lecture18- 第2部分

just　so　far　as　the　telescope　shows　power；　or　the　microscope　shows



skill；　if　his　moral　law　is　to　be　ascertained　simply　by　the



physical　processes　of　the　animal　frame；　or　his　will　gathered　from



the　immediate　issues　of　human　affairs；　if　his　Essence　is　just　as



high　and　deep　and　broad　as　the　universe　and　no　more　if　this　be



the　fact；　then　will　I　confess　that　there　is　no　specific　science



about　God；　that　theology　is　but　a　name；　and　a　protest　in　its



behalf　an　hypocrisy。　　Then；　pious　as　it　is　to　think　of　Him　while



the　pageant　of　experiment　or　abstract　reasoning　passes　by；　still



such　piety　is　nothing　more　than　a　poetry　of　thought；　or　an



ornament　of　language；　a　certain　view　taken　of　Nature　which　one



man　has　and　another　has　not；　which　gifted　minds　strike　out；　which



others　see　to　be　admirable　and　ingenious；　and　which　all　would　be



the　better　for　adopting。　　It　is　but　the　theology　of　Nature；　just



as　we　talk　of　the　PHILOSOPHY　or　the　ROMANCE　of　history；　or　the



POETRY　of　childhood；　or　the　picturesque　or　the　sentimental　or　the



humorous；　or　any　other　abstract　quality　which　the　genius　or　the



caprice　of　the　individual；　or　the　fashion　of　the　day；　or　the



consent　of　the　world；　recognizes　in　any　set　of　objects　which　are



subjected　to　its　contemplation。　　I　do　not　see　much　difference



between　avowing　that　there　is　no　God；　and　implying　that　nothing



definite　can　be　known　for　certain　about　Him。〃







What　I　mean　by　Theology；　continues　Newman；　is　none　of　these



things：　　〃I　simply　mean　the　SCIENCE　OF　GOD；　or　the　truths　we　know



about　God；　put　into　a　system；　just　as　we　have　a　science　of　the



stars　and　call　it　astronomy；　or　of　the　crust　of　the　earth　and



call　it　geology。〃







In　both　these　extracts　we　have　the　issue　clearly　set　before　us：　



Feeling　valid　only　for　the　individual　is　pitted　against　reason



valid　universally。　　The　test　is　a　perfectly　plain　one　of　fact。　



Theology　based　on　pure　reason　must　in　point　of　fact　convince　men



universally。　　If　it　did　not；　wherein　would　its　superiority



consist？　　If　it　only　formed　sects　and　schools；　even　as　sentiment



and　mysticism　form　them；　how　would　it　fulfill　its　programme　of



freeing　us　from　personal　caprice　and　waywardness？　　This　perfectly



definite　practical　test　of　the　pretensions　of　philosophy　to　found



religion　on　universal　reason　simplifies　my　procedure　to…day。　　I



need　not　discredit　philosophy　by　laborious　criticism　of　its



arguments。　It　will　suffice　if　I　show　that　as　a　matter　of　history



it　fails　to　prove　its　pretension　to　be　〃objectively〃　convincing。　



In　fact；　philosophy　does　so　fail。　　It　does　not　banish



differences；　it　founds　schools　and　sects　just　as　feeling　does。　　I



believe；　in　fact；　that　the　logical　reason　of　man　operates　in　this



field　of　divinity　exactly　as　it　has　always　operated　in　love；　or



in　patriotism；　or　in　politics；　or　in　any　other　of　the　wider



affairs　of　life；　in　which　our　passions　or　our　mystical　intuitions



fix　our　beliefs　beforehand。　　It　finds　arguments　for　our



conviction；　for　indeed　it　HAS　to　find　them。　　It　amplifies　and



defines　our　faith；　and　dignifies　it　and　lends　it　words　and



plausibility。　　It　hardly　ever　engenders　it；　it　cannot　now　secure



it。＇292＇







＇292＇　As　regards　the　secondary　character　of　intellectual



constructions；　and　the　primacy　of　feeling　and　instinct　in



founding　religious　beliefs　see　the　striking　work　of　H。　Fielding；



The　Hearts　of　Men；　London；　1902；　which　came　into　my　hands　after



my　text　was　written。　　〃Creeds；〃　says　the　author；　〃are　the　grammar



of　religion；　they　are　to　religion　what　grammar　is　to　speech。　



Words　are　the　expression　of　our　wants　grammar　is　the　theory



formed　afterwards。　　Speech　never　proceeded　from　grammar；　but　the



reverse。　　As　speech　progresses　and　changes　from　unknown　causes；



grammar　must　follow〃　（p。　313）。　　The　whole　book；　which　keeps



unusually　close　to　concrete　facts；　is　little　more　than　an



amplification　of　this　text。















Lend　me　your　attention　while　I　run　through　some　of　the　points　of



the　older　systematic　theology。　　You　find　them　in　both　Protestant



and　Catholic　manuals；　best　of　all　in　the　innumerable　text…books



published　since　Pope　Leo's　Encyclical　recommending　the　study　of



Saint　Thomas。　　I　glance　first　at　the　arguments　by　which　dogmatic



theology　establishes　God's　existence；　after　that　at　those　by



which　it　establishes　his　nature。＇293＇







＇293＇　For　convenience'　sake；　I　follow　the　order　of　A。　Stockl's



Lehrbuch　der　Philosophie；　5te　Autlage；　Mainz；　1881；　Band　ii。　　B。　



Boedder's　Natural　Theology；　London；　1891；　is　a　handy　English



Catholic　Manual；　but　an　almost　identical　doctrine　is　given　by



such　Protestant　theologians　as　C。　Hodge：　　Systematic　Theology；



New　York；　1873；　or　A。　H。　Strong：　　Systematic　Theology；　5th



edition；　New　York；　1896。















The　arguments　for　God's　existence　have　stood　for　hundreds　of



years　with　the　waves　of　unbelieving　criticism　breaking　against



them；　never　totally　discrediting　them　in　the　ears　of　the



faithful；　but　on　the　whole　slowly　and　surely　washing　out　the



mortar　from　between　their　joints。　　If　you　have　a　God　already　whom



you　believe　in；　these　arguments　confirm　you。　If　you　are



atheistic；　they　fail　to　set　you　right。　　The　proofs　are　various。　



The　〃cosmological〃　one；　so…called；　reasons　from　the　contingence



of　the　world　to　a　First　Cause　which　must　contain　whatever



perfections　the　world　itself　contains。　　The　〃argument



from　design〃　reasons；　from　the　fact　that　Nature's　laws　are



mathematical；　and　her　parts　benevolently　adapted　to　each　other；



that　this　cause　is　both　intellectual　and　benevolent。　The　〃moral



argument〃　is　that　the　moral　law　presupposes　a　lawgiver。　　The



〃argument　ex　consensu　gentium〃　is　that　the　belief　in　God　is　so



widespread　as　to　be　grounded　in　the　rational　nature　of　man；　and



should　therefore　carry　authority　with　it。







As　I　just　said；　I　will　not　discuss　these　arguments　technically。



The　bare　fact　that　all　idealists　since　Kant　have　felt　entitled



either　to　scout　or　to　neglect　them　shows　that　they　are　not　solid



enough　to　serve　as　religion's　all…sufficient　foundation。　



Absolutely　impersonal　reasons　would　be　in　duty　bound　to　show　more



general　convincingness。　　Causation　is　indeed　too　obscure　a



principle　to　bear　the　weight　of　the　whole　structure　of　theology。　



As　for　the　argument　from　design；　see　how　Darwinian　ideas　have



revolutionized　it。　　Conceived　as　we　now　conceive　them；　as　so　many



fortunate　escapes　from　almost　limitless　processes　of　destruction；



the　benevolent　adaptations　which　we　find　in　Nature　suggest　a



deity　very　different　from　the　one　who　figured　in　the　earlier



versions　of　the　argument。＇294＇　The　fact　is　that　these　arguments　



do　but　follow　the　combined　suggestions　of　the　facts　and　of　our



feeling。　　They　prove　nothing　rigorously。　　They　only　corroborate



our　preexistent　partialities。







＇294＇　It　must　not　be　forgotten　that　any　form　of　DISorder　in　the



world　might；　by　the　design　argument；　suggest　a　God　for　just　that



kind　of　disorder。　　The　truth　is　that　any　state　of　things　whatever



that　can　be　named　is　logically　susceptible　of　teleological



interpretation。　The　ruins　of　the　earthquake　at　Lisbon；　for



example：　　the　whole　of　past　history　had　to　be　planned　exactly　as



it　was　to　bring　about　in　the　fullness　of　time　just　that



particular　arrangement　of　debris　of　masonry；　furniture；　and　once



living　bodies。　　No　other　train　of　causes　would　have　been



sufficient。　　And　so　of　any　other　arrangement；　bad　or　good；　which



might　as　a　matter　of　fact　be　found　resulting　anywhere　from



previous　conditions。　　To　avoid　such　pessimistic　consequences　and



save　its　beneficent　designer；　the　design　argument　accordingly



invokes　two　other　principles；　restrictive　in　their　operation。　



The　first　is　physical：　　Nature's　forces　tend　of　their　own　accord



only　to　disorder　and　destruction；　to　heaps　of　ruins；　not　to



architecture。







This　principle；　though　plausible　at　first　sight；　seems；　in　the



light　of　recent　biology；　to　be　more　and　more　improbable。　　The



second　principle　is　one　of　anthropomorphic　interpretation。　　No



arrangement　that　for　us　is　〃disorderly〃　can　possibly　have　been　an



object　of　design　at　all。　　This　principle　is　of　course　a　mere



assumption　in　the　interests　of　anthropomorphic　Theism。















When　one　views　the　world　with　no　definite　theological　bias　one



way　or　the　other；　one　sees　that　order　and　disorder；　as　we　now



recognize　them；　are　purely　human　inventions。　　We　are　interested



in　certain　types　of　arrangement；　useful；　aesthetic；　or　moralso



interested　that　whenever　we　find　them　realized；　the　fact



emphatically　rivets　our　attention。　　The　result　is　that　we　work



over　the　contents　of　the　world　selectively。　　It　is　overflowing



with　disorderly　arrangements　from　our　point　of　view；　but　order　is



the　only　thing　we　care　for　and　look　at；　and　by　choosing；　one　can



always　find　some　sort　of　orderly　arrangement　in　the　midst　of　any



chaos。　　If　I　should　throw　down　a　thousand　beans　at　random　upon　a



table；　I　could　doubtless；　by　eliminating　a　sufficient　number　of



them；　leave　the　rest　in　almost　any　geometrical　pattern　you　might



propose　to　me；　and　you　might　then　say　that　that　pattern　was　the



thing　prefigured　beforehand；　and　that　the　other　beans　were　mere



irrelevance　and　packing　material。　　Our　dealings　with　Nature　are



just　like　this。　　She　is　a　vast　plenum　in　which　our　attention



draws　capricious　lines　in　innumerable　directions。　　We　count　an