personal memoirs-1- 第35部分

persecuted　by　guerrillas　on　account　of　his　loyal　sentiments。　　He　knew

the　country　well；　and　as　his　loyalty　was　vouched　for　I　asked　him　to

go　into　the　enemy's　camp；　which　I　believed　to　be　near　Lafayette；　and；

bring　me　such　information　as　he　could　gather。　　He　said　such　a　journey

would　be　at　the　risk　of　his　life；　and　that　at　best　he　could　not

expect　to　remain　in　that　section　of　country　if　he　undertook　it；　but

that　he　would　run　all　the　chances　if　I　would　enable　him　to　emigrate

to　the　West　at　the　end　c　f　the　〃job；〃　which　I　could　do　by　purchasing

the　small　〃bunch〃　of　stock　he　owned　on　the　mountain。　　To　this　I

readily　assented；　and　he　started　on　the　delicate　undertaking。　　He

penetrated　the　enemy's　lines　with　little　difficulty；　but　while

prosecuting　his　search　for　information　was　suspected；　and　at　once

arrested　and　placed　under　guard。　　From　this　critical　situation　he

escaped；　however；　making　his　way　through　the　enemy's　picket…line　in

the　darkness　by　crawling　on　his　belly　and　deceiving　the　sentinels　by

imitating　the　grunts　of　the　half…wild；　sand…colored　hogs　with　which

the　country　abounded。　　He　succeeded　in　reaching　Rosecrans's

headquarters　finally；　and　there　gave　the　definite　information　that

Bragg　intended　to　fight；　and　that　he　expected　to　be　reinforced　by

Longstreet。



By　this　time　it　was　clear　that　Bragg　had　abandoned　Chattanooga　with

the　sole　design　of　striking　us　in　detail　as　we　followed　in　pursuit；

and　to　prevent　his　achieving　this　purpose　orders　came　at　12　o'clock；

midnight；　for　McCook　to　draw　in　toward　Chattanooga。　　This　could　be

done　only　by　recrossing　Lookout　Mountain；　the　enemy's　army　at

Lafayette　now　interposing　between　us　and　Thomas's　corps。　　The

retrograde　march　began　at　once。　　I　moved　back　over　the　mountain　on

the　13th　and　14th　to　Stevens's　Mills；　and　on　the　15th　and　16th

recrossed　through　Stevens's　Gap；　in　the　Lookout　range；　and　encamped

at　its　base　in　McLamore's　cove。　　The　march　was　made　with　all　possible

celerity；　for　the　situation　was　critical　and　demanded　every　exertion。

The　ascent　and　descent　of　the　mountains　was　extremely　exhausting；　the

steep　grades　often　rendering　it　necessary　to　drag　up　and　let　down　by

hand　both　the　transportation　and　artillery。　　But　at　last　we　were　in

conjunction　with　the　main　army；　and　my　division　breathed　easier。



On　the　17th　I　remained　in　line　of　battle　all　day　and　night　in　front

of　McLamore's　cove；　the　enemy　making　slight　demonstrations　against　me

from　the　direction　of　Lafayette。　　The　main　body　of　the　army　having

bodily　moved　to　the　left　meanwhile；　I　followed　it　on　the　18th；

encamping　at　Pond　Spring。　　On　the　19th　I　resumed　the　march　to　the

left　and　went　into　line　of　battle　at　Crawfish　Springs　to　cover　our

right　and　rear。　　Immediately　after　forming　this　line；　I　again　became

isolated　by　the　general　movement　to　the　left；　and　in　consequence　was

directed　to　advance　and　hold　the　ford　of　Chickamauga　Creek　at　Lee　and

Gordon's　Mills；　thus　coming　into　close　communication　with　the　balance

of　our　forces。　　I　moved　into　this　position　rapidly；　being　compelled；

though；　first　to　drive　back　the　enemy's　cavalry　skirmishers；　who；

having　crossed　to　the　west　side　of　the　creek；　annoyed　the　right　flank

of　my　column　a　good　deal　while　en　route。



Upon　arrival　at　Lee　and　Gordon's　Mills　I　found　the　ford　over

Chickamauga　Creek　temporarily　uncovered；　through　the　hurried　movement

of　Wood　to　the　assistance　of　Davis's　division。　　The　enemy　was　already

present　in　small　force；　with　the　evident　intention　of　taking

permanent　possession；　but　my　troops　at　once　actively　engaged　him　and

recovered　the　ford　with　some　slight　losses。　　Scarcely　had　this　been

done　when　I　was　directed　to　assist　Crittenden。　　Leaving　Lytle's

brigade　at　the　ford；　I　proceeded　with　Bradley's　and　Laiboldt's　to

help　Crittenden；　whose　main　line　was　formed　to　the　east　of　the

Chattanooga　and　Lafayette　road；　its　right　trending　toward　a　point　on

Chickamauga　Creek　about　a　mile　and　a　half　north　of　Lee　and　Gordon's

Mills。　　By　the　time　I　had　joined　Crittenden　with　my　two　brigades；

Davis　had　been　worsted　in　an　attack　Rosecrans　had　ordered　him　to　make

on　the　left　of　that　portion　of　the　enemy's　line　which　was　located

along　the　west　bank　of　the　Chickamauga；　the　repulse　being　so　severe

that　one　of　Davis's　batteries　had　to　be　abandoned。　　Bradley's　brigade

arrived　on　the　ground　first　and　was　hastily　formed　and　thrown　into

the　fight；　which　up　to　this　moment　had　been　very　doubtful；　fortune

inclining　first　to　one　side；　then　to　the　other。　　Bradley's　brigade

went　in　with　steadiness；　and　charging　across　an　open　corn…field　that

lay　in　front　of　the　Lafayette　road；　recovered　Davis's　guns　and　forced

the　enemy　to　retire。　　Meanwhile　Laiboldt's　brigade　had　come　on　the

scene；　and　forming　it　on　Bradley's　right；　I　found　myself　at　the　end

of　the　contest　holding　the　ground　which　was　Davis's　original

position。　　It　was　an　ugly　fight　and　my　loss　was　heavy；　including

Bradley　wounded。　　The　temporary　success　was　cheering；　and　when

Lytle's　brigade　joined　me　a　little　later　I　suggested　to　Crittenden

that　we　attack；　but　investigation　showed　that　his　troops；　having　been

engaged　all　day；　were　not　in　condition；　so　the　suggestion　could　not

be　carried　out。



The　events　of　the　day　had　indicated　that　Bragg's　main　object　was　to

turn　Rosecrans's　left；　it　was　therefore　still　deemed　necessary　that

the　army　should　continue　its　flank　movement　to　the　left；　so　orders

came　to　draw　my　troops　in　toward　the　widow　Glenn's　house。　　By

strengthening　the　skirmish　line　and　shifting　my　brigades　in

succession　from　right　to　left　until　the　point　designated　was　reached；

I　was　able　to　effect　the　withdrawal　without　much　difficulty；　calling

in　my　skirmish　line　after　the　main　force　had　retired。



My　command　having　settled　down　for　the　night　in　this　new　line　I　rode

to　army　headquarters；　to　learn　if　possible　the　expectations　for　the

morrow　and　hear　the　result　of　the　battle　in　General　Thomas's　front。

Nearly　all　the　superior　officers　of　the　army　were　at　headquarters；

and　it　struck　me　that　much　depression　prevailed；　notwithstanding　the

fact　that　the　enemy's　attempts　during　the　day　to　turn　our　left　flank

and　also　envelop　our　right　had　been　unsuccessful。　　It　was　now

positively　known；　through　prisoners　and　otherwise；　that　Bragg　had

been　reinforced　to　such　an　extent　as　to　make　him　materially　outnumber

us；　consequently　there　was　much　apprehension　for　the　future。



The　necessity　of　protecting　our　left　was　most　apparent；　and　the　next

day　the　drifting　in　that　direction　was　to　be　continued。　　This

movement　in　the　presence　of　the　enemy；　who　at　all　points　was　actively

seeking　an　opportunity　to　penetrate　our　line　and　interpose　a　column

between　its　right　and　left；　was　most　dangerous。　　But　the　necessity

for　shifting　the　army　to　the　left　was　obvious；　hence　only　the　method

by　which　it　was　undertaken　is　open　to　question。　　The　move　was　made　by

the　flank　in　the　face　of　an　exultant　foe　superior　in　numbers；　and　was

a　violation　of　a　simple　and　fundamental　military　principle。　　Under

such　circumstauces　columns　naturally　stretch　out　into　attenuated

lines；　organizations　become　separated；　and　intervals　occur；　all　of

which　we　experienced；　and　had　the　orders　for　the　movement　been

construed　properly　I　doubt　if　it　could　have　been　executed　without

serious　danger。　　Necessity　knows　no　law；　however；　and　when　all　the

circumstances　of　this　battle　are　fully　considered　it　is　possible　that

justification　may　be　found　for　the　manoeuvres　by　which　the　army　was

thus　drifted　to　the　left。　　We　were　in　a　bad　strait　unquestionably；

and　under　such　conditions　possibly　the　exception　had　to　be　applied

rather　than　the　rule。



At　daylight　on　the　morning　of　the　20th　a　dense　fog　obscured

everything；　consequently　both　armies　were　passive　so　far　as　fighting

was　concerned。　　Rosecrans　took　advantage　of　the　inaction　to　rearrange

his　right；　and　I　was　pulled　back　closer　to　the　widow　Glenn's　house　to

a　strong　position；　where　I　threw　together　some　rails　and　logs　as

barricades；　but　I　was　disconnected　from　the　troops　on　my　left　by　a

considerable　interval。　　Here　I　awaited　the　approach　of　the　enemy；　but

he　did　not　disturb　me；　although　about　9　o'clock　in　the　forenoon　he

had　opened　on　our　extreme　left　with　musketry　fire　and　a　heavy

cannonade。　　Two　hours　later　it　was　discovered　by　McCook　that　the

interval　between　the　main　army　and　me　was　widening；　and　he　ordered　me

to　send　Laiboldt's　brigade　to　occupy　a　portion　of　the　front　that　had

been　covered　by　Negley's　division。　　Before　getting　this　brigade　into

place；　however；　two　small　brigades　of　Davis's　division　occupied　the

ground；　and　I　directed　Laiboldt　to　form　in　column　of　regiments　on　the

crest　of　a　low　ridge　in　rear　of　Carlin's　brigade；　so　as　to　prevent

Davis's　right　flank　from　being　turned。　　The　enemy　was　now　feeling

Davis　strongly；　and　I　was　about　sending　for　Lytle's　and　Bradley's

brigades　when　I　received　an　order　to　move　these　rapidly　to　the；

extreme　left　of　the　army　to　the　assistance　of　General　Thomas。　　I　rode

hastily　back　toward　their　position；　but　in　the　meanwhile；　they　had

been　notified　by　direct　orders　from　McCook；　and　were　moving　out　at　a

double…quick　toward　the　Lafayette　road。　　By　this　time　the　enemy　had

assaulted　Davis　furiously　in　front　and　flank；　and　driven　him　from　his

line；　and　as　the　confused　mass　came　back；　McCook　ordered　Laiboldt　to

charge　by　deploying　to　the　front。　　This　he　did　through　Davis's　broken

ranks；　but　failed　to　check　the　enemy's　heavy　lines；　and　finally

Laiboldt's　brigade　broke　also　and　fell　to　the　rear。　　My　remaining

troops；　headed　by　Lytle；　were　now　passing　along　the　rear　of　the

ground　where　this　disaster　took　placein　column　on　the　roaden

route　to　Thomas；　and　as　the　hundreds　of　fugitives　rushed　back；　McCook

directed　me　to　throw　in　Lytle's　and　Bradley's　brigades。　　This　was

hastily　done；　they　being　formed　to　the　front　under　a　terrible　fire。

Scarcely　were　they　aligned　when　the　same　horde　of　Confedera