lecture18- 第4部分

ascertaining　what　practical　difference　would　result　from　one



alternative　or　the　other　being　true。　　What　is　the　particular



truth　in　question　KNOWN　AS？　　In　what　facts　does　it　result？　　What



is　its　cash…value　in　terms　of　particular　experience？　　This　is　the



characteristic　English　way　of　taking　up　a　question。　　In　this　way；



you　remember；　Locke　takes　up　the　question　of　personal　identity。



What　you　mean　by　it　is　just　your　chain　of　particular　memories；



says　he。　　That　is　the　only　concretely　verifiable　part　of　its



significance。　　All　further　ideas　about　it；　such　as　the　oneness　or



manyness　of　the　spiritual　substance　on　which　it　is　based；　are



therefore　void　of　intelligible　meaning；　and　propositions　touching



such　ideas　may　be　indifferently　affirmed　or　denied。　　So　Berkeley



with　his　〃matter。〃







The　cash…value　of　matter　is　our　physical　sensations。　　That　is



what　it　is　known　as；　all　that　we　concretely　verify　of　its



conception。　　That；　therefore；　is　the　whole　meaning　of　the　term



〃matter〃any　other　pretended　meaning　is　mere　wind　of　words。　



Hume　does　the　same　thing　with　causation。　　It　is　known　as　habitual



antecedence；　and　as　tendency　on　our　part　to　look　for　something



definite　to　come。　　Apart　from　this　practical　meaning　it　has　no



significance　whatever；　and　books　about　it　may　be　committed　to　the



flames；　says　Hume。　　Dugald　Stewart　and　Thomas　Brown；　James　Mill；



John　Mill；　and　Professor　Bain；　have　followed　more　or　less



consistently　the　same　method；　and　Shadworth　Hodgson　has　used　the



principle　with　full　explicitness。　　When　all　is　said　and　done；　it



was　English　and　Scotch　writers；　and　not　Kant；　who　introduced　〃the



critical　method〃　into　philosophy；　the　one　method　fitted　to　make



philosophy　a　study　worthy　of　serious　men。　　For　what　seriousness



can　possibly　remain　in　debating　philosophic　propositions　that



will　never　make　an　appreciable　difference　to　us　in　action？　　And



what　could　it　matter；　if　all　propositions　were　practically



indifferent；　which　of　them　we　should　agree　to　call　true　or　which



false？







An　American　philosopher　of　eminent　originality；　Mr。　Charles



Sanders　Peirce；　has　rendered　thought　a　service　by　disentangling



from　the　particulars　of　its　application　the　principle　by　which



these　men　were　instinctively　guided；　and　by　singling　it　out　as



fundamental　and　giving　to　it　a　Greek　name。　　He　calls　it　the



principle　of　PRAGMATISM；　and　he　defends　it　somewhat　as



follows：＇297＇







＇297＇　In　an　article；　How　to　make　our　Ideas　Clear；　in　the　Popular



Science　Monthly　for　January；　1878；　vol。　xii。　p。　286。















Thought　in　movement　has　for　its　only　conceivable　motive　the



attainment　of　belief；　or　thought　at　rest。　　Only　when　our　thought



about　a　subject　has　found　its　rest　in　belief　can　our　action　on



the　subject　firmly　and　safely　begin。　　Beliefs；　in　short；　are



rules　for　action；　and　the　whole　function　of　thinking　is　but　one



step　in　the　production　of　active　habits。　　If　there　were　any　part



of　a　thought　that　made　no　difference　in　the　thought's　practical



consequences；　then　that　part　would　be　no　proper　element　of　the



thought's　significance。　　To　develop　a　thought's　meaning　we　need



therefore　only　determine　what　conduct　it　is　fitted　to　produce；



that　conduct　is　for　us　its　sole　significance；　and　the　tangible



fact　at　the　root　of　all　our　thought…distinctions　is　that　there　is



no　one　of　them　so　fine　as　to　consist　in　anything　but　a　possible



difference　of　practice。　　To　attain　perfect　clearness　in　our



thoughts　of　an　object；　we　need　then　only　consider　what



sensations；　immediate　or　remote；　we　are　conceivably　to　expect



from　it；　and　what　conduct　we　must　prepare　in　case　the　object



should　be　true。　　Our　conception　of　these　practical　consequences



is　for　us　the　whole　of　our　conception　of　the　object；　so　far　as



that　conception　has　positive　significance　at　all。







This　is　the　principle　of　Peirce；　the　principle　of　pragmatism。



Such　a　principle　will　help　us　on　this　occasion　to　decide；　among



the　various　attributes　set　down　in　the　scholastic　inventory　of



God's　perfections；　whether　some　be　not　far　less　significant　than



others。







If；　namely；　we　apply　the　principle　of　pragmatism　to　God's



metaphysical　attributes；　strictly　so　called；　as　distinguished



from　his　moral　attributes；　I　think　that；　even　were　we　forced　by　a



coercive　logic　to　believe　them；　we　still　should　have　to　confess



them　to　be　destitute　of　all　intelligible　significance。　Take　God's



aseity；　for　example；　or　his　necessariness；　his　immateriality；　his



〃simplicity〃　or　superiority　to　the　kind　of　inner　variety　and



succession　which　we　find　in　finite　beings；　his　indivisibility；



and　lack　of　the　inner　distinctions　of　being　and　activity；



substance　and　accident；　potentiality　and　actuality；　and　the　rest；



his　repudiation　of　inclusion　in　a　genus；　his　actualized　infinity；



his　〃personality；〃　apart　from　the　moral　qualities　which　it　may



comport；　his　relations　to　evil　being　permissive　and　not　positive；



his　self…sufficiency；　self…love；　and　absolute　felicity　in



himself：candidly　speaking；　how　do　such　qualities　as　these



make　any　definite　connection　with　our　life？　　And　if　they



severally　call　for　no　distinctive　adaptations　of　our　conduct；



what　vital　difference　can　it　possibly　make　to　a　man's　religion



whether　they　be　true　or　false？







For　my　own　part；　although　I　dislike　to　say　aught　that　may　grate



upon　tender　associations；　I　must　frankly　confess　that　even　though



these　attributes　were　faultlessly　deduced；　I　cannot　conceive　of



its　being　of　the　smallest　consequence　to　us　religiously　that　any



one　of　them　should　be　true。　　Pray；　what　specific　act　can　I



perform　in　order　to　adapt　myself　the　better　to　God's　simplicity？　



Or　how　does　it　assist　me　to　plan　my　behavior；　to　know　that　his



happiness　is　anyhow　absolutely　complete？　　In　the　middle　of　the



century　just　past；　Mayne　Reid　was　the　great　writer　of　books　of



out…of…door　adventure。　He　was　forever　extolling　the　hunters　and



field…observers　of　living　animals'　habits；　and　keeping　up　a　fire



of　invective　against　the　〃closet…naturalists；〃　as　he　called　them；



the　collectors　and　classifiers；　and　handlers　of　skeletons　and



skins。　　When　I　was　a　boy；　I　used　to　think　that　a　closet…



naturalist　must　be　the　vilest　type　of　wretch　under　the　sun。　But



surely　the　systematic　theologians　are　the　closet…naturalists　of



the　deity；　even　in　Captain　Mayne　Reid's　sense。　　What　is　their



deduction　of　metaphysical　attributes　but　a　shuffling　and　matching



of　pedantic　dictionary…adjectives；　aloof　from　morals；　aloof　from



human　needs；　something　that　might　be　worked　out　from　the　mere



word　〃God〃　by　one　of　those　logical　machines　of　wood　and　brass



which　recent　ingenuity　has　contrived　as　well　as　by　a　man　of　flesh



and　blood。　　They　have　the　trail　of　the　serpent　over　them。　　One



feels　that　in　the　theologians'　hands；　they　are　only　a　set　of



titles　obtained　by　a　mechanical　manipulation　of　synonyms；



verbality　has　stepped　into　the　place　of　vision；　professionalism



into　that　of　life。　　Instead　of　bread　we　have　a　stone；　instead　of



a　fish；　a　serpent。　　Did　such　a　conglomeration　of　abstract　terms



give　really　the　gist　of　our　knowledge　of　the　deity；　schools　of



theology　might　indeed　continue　to　flourish；　but　religion；　vital



religion；　would　have　taken　its　flight　from　this　world。　What　keeps



religion　going　is　something　else　than　abstract　definitions　and



systems　of　concatenated　adjectives；　and　something　different　from



faculties　of　theology　and　their　professors。　　All　these　things　are



after…effects；　secondary　accretions　upon　those　phenomena　of　vital



conversation　with　the　unseen　divine；　of　which　I　have　shown　you　so



many　instances；　renewing　themselves　in　saecula　saeculorum　in　the



lives　of　humble　private　men。







So　much　for　the　metaphysical　attributes　of　God！　　From　the　point



of　view　of　practical　religion；　the　metaphysical　monster　which



they　offer　to　our　worship　is　an　absolutely　worthless　invention　of



the　scholarly　mind。







What　shall　we　now　say　of　the　attributes　called　moral？



Pragmatically；　they　stand　on　an　entirely　different　footing。　They



positively　determine　fear　and　hope　and　expectation；　and　are



foundations　for　the　saintly　life。　　It　needs　but　a　glance　at　them



to　show　how　great　is　their　significance。







God's　holiness；　for　example：　　being　holy；　God　can　will　nothing



but　the　good。　　Being　omnipotent；　he　can　secure　its　triumph。　



Being　omniscient；　he　can　see　us　in　the　dark。　　Being　just；　he　can



punish　us　for　what　he　sees。　　Being　loving；　he　can　pardon　too。　



Being　unalterable；　we　can　count　on　him　securely。　　These　qualities



enter　into　connection　with　our　life；　it　is　highly　important　that



we　should　be　informed　concerning　them。　　That　God's　purpose　in



creation　should　be　the　manifestation　of　his　glory　is　also　an



attribute　which　has　definite　relations　to　our　practical　life。　



Among　other　things　it　has　given　a　definite　character　to　worship



in　all　Christian　countries。　　If　dogmatic　theology　really　does



prove　beyond　dispute　that　a　God　with　characters　like　these



exists；　she　may　well　claim　to　give　a　solid　basis　to　religious



sentiment。　　But　verily；　how　stands　it　with　her　arguments？







It　stands　with　them　as　ill　as　with　the　arguments　for　his



existence。　　Not　only　do　post…Kantian　idealists　reject　them　root



and　branch；　but　it　is　a　plain　historic　fact　that　they　never　have



converted　any　one　who　has　found　in　the　moral　complexion　of　the



world；　as　he　experienced