personal memoirs-1- 第46部分

troops　as　to　secure　these　objects　by　holding　the　line　of　the　Brock

road　beyond　the　Furnaces；　and　thence　around　to　Todd's　Tavern　and

Piney　Branch　Church。　　On　the　6th；　through　some　false　information；

General　Meade　became　alarmed　about　his　left　flank；　and　sent　me　the

following　note：



〃HEADQUARTERS　ARMY　OF　THE　POTOMAC；

〃May　6；　1864。1　o'clock　P。　M。

〃MAJOR…GENERAL　SHERIDAN；

〃Commanding　Cavalry　Corps



〃Your　despatch　of　11。45　a。m。；　received。　　General　Hancock　has　been

heavily　pressed；　and　his　left　turned。　　The　major…general　commanding

thinks　that　you　had　better　draw　in　your　cavalry；　so　as　to　secure　the

protection　of　the　trains。　　The　order　requiring　an　escort　for　the

wagons　to…night　has　been　rescinded。



〃A。　A。　HUMPHREYS；

〃Major…General；　Chief…of…Staff。〃





On　the　morning　of　the　6th　Custer's　and　Devin's　brigades　had　been

severely　engaged　at　the　Furnaces　before　I　received　the　above　note。

They　had　been　most　successful　in　repulsing　the　enemy's　attacks；

however；　and　I　felt　that　the　line　taken　up　could　be　held；　but　the

despatch　from　General　Humphreys　was　alarming；　so　I　drew　all　the

cavalry　close　in　toward　Chancellorsville。　　It　was　found　later　that

Hancock's　left　had　not　been　turned；　and　the　points　thus　abandoned　had

to　be　regained　at　a　heavy　cost　in　killed　and　wounded；　to　both　the

cavalry　and　the　infantry。



On　the　7th　of　May；　under　directions　from　headquarters；　Army　of　the

Potomac；　the　trains　were　put　in　motion　to　go　into　park　at　Piney

Branch　Church；　in　anticipation　of　the　movement　that　was　about　to　be

made　for　the　possession　of　Spottsylvania　Court　House。　　I　felt

confident　that　the　order　to　move　the　trains　there　had　been　given

without　a　full　understanding　of　the　situation；　for　Piney　Branch

Church　was　now　held　by　the　enemy；　a　condition　which　had　resulted　from

the　order　withdrawing　the　cavalry　on　account　of　the　supposed　disaster

to　Hancock's　left　the　day　before；　but　I　thought　the　best　way　to

remedy　matters　was　to　hold　the　trains　in　the　vicinity　of　Aldrich's

till　the　ground　on　which　it　was　intended　to　park　them　should　be

regained。



This　led　to　the　battle　of　Todd's　Tavern；　a　spirited　fight　for　the

possession　of　the　crossroads　at　that　point；　participated　in　by　the

enemy's　cavalry　and　Gregg's　division；　and　two　brigades　of　Torbert's

division；　the　latter　commanded　by　Merritt；　as　Torbert　became　very　ill

on　the　6th；　and　had　to　be　sent　to　the　rear。　　To　gain　the　objective

pointthe　crossroadsI　directed　Gregg　to　assail　the　enemy　on　the

Catharpen　road　with　Irvin　Gregg's　brigade　and　drive　him　over　Corbin's

bridge；　while　Merritt　attacked　him　with　the　Reserve　brigade　on　the

Spottsylvania　road　in　conjunction　with　Davies's　brigade　of　Gregg's

division；　which　was　to　be　put　in　on　the　Piney　Branch　Church　road；　and

unite　with　Merritt's　left。　　Davies's　and　Irvin　Gregg's　brigades　on　my

right　and　left　flanks　met　with　some　resistance；　yet　not　enough　to

deter　them　from；　executing　their　orders。　　In　front　of　Merritt　the

enemy　held　on　more　stubbornly；　however；　and　there　ensued　an

exceedingly　severe　and；　at　times；　fluctuating　fight。　　Finally　the

Confederates　gave　way；　and　we　pursued　them　almost　to　Spottsylvania

Court　House；　but　deeming　it　prudent　to　recall　the　pursuers　about

dark；　I　encamped　Gregg's　and　Merritt's　divisions　in　the　open　fields

to　the　east　of　Todd's　Tavern。



During　the　preceding　three　days　the　infantry　corps　of　the　army　had

been　engaged　in　the　various　conflicts　known　as　the　battles　of　the

Wilderness。　　The　success　of　the　Union　troops　in　those　battles　had　not

been　all　that　was　desired；　and　General　Grant　now　felt　that　it　was

necessary　to　throw　himself　on　Lee's　communications　if　possible；　while

preserving　his　own　intact　by　prolonging　the　movement　to　the　left。

Therefore；　on　the　evening　of　the　7th　he　determined　to　shift　his　whole

army　toward　Spottsylvania　Court　House；　and　initiated　the　movement　by

a　night　march　of　the　infantry　to　Todd's　Tavern。　　In　view　of　what　was

contemplated；　I　gave　orders　to　Gregg　and　Merritt　to　move　at　daylight

on　the　morning　of　the　8th；　for　the　purpose　of　gaining　possession　of

Snell's　bridge　over　the　Po　River；　the　former　by　the　crossing　at

Corbin's　bridge　and　the　latter　by　the　Block　House。　　I　also　directed

Wilson；　who　was　at　Alsop's　house；　to　take　possession　of　Spottsylvania

as　early　as　possible　on　the　morning　of　the　8th；　and　then　move　into

position　at　Snell's　bridge　conjointly　with　the　other　two　divisions。

Wilson's　orders　remained　as　I　had　issued　them；　so　he　moved

accordingly　and　got　possession　of　Spottsylvania；　driving　the　enemy's

cavalry　a　mile　beyond；　as　will　be　seen　by　the　following　despatch　sent

me　at　9　A。　M。　of　the　8th：



〃HEADQUARTERS　THIRD　DIVISION；　CAVALRY　CORPS；

〃ARMY　OF　THE　POTOMAC。

〃SPOTTSYLVANIA　COURT　HOUSE；　May　8；　1864　9　A。　M。

〃　LIEUTENANT…COLONEL　FORSYTH；　CHIEF…OF…STAFF；　C。　C。



〃Have　run　the　enemy's　cavalry　a　mile　from　Spottsylvania　Court　House；

have　charged　them；　and　drove　them　through　the　village；　am　fighting

now　with　a　considerable　force；　supposed　to　be　Lee's　division。

Everything　all　right。



〃J。　H。　WILSON；

〃Brigadier…General　Commanding。





During　the　night　of　the　7th　General　Meade　arrived　at　Todd's　Tavern

and　modified　the　orders　I　had　given　Gregg　and　Merritt；　directing

Gregg　simply　to　hold　Corbin's　bridge；　and　Merritt　to　move　out　in

front　of　the　infantry　column　marching　on　the　Spottsylvania　road。

Merritt　proceeded　to　obey；　but　in　advancing；　our　cavalry　and　infantry

became　intermingled　in　the　darkness；　and　much　confusion　and　delay　was

the　consequence。　　I　had　not　been　duly　advised　of　these　changes　in

Gregg's　and　Merritt's　orders；　and　for　a　time　I　had　fears　for　the

safety　of　Wilson；　but；　while　he　was　preparing　to　move　on　to　form　his

junction　with　Gregg　and　Merritt　at　Snell's　bridge；　the　advance　of

Anderson　（who　was　now　commanding　Longstreet's　corps）　appeared　on　the

scene　and　drove　him　from　Spottsylvania。



Had　Gregg　and　Merritt　been　permitted　to　proceed　as　they　were

originally　instructed；　it　is　doubtful　whether　the　battles　fought　at

Spottsylvania　would　have　occurred；　for　these　two　divisions　would　have

encountered　the　enemy　at　the　Pa　River；　and　so　delayed　his　march　as　to

enable　our　infantry　to　reach　Spottsylvania　first；　and　thus　force　Lee

to　take　up　a　line　behind　the　Po。　　I　had　directed　Wilson　to　move　from

the　left　by　〃the　Gate〃　through　Spottsylvania　to　Snell's　bridge；　while

Gregg　and　Merritt　were　to　advance　to　the　same　point　by　Shady　Grove

and　the　Block　House。　　There　was　nothing　to　prevent　at　least　a　partial

success　of　these　operations；　that　is　to　say；　the　concentration　of　the

three　divisions　in　front　of　Snell's　bridge；　even　if　we　could　not

actually　have　gained　it。　　But　both　that　important　point　and　the

bridge　on　the　Block　House　road　were　utterly　ignored；　and　Lee's

approach　to　Spottsylvania　left　entirely　unobstructed；　while　three

divisions　of　cavalry　remained　practically　ineffective　by　reason　of

disjointed　and　irregular　instructions。



On　the　morning　of　the　8th；　when　I　found　that　such　orders　had　been

given；　I　made　some　strong　remonstrances　against　the　course　that　had

been　pursued；　but　it　was　then　too　late　to　carry　out　the　combinations

I　had　projected　the　night　before；　so　I　proceeded　to　join　Merritt　on

the　Spottsylvania　road。　　On　reaching　Merritt　I　found　General　Warren

making　complaint　that　the　cavalry　were　obstructing　his　infantry

column；　so　I　drew　Merritt　off　the　road；　and　the　leading　division　of

the　Fifth　Corps　pushed　up　to　the　front。　　It　got　into　line　about　　11

o'clock；　and　advanced　to　take　the　village；　but　it　did　not　go　very　far

before　it　struck　Anderson's　corps；　and　was　hurled　back　with　heavy

loss。　　This　ended　all　endeavor　to　take　Spottsylvania　that　day。



A　little　before　noon　General　Meade　sent　for　me；　and　when　I　reached

his　headquarters　I　found　that　his　peppery　temper　had　got　the　better

of　his　good　judgment；　he　showing　a　disposition　to　be　unjust；　laying

blame　here　and　there　for　the　blunders　that　had　been　committed。　　He

was　particularly　severe　on　the　cavalry；　saying；　among　other　things；

that　it　had　impeded　the　march　of　the　Fifth　Corps　by　occupying　the

Spottsylvania　road。　　I　replied　that　if　this　were　true；　he　himself　had

ordered　it　there　without　my　knowledge。　　I　also　told　him　that　he　had

broken　up　my　combinations；　exposed　Wilson's　division　to　disaster；　and

kept　Gregg　unnecessarily　idle；　and　further；　repelled　his　insinuations

by　saying　that　such　disjointed　operations　as　he　had　been　requiring　of

the　cavalry　for　the　last　four　days　would　render　the　corps　inefficient

and　useless　before　long。　　Meade　was　very　much　irritated；　and　I　was

none　the　less　so。　　One　word　brought　on　another；　until；　finally；　I

told　him　that　I　could　whip　Stuart　if　he　（Meade）　would　only　let　me；

but　since　he　insisted　on　giving　the　cavalry　directions　without

consulting　or　even　notifying　me；　he　could　henceforth　command　the

Cavalry　Corps　himselfthat　I　would　not　give　it　another　order。



The　acrimonious　interview　ended　with　this　remark；　and　after　I　left

him　he　went　to　General　Grant's　headquarters　and　repeated　the

conversation　to　him；　mentioning　that　I　had　said　that　I　could　whip

Stuart。　　At　this　General　Grant　remarked：　〃Did　he　say　so？　Then　let　him

go　out　and　do　it。〃　　This　intimation　was　immediately　acted　upon　by

General　Meade；　and　a　little　later　the　following　order　came　to　me：



〃HEADQUARTERS　ARMY　OF　THE　POTOMAC

〃May　8th；　1864　1　P。　M。



〃GENERAL　SHERIDAN；

〃Commanding　Cavalry　Corps。



〃The　major…general　commanding　directs　you　to　immediately　concentrate

your　available　mounted　force；　and　with　your　ammunition　trains　and

such　supply　trains　as　are　filled　（exclusive　of　ambulances）　proceed

against　the　enemy's　cavalry；　and　when　your　supplies　are　exhausted；

proceed　via　New　Market　and　Green　Bay　to　Haxall's　Landing　on　the　James

River；　there　communicating　with　General　Butler；　procuring　supplies

and　return　to　this　army。　　Your　dismounted　men　will　be　left　with　the

train　here。