figures and numbers for the expression of thoughts； and to treat them
violently for this purpose。 For the specific concept would always be related only externally to
them。 The simple elementary figures and numbers can in any case be used as symbols； which；
however； are a subordinate and poor expression for thoughts。 The first attempts of pure thought
took recourse to such aids： the Pythagorean system of numbers is the famous example of this。 But
with richer concepts these means became completely unsatisfactory； since their external
juxtaposition and contingent combination are not at all appropriate to the nature of the concept；
and make it altogether ambiguous which of the many possible relationships in complex numbers
and figures should be adhered to。 Besides； the fluid character of the concept is dissipated in such
an external medium； in which each determination falls into the indifferent being outside the others。
This ambiguity could only be removed by an explanation。 The essential expression of the thought is
in that case this explanation； and this symbolising is an empty superfluity。
Other mathematical determinations； such as infinity and its relationships； the infinitesimal； factors；
powers； and so ' on； have their true concepts in philosophy itself。 It is awkward to want to take
and derive these from mathematics； where they are employed in a nonconceptual； often
meaningless way； rather； they must await their justification and significance from philosophy。 The
truly philosophical science of mathematics as theory of magnitude would be the science of
measures； but this already presupposes the real particularity of things； which is only at hand in
concrete nature。