personal memoirs-1- 第31部分

touch　their　disgraced　swords；　I　compelled　them　to　deliver　theirs　up

to　my　colored　servant；　who　also　cut　from　their　coats　every　insignia

of　rank。　　Then；　after　there　had　been　read　to　the　command　an　order

from　army　headquarters　dismissing　the　four　from　the　service；　the

scene　was　brought　to　a　close　by　drumming　the　cowards　out　of　camp。　　It

was　a　mortifying　spectacle；　but　from　that　day　no　officer　in　that

division　ever　abandoned　his　colors。



My　effective　force　in　the　battle　of　Stone　River　was　4；154　officers

and　men。　　Of　this　number　I　lost　1；633　killed；　wounded；　and　missing；

or　nearly　40　per　cent。　　In　the　remaining　years　of　the　war；　though

often　engaged　in　most　severe　contests；　I　never　experienced　in　any　of

my　commands　so　high　a　rate　of　casualties。　　The　ratio　of　loss　in　the

whole　of　Rosecrans's　army　was　also　high；　and　Bragg's　losses　were

almost　equally　great。　　Rosecrans　carried　into　the　action　about　42；000

officers　and　men。　　He　lost　13；230；　or　31　per　cent。　　Bragg's　effective

force　was　37；800　officers　and　men；　he　lost　10；306；　or　nearly　28　per

cent。



Though　our　victory　was　dearly　bought；　yet　the　importance　of　gaining

the　day　at　any　price　was　very　great；　particularly　when　we　consider

what　might　have　been　the　result　had　not　the　gallantry　of　the　army　and

the　manoeuvring　during　the　early　disaster　saved　us　from　ultimate

defeat。　　We　had　started　out　from　Nashville　on　an　offensive　campaign；

probably　with　no　intention　of　going　beyond　Murfreesboro'；　in

midwinter；　but　still　with　the　expectation　of　delivering　a　crushing

blow　should　the　enemy　accept　our　challenge　to　battle。　　He　met　us　with

a　plan　of　attack　almost　the　counterpart　of　our　own。　　In　the　execution

of　his　plan　he　had　many　advantages；　not　the　least　of　which　was　his

intimate　knowledge　of　the　ground；　and　he　came　near　destroying　us。

Had　he　done　so；　Nashville　would　probably　have　fallen；　at　all　events；

Kentucky　would　have　been　opened　again　to　his　incursions；　and　the

theatre　of　war　very　likely　transferred　once　more　to　the　Ohio　River。

As　the　case　now　stood；　however；　Nashville　was　firmly　established　as　a

base　for　future　operations；　Kentucky　was　safe　from　the　possibility　of

being　again　overrun；　and　Bragg；　thrown　on　the　defensive；　was

compelled　to　give　his　thoughts　to　the　protection　of　the　interior　of

the　Confederacy　and　the　security　of　Chattanooga；　rather　than　indulge

in　schemes　of　conquest　north　of　the　Cumberland　River。　　While　he　still

held　on　in　Middle　Tennessee　his　grasp　was　so　much　loosened　that　only

slight　effort　would　be　necessary　to　push　him　back　into　Georgia；　and

thus　give　to　the　mountain　region　of　East　Tennessee　an　opportunity　to

prove　its　loyalty　to　the；　Union。



The　victory　quieted　the　fears　of　the　West　and　Northwest；　destroyed

the　hopes　of　the　secession　element　in　Kentucky；　renewed　the　drooping

spirits　of　the　East　Tennesseans；　and　demoralized　the　disunionists　in

Middle　Tennessee；　yet　it　was　a　negative　victory　so　far　as　concerned

the　result　on　the　battle…field。　　Rosecrans　seems　to　have　planned　the

battle　with　the　idea　that　the　enemy　would　continue　passive；　remain

entirely　on　the　defensive；　and　that　it　was　necessary　only　to　push

forward　our　left　in　order　to　force　the　evacuation　of　Murfreesboro'；

and　notwithstanding　the　fact　that　on　the　afternoon　of　December　30

McCook　received　information　that　the　right　of　Johnson's　division。

resting　near　the　Franklin　pike；　extended　only　to　about　the　centre　of

the　Confederate　army；　it　does　not　appear　that　attack　from　that

quarter　was　at　all　apprehended　by　the　Union　commanders。



The　natural　line　of　retreat　of　the　Confederates　was　not　threatened　by

the　design　of　Rosecrans；　and　Bragg；　without　risk　to　his

communications；　anticipated　it　by　a　counter…attack　of　like　character

from　his　own　left；　and　demolished　his　adversary's　plan　the　moment　we

were　thrown　on　the　defensive。　　Had　Bragg　followed　up　with　the　spirit

which　characterized　its　beginning　the　successful　attack　by　Hardee　on

our　right　wingand　there　seems　no　reason　why　he　should　not　have　done

sothe　army　of　Rosecrans　still　might　have　got　back　to　Nashville；　but

it　would　have　been　depleted　and　demoralized　to　such　a　degree　as　to

unfit　it　for　offensive　operations　for　a　long　time　afterward。　　Bragg's

intrenchments　in　front　of　Stone　River　were　very　strong；　and　there

seems　no　reason　why　he　should　not　have　used　his　plain　advantage　as

explained；　but　instead　he　allowed　us　to　gain　time；　intrench；　and

recover　a　confidence　that　at　first　was　badly　shaken。　　Finally；　to　cap

the　climax　of　his　errors；　he　directed　Breckenridge　to　make　the

assault　from　his　right　flank　on　January　2；　with　small　chance　for

anything　but　disaster；　when　the　real　purpose　in　view　could　have　been

accomplished　without　the　necessity　of　any　offensive　manoeuvre

whatever。









CHAPTER　XIV。



APPOINTED　A　MAJOR…GENERALTHE　SECRET　EXPEDITION　UNDER　CARD　THE

SCOUTHIS　CAPTURE　BY　GUERRILLASESCAPEA　REVENGE　PARTYWOMEN

SOLDIERSA　FIGHT　WITH　SABRESTULLAHOMA　CAMPAIGNA　FOOLISH

ADVENTURE。



On　the　6th　of　January；　1863；　my　division　settled　quietly　down　in　its

camp　south　of　Murfreesboro'。　　Its　exhausted　condition　after　the

terrible　experiences　of　the　preceding　week　required　attention。　　It

needed　recuperation；　reinforcement；　and　reorganization；　and　I　set

about　these　matters　without　delay；　in　anticipation　of　active

operations　early　in　the　spring。　　No　forward　movement　was　made　for

nearly　six　months；　however；　and　throughout　this　period　drills；

parades；　reconnoissances；　and　foraging　expeditions　filled　in　the　time

profitably。　　In　addition　to　these　exercises　the　construction　of

permanent　fortifications　for　the　security　of　Murfreesboro'　was

undertaken　by　General　Rosecrans；　and　large　details　from　my　troops

were　furnished　daily　for　the　work。　　Much　attention　was　also　given　to

creating　a　more　perfect　system　of　guard　and　picket　duty…a　matter　that

had　hitherto　been　somewhat　neglected　in　the　army；　as　its　constant

activity　had　permitted　scant　opportunity　for　the　development　of　such

a　system。　　It　was　at　this　time　that　I　received　my　appointment　as　a

major…general　of　Volunteers。　　My　promotion　had　been　recommended　by

General　Rosecrans　immediately　after　the　battle　of　Stone　River；　but

for　some　reason　it　was　delayed　until　April；　and　though　a　long　time

elapsed　between　the　promise　and　the　performance；　my　gratification　was

extreme。



My　scout；　Card；　was　exceedingly　useful　while　encamped　near

Murfreesboro；　making　several　trips　to　East　Tennessee　within　the

enemy's　lines　to　collect　information　as　to　the　condition　of　the　loyal

people　there；　and　to　encourage　them　with　the　hope　of　early

liberation。　　He　also　brought　back　from　each　trip　very　accurate

statements　as　to　the　strength　and　doings　of　the　Confederate　army；

fixing　almost　with　certainty　its　numbers　and　the　locations　of　its

different　divisions；　and　enabling　my　engineer…officerMajor

Morhardtto　construct　good　maps　of　the　country　in　our　front。　　On

these　dangerous　excursions　Card　was　always　accompanied　by　one　of　his

brothers；　the　other　remaining　with　me　to　be　ready　for　duty　if　any

accident　occurred　to　those　who　had　gone　out；　or　in　case　I　wanted　to

communicate　with　them。　　In　this　way　we　kept　well　posted；　although　the

intelligence　these　men　brought　was　almost　always　secured　at　the　risk

of　their　lives。



Early　in　the　spring；　before　the　Tullahoma　campaign　began；　I　thought

it　would　be　practicable；　by　sending　out　a　small　secret　expedition　of

but　three　or　four　men；　to　break　the　Nashville　and　Chattanooga

railroad　between　Chattanooga　and　the　enemy's　position　at　Tullahoma　by

burning　the　bridges　in　Crow　Creek　valley　from　its　head　to　Stevenson；

Alabama；　and　then　the　great　bridge　across　the　Tennessee　River　at

Bridgeport。　　Feeling　confident　that　I　could　persuade　Card　to

undertake　the　perilous　duty；　I　broached　the　contemplated　project　to

him；　and　he　at　once　jumped　at　the　opportunity　of　thus　distinguishing

himself；　saying　that　with　one　of　his　brothers　and　three　other　loyal

East　Tennesseeans；　whose　services　he　knew　could　be　enlisted；　he　felt

sure　of　carrying　out　the　idea；　so　I　gave　him　authority　to　choose　his

own　assistants。　　In　a　few　days　his　men　appeared　at　my　headquarters；

and　when　supplied　with　money　in　notes　of　the　State　Bank　of　Tennessee；

current　everywhere　as　gold　in　those　days；　the　party；　composed　of

Card；　the　second　brother；　and　the　three　East　Tennesseeans；　started　on

their　precarious　enterprise；　their　course　being　directed　first　toward

the　Cumberland　Mountains；　intending　to　strike　the　Nashville　and

Chattanooga　railroad　somewhere　above　Anderson's　station。　　They

expected　to　get　back　in　about　fifteen　days；　but　I　looked　for　some

knowledge　of　the　progress　of　their　adventure　before　the　expiration　of

that　period；　hoping　to　hear　through　Confederate　sources　prisoners　and

the　like…of　the　destruction　of　the　bridges。　　I　waited　in　patience　for

such　news；　but　none　came；　and　as　the　time　Card　had　allotted　himself

passed　by；　I　watched　anxiously　for　his　return；　for；　as　there　was

scarcely　a　doubt　that　the　expedition　had　proved　a　failure；　the　fate

of　the　party　became　a　matter　of　deep　concern　to　Card's　remaining

brother　and　to　me。　　Finally　this　brother　volunteered　to　go　to　his

father's　house　in　East　Tennessee　to　get　tidings　of　the　party；　and　I

consented；　for　the　probabilities　were　that　some　of　them　had　made

their　way　to　that　point；　or　at　least　that　some　information　had

reached　there　about　them。　　As　day　after　day　went　by；　the　time　fixed

for　this　brother's　return　came　round；　yet　he　also　remained　out；　but

some　days　after　the　lad　was　due　Card　himself　turned　up　accompanied　by

the　brother　he　had　taken　with　him；　soon　explained　his　delay　in

getting　back；　and　gave　me　the　story　of　his　adventures　while　absent。



After　leaving　my　camp；　his　party　had　followed　various　byways　across

the　Cumberland　Mountains　to　Crow　Creek　Valley；　as　instructed；　but

when　nearing　the　railroad　above　Anderson's　Station；　they　were

captured　by　some　guerrillas