lecture18- 第6部分

with　the　presence　and　life　of　the　Infinite。







〃Oneness　of　mind　and　will　with　the　divine　mind　and　will　is　not



the　future　hope　and　aim　of　religion；　but　its　very　beginning　and



birth　in　the　soul。　　To　enter　on　the　religious　life　is　to



terminate　the　struggle。　　In　that　act　which　constitutes　the



beginning　of　the　religious　lifecall　it　faith；　or　trust；　or



self…surrender；　or　by　whatever　name　you　willthere　is　involved



the　identification　of　the　finite　with　a　life　which　is　eternally



realized。　　It　is　true　indeed　that　the　religious　life　is



progressive；　but　understood　in　the　light　of　the　foregoing　idea；



religious　progress　is　not　progress　TOWARDS；　but　WITHIN　the　sphere



of　the　Infinite。　　It　is　not　the　vain　attempt　by　endless　finite



additions　or　increments　to　become　possessed　of　infinite　wealth；



but　it　is　the　endeavor；　by　the　constant　exercise　of　spiritual



activity；　to　appropriate　that　infinite　inheritance　of　which　we



are　already　in　possession。　　The　whole　future　of　the　religious



life　is　given　in　its　beginning；　but　it　is　given　implicitly。　　The



position　of　the　man　who　has　entered　on　the　religious　life　is　that



evil；　error；　imperfection；　do　not　really　belong　to　him：　　they　are



excrescences　which　have　no　organic　relation　to　his　true　nature：　



they　are　already　virtually；　as　they　will　be　actually；　suppressed



and　annulled；　and　in　the　very　process　of　being　annulled　they



become　the　means　of　spiritual　progress。　　Though　he　is　not　exempt



from　temptation　and　conflict；　＇yet＇　in　that　inner　sphere　in　which



his　true　life　lies；　the　struggle　is　over；　the　victory　already



achieved。　　It　is　not　a　finite　but　an　infinite　life　which　the



spirit　lives。　　Every　pulse…beat　of　its　＇existence＇　is　the



expression　and　realization　of　the　life　of　God。〃＇299＇







＇299＇　John　Caird：　　An　Introduction　to　the　Philosophy　of　Religion



London　and　New　York；　1880；　pp。　243…250；　and　291…299；　much



abridged。















You　will　readily　admit　that　no　description　of　the　phenomena　of



the　religious　consciousness　could　be　better　than　these　words　of



your　lamented　preacher　and　philosopher。　They　reproduce　the　very



rapture　of　those　crises　of　conversion　of　which　we　have　been



hearing；　they　utter　what　the　mystic　felt　but　was　unable　to



communicate；　and　the　saint；　in　hearing　them；　recognizes　his　own



experience。　　It　is　indeed　gratifying　to　find　the　content　of



religion　reported　so　unanimously。　　But　when　all　is　said　and　done；



has　Principal　Cairdand　I　only　use　him　as　an　example　of　that



whole　mode　of　thinkingtranscended　the　sphere　of　feeling　and　of



the　direct　experience　of　the　individual；　and　laid　the　foundations



of　religion　in　impartial　reason？　　Has　he　made　religion　universal



by　coercive　reasoning；　transformed　it　from　a　private　faith　into　a



public　certainty？　　Has　he　rescued　its　affirmations　from　obscurity



and　mystery？







I　believe　that　he　has　done　nothing　of　the　kind；　but　that　he　has



simply　reaffirmed　the　individual's　experiences　in　a　more



generalized　vocabulary。　　And　again；　I　can　be　excused　from　proving



technically　that　the　transcendentalist　reasonings　fail　to　make



religion　universal；　for　I　can　point　to　the　plain　fact　that　a



majority　of　scholars；　even　religiously　disposed　ones；　stubbornly



refuse　to　treat　them　as　convincing。　　The　whole　of　Germany；　one



may　say；　has　positively　rejected　the　Hegelian　argumentation。　　As



for　Scotland；　I　need　only　mention　Professor　Fraser's　and



Professor　Pringle…Pattison's　memorable　criticisms；　with　which　so



many　of　you　are　familiar。＇300＇　　Once　more；　I　ask；　if



transcendental　idealism　were　　as　objectively　and　absolutely



rational　as　it　pretends　to　be；　could　it　possibly　fail　so



egregiously　to　be　persuasive？







＇300＇　A。　C。　Fraser：　　Philosophy　of　Theism；　second　edition；



Edinburgh　and　London；　1899；　especially　part　ii；　chaps。　vii。　and



viii。　　A。　Seth　＇Pringle…Pattison＇：　　Hegelianism　and　Personality；



Ibid。；　1890；　passim。















The　most　persuasive　arguments　in　favor　of　a　concrete　individual



Soul　of　the　world；　with　which　I　am　acquainted；　are　those　of　my



colleague；　Josiah　Royce；　in　his　Religious　Aspect　of　Philosophy；



Boston；　1885；　in　his　Conception　of　God；　New　York　and　London；



1897；　and　lately　in　his　Aberdeen　Gifford　Lectures；　The　World　and



the　Individual；　2　vols。；　New　York　and　London；　1901…02。　　I



doubtless　seem　to　some　of　my　readers　to　evade　the　philosophic



duty　which　my　thesis　in　this　lecture　imposes　on　me；　by　not　even



attempting　to　meet　Professor　Royce's　arguments　articulately。　　I



admit　the　momentary　evasion。　　In　the　present　lectures；　which　are



cast　throughout　in　a　popular　mould；　there　seemed　no　room　for



subtle　metaphysical　discussion；　and　for　tactical　purposes　it　was



sufficient　the　contention　of　philosophy　being　what　it　is　（namely；



that　religion　can　be　transformed　into　a　universally　convincing



science）；　to　point　to　the　fact　that　no　religious　philosophy　has



actually　convinced　the　mass　of　thinkers。　　Meanwhile　let　me　say



that　I　hope　that　the　present　volume　may　be　followed　by　another；



if　I　am　spared　to　write　it；　in　which　not　only　Professor　Royce's



arguments；　but　others　for　monistic　absolutism　shall　be　considered



with　all　the　technical　fullness　which　their　great　importance



calls　for。　　At　present　I　resign　myself　to　lying　passive　under　the



reproach　of　superficiality。







What　religion　reports；　you　must　remember；　always　purports　to　be　a



fact　of　experience：　　the　divine　is　actually　present；　religion



says；　and　between　it　and　ourselves　relations　of　give　and　take　are



actual。　　If　definite　perceptions　of　fact　like　this　cannot　stand



upon　their　own　feet；　surely　abstract　reasoning　cannot　give　them



the　support　they　are　in　need　of。　　Conceptual　processes　can　class



facts；　define　them；　interpret　them；　but　they　do　not　produce　them；



nor　can　they　reproduce　their　individuality。　　There　is　always　a



PLUS；　a　THISNESS；　which　feeling　alone　can　answer　for。　　Philosophy



in　this　sphere　is　thus　a　secondary　function；　unable　to　warrant



faith's　veracity；　and　so　I　revert　to　the　thesis　which　I　announced



at　the　beginning　of　this　lecture。







In　all　sad　sincerity　I　think　we　must　conclude　that　the　attempt　to



demonstrate　by　purely　intellectual　processes　the　truth　of　the



deliverances　of　direct　religious　experience　is　absolutely



hopeless。







It　would　be　unfair　to　philosophy；　however；　to　leave　her　under



this　negative　sentence。　　Let　me　close；　then；　by　briefly



enumerating　what　she　CAN　do　for　religion。　　If　she　will　abandon



metaphysics　and　deduction　for　criticism　and　induction；　and



frankly　transform　herself　from　theology　into　science　of



religions；　she　can　make　herself　enormously　useful。







The　spontaneous　intellect　of　man　always　defines　the　divine　which



it　feels　in　ways　that　harmonize　with　its　temporary　intellectual



prepossessions。　　Philosophy　can　by　comparison　eliminate　the　local



and　the　accidental　from　these　definitions。　　Both　from　dogma　and



from　worship　she　can　remove　historic　incrustations。　　By



confronting　the　spontaneous　religious　constructions　with　the



results　of　natural　science；　philosophy　can　also　eliminate



doctrines　that　are　now　known　to　be　scientifically　absurd　or



incongruous。



　



Sifting　out　in　this　way　unworthy　formulations；　she　can　leave　a



residuum　of　conceptions　that　at　least　are　possible。　With　these



she　can　deal　as　HYPOTHESES；　testing　them　in　all　the　manners；



whether　negative　or　positive；　by　which　hypotheses　are　ever



tested。　　She　can　reduce　their　number；　as　some　are　found　more　open



to　objection。　　She　can　perhaps　become　the　champion　of　one　which



she　picks　out　as　being　the　most　closely　verified　or　verifiable。　



She　can　refine　upon　the　definition　of　this　hypothesis；



distinguishing　between　what　is　innocent　over…belief　and　symbolism



in　the　expression　of　it；　and　what　is　to　be　literally　taken。　　As　a



result；　she　can　offer　mediation　between　different　believers；　and



help　to　bring　about　consensus　of　opinion。　　She　can　do　this　the



more　successfully；　the　better　she　discriminates　the　common　and



essential　from　the　individual　and　local　elements　of　the　religious



beliefs　which　she　compares。







I　do　not　see　why　a　critical　Science　of　Religions　of　this　sort



might　not　eventually　command　as　general　a　public　adhesion　as　is



commanded　by　a　physical　science。　　Even　the　personally



non…religious　might　accept　its　conclusions　on　trust；　much　as



blind　persons　now　accept　the　facts　of　opticsit　might　appear　as



foolish　to　refuse　them。　　Yet　as　the　science　of　optics　has　to　be



fed　in　the　first　instance；　and　continually　verified　later；　by



facts　experienced　by　seeing　persons；　so　the　science　of　religions



would　depend　for　its　original　material　on　facts　of　personal



experience；　and　would　have　to　square　itself　with　personal



experience　through　all　its　critical　reconstructions。　　It　could



never　get　away　from　concrete　life；　or　work　in　a　conceptual



vacuum。　　It　would　forever　have　to　confess；　as　every　science



confesses；　that　the　subtlety　of　nature　flies　beyond　it；　and　that



its　formulas　are　but　approximations。　Philosophy　lives　in　words；



but　truth　and　fact　well　up　into　our　lives　in　ways　that　exceed



verbal　formulation。　　There　is　in　the　living　act　of　perception



always　something　that　glimmers　and　twinkles　and　will　not　be



caught；　and　for　which　reflection　comes　too　late。　　No　one　knows



this　as　well　as　the　philosopher。　　He　must　fire　his　volley　of　new



vocables　out　of　his　conceptual　shotgun；