averse to seeing their comrades killed without compensating results；
and none realize more quickly than they the blundering that often
takes place on the field of battle。 They want some tangible
indemnity for the loss of life； and as victory is an offset the value
of which is manifest； it not only makes them content to shed their
blood； but also furnishes evidence of capacity in those who command
them。 My regiment had lost very few men since coming under my
command； but it seemed； in the eyes of all who belonged to it； that
casualties to the enemy and some slight successes for us had repaid
every sacrifice； and in consequence I had gained not only their
confidence as soldiers； but also their esteem and love as men； and to
a degree far beyond what I then realized。
As soon as the camp of my brigade was pitched at Booneville； I began
to scout in every direction； to obtain a knowledge of the enemy's
whereabouts and learn the ground about me。 My standing in drawing at
the Military Academy had never been so high as to warrant the belief
that I could ever prove myself an expert； but a few practical lessons
in that line were impressed on me there； and I had retained enough to
enable me to make rough maps that could be readily understood； and
which would be suitable to replace the erroneous skeleton outlines of
northern Mississippi； with which at this time we were scantily
furnished； so as soon as possible I compiled for the use of myself
and my regimental commanders an information map of the surrounding
country。 This map exhibited such details as country roads； streams；
farmhouses； fields； woods； and swamps； and such other topographical
features as would be useful。 I must confess that my crude sketch did
not evidence much artistic merit； but it was an improvement on what
we already possessed in the way of details to guide the command； and
this was what I most needed； for it was of the first importance that
in our exposed condition we should be equipped with a thorough
knowledge of the section in which we were operating； so as to be
prepared to encounter an enemy already indicating recovery from the
disorganizing effects of his recent retreat。
In the immediate vicinity of Booneville the country was covered with
heavy forests； with here and there clearings or intervening fields
that had been devoted to the cultivation of cotton and corn。 The
ground was of a low character； typical of northeastern Mississippi；
and abounded in small creeks that went almost totally dry even in
short periods of drought； but became flooded with muddy water under
the outpouring of rain peculiar to a semi…tropical climate。 In such
a region there were many chances of our being surprised； especially
by an enemy who knew the country well； and whose ranks were filled
with local guides； and great precautions as well as the fullest
information were necessary to prevent disaster。 I therefore
endeavored to familiarize all with our surroundings； but scarcely had
matters begun to shape themselves as I desired when our annihilation
was attempted by a large force of Confederate cavalry。
On the morning of July 1； 1862； a cavalry command of between five and
six thousand…men； under the Confederate General James R。 Chalmers；
advanced on two roads converging near Booneville。 The head of the
enemy's column on the Blackland and Booneville road came in contact
with my pickets three miles and a half west of Booneville。 These
pickets； under Lieutenant Leonidas S。 Scranton； of the Second
Michigan Cavalry； fell back slowly； taking advantage of every tree or
other cover to fire from till they arrived at the point where the
converging roads joined。 At this junction there was a strong
position in the protecting timber； and here Scranton made a firm
stand； being reinforced presently by the few men he had out as
pickets on the road to his left； a second company I had sent him from
camp； and subsequently by three companies more； all now commanded by
Captain Campbell。 This force was dismounted and formed in line； and
soon developed that the enemy was present in large numbers。 Up to
this time Chalmers had shown only the heads of his columns； and we
had doubts as to his purpose； but now that our resistance forced him
to deploy two regiments on the right and left of the road； it became
apparent that he meant business； and that there was no time to lose
in preparing to repel his attack。
Full information of the situation was immediately sent me； and I
directed Campbell to hold fast； if possible； till I could support
him； but if compelled to retire he was authorized to do so slowly；
taking advantage of every means that fell in his way to prolong the
fighting。 Before this I had stationed one battalion of the Second
Iowa in Booneville； but Colonel Edward Hatch； commanding that
regiment； was now directed to leave one company for the protection of
our camp a little to the north of the station； and take the balance
of the Second Iowa； with the battalion in Booneville except two sabre
companies； and form the whole in rear of Captain Campbell； to protect
his flanks and support him by a charge should the enemy break his
dismounted line。
While these preparations were being made； the Confederates attempted
to drive Campbell from his position by a direct attack through an
open field。 In this they failed； however； for our men； reserving
their fire until the enemy came within about thirty yards； then
opened on him with such a shower of bullets from our Colt's rifles
that it soon became too hot for him； and he was repulsed with
considerable loss。 Foiled in this move； Chalmers hesitated to attack
again in front； but began overlapping both flanks of Campbell's line
by force of numbers； compelling Campbell to retire toward a strong
position I had selected in his rear for a line on which to make our
main resistance。 As soon as the enemy saw this withdrawing he again
charged in front； but was again as gallantly repelled as in the first
assault； although the encounter was for a short time so desperate as
to have the character of a hand…to…hand conflict； several groups of
friend and foe using on each other the butts of their guns。 At this
juncture the timely arrival of Colonel Hatch with the Second Iowa
gave a breathing…spell to Campbell； and made the Confederates so
chary of further direct attacks that he was enabled to retire； and at
the same time I found opportunity to make disposition of the
reinforcement to the best advantage possible； placing the Second Iowa
on the left of the new line and strengthening Campbell on its right
with all the men available。
In view of his numbers； the enemy soon regained confidence in his
ability to overcome us； and in a little while again began his
flanking movements； his right passing around my left flank some
distance； and approaching our camp and transportation； which I had
forbidden to be moved out to the rear。 Fearing that he would envelop
us and capture the camp and transportation； I determined to take the
offensive。 Remembering a circuitous wood road that I had become
familiar with while making the map heretofore mentioned； I concluded
that the most effective plan would be to pass a small column around
the enemy's left； by way of this road； and strike his rear by a
mounted charge simultaneously with an advance of our main line on his
front。 I knew that the attack in rear would be a most hazardous
undertaking； but in the face of such odds as the enemy had the
condition of affairs was most critical； and could be relieved； only
by a bold and radical change in our tactics； so I at once selected
four sabre companies； two from the Second Michigan and two from the
Second Iowa； and placing Captain Alger； of the former regiment； in
command of them； I informed him that I expected of them the quick and
desperate work that is usually imposed on a forlorn hope。
To carry out the purpose now in view； I instructed Captain Alger to
follow the wood road as it led around the left of the enemy's
advancing forces； to a point where 'it joined the Blackland road；
about three miles from Booneville； and directed him； upon reaching
the Blackland road； to turn up it immediately； and charge the rear of
the enemy's line。 Under no circumstances was he to deploy the
battalion； but charge in column right through whatever he came upon；
and report to me in front of Booneville； if at all possible for him
to get there。 If he failed to break through the enemy's line； he was
to go ahead as far as he could； and then if any of his men were left；
and he was able to retreat； he was to do so by the same route he had
taken on his way out。 To conduct him on this perilous service I sent
along a thin； sallow； tawny…haired Mississippian named Beene； whom I
had employed as a guide and scout a few days before； on account of
his intimate knowledge of the roads； from the public thoroughfares
down to the insignificant by…paths of the neighboring swamps。 With
such guidance I felt sure that the column would get to the desired
point without delay； for there was no danger of its being lost or
misled by taking any of the many by…roads which traversed the dense
forests through which it would be obliged to pass。 I also informed
Alger that I should take the reserve and join the main line in front
of Booneville for the purpose of making an advance of my whole force；
and that as a signal he must have his men cheer loudly when he struck
the enemy's rear； in order that my attack might be simultaneous with
his。
I gave him one hour to go around and come back through the enemy； and
when he started I moved to the front with the balance of the reserve；
to put everything I had into the fight。 This meant an inestimable
advantage to the enemy in case of our defeat； but our own safety
demanded the hazard。 All along our attenuated line the fighting was
now sharp； a