immediately to the land； and have been employed in buying more
cattle； and hiring more servants； in order to improve and
cultivate it better。 But by being obliged to sell his corn by
retail； he was obliged to keep a great part of his capital in his
granaries and stack yard through the year； and could not；
therefore； cultivate so well as with the same capital he might
otherwise have done。 This law； therefore； necessarily obstructed
the improvement of the land； and； instead of tending to render
corn cheaper； must have tended to render it scarcer； and
therefore dearer； than it would otherwise have been。
After the business of the farmer； that of the corn merchant
is in reality the trade which； if properly protected and
encouraged； would contribute the most to the raising of corn。 It
would support the trade of the farmer in the same manner as the
trade of the wholesale dealer supports that of the manufacturer。
The wholesale dealer； by affording a ready market to the
manufacturer； by taking his goods off his hand as fast as he can
make their price to him before he has made them； enables him to
keep his whole capital； and sometimes even more than his whole
capital； constantly employed in manufacturing； and consequently
to manufacture a much greater quantity of goods than if he was
obliged to dispose of them himself to the immediate consumers； or
even to the retailers。 As the capital of the wholesale merchant；
too； is generally sufficient to replace that of many
manufacturers； this intercourse between him and them interests
the owner of a large capital to support the owners of a great
number of small ones； and to assist them in those losses and
misfortunes which might otherwise prove ruinous to them。
An intercourse of the same kind universally established
between the farmers and the corn merchants would be attended with
effects equally beneficial to the farmers。 They would be enabled
to keep their whole capitals； and even more than their whole
capitals； constantly employed in cultivation。 In case of any of
those accidents； to which no trade is more liable than theirs；
they would find in their ordinary customer； the wealthy corn
merchant； a person who had both an interest to support them； and
the ability to do it； and they would not； as at present； be
entirely dependent upon the forbearance of their landlord； or the
mercy of his steward。 Were it possible； as perhaps it is not； to
establish this intercourse universally； and all at once； were it
possible to turn all at once the whole farming stock of the
kingdom to its proper business； the cultivation of land；
withdrawing it from every other employment into which any part of
it may be at present diverted； and were it possible； in order to
support and assist upon occasion the operations of this great
stock； to provide all at once another stock almost equally great；
it is not perhaps very easy to imagine how great； how extensive；
and how sudden would be the improvement which this change of
circumstances would alone produce upon the whole face of the
country。
The statute of Edward VI； therefore； by prohibiting as much
as possible any middle man from coming between the grower and the
consumer； endeavoured to annihilate a trade； of which the free
exercise is not only the best palliative of the inconveniences of
a dearth but the best preventative of that calamity： after the
trade of the farmer； no trade contributing so much to the growing
of corn as that of the corn merchant。
The rigour of this law was afterwards softened by several
subsequent statutes； which successively permitted the engrossing
of corn when the price of wheat should not exceed twenty；
twenty…four； thirty…two； and forty shillings the quarter。 At
last； by the 15th of Charles II； c。 7； the engrossing or buying
of corn in order to sell it again； as long as the price of wheat
did not exceed forty…eight shillings the quarter； and that of
other grain in proportion； was declared lawful to all persons not
being forestallers； that is； not selling again in the same market
within three months。 All the freedom which the trade of the
inland corn dealer has ever yet enjoyed was bestowed upon it by
this statute。 The statute of the 12th of the present king； which
repeals almost all the other ancient laws against engrossers and
forestallers； does not repeal the restrictions of this particular
statute； which therefore still continue in force。
This statute； however； authorizes in some measure two very
absurd popular prejudices。
First； it supposes that when the price of wheat has risen so
high as forty…eight shillings the quarter； and that of other
grains in proportion； corn is likely to be so engrossed as to
hurt the people。 But from what has been already said； it seems
evident enough that corn can at no price be so engrossed by the
inland dealers as to hurt the people： and forty…eight shillings
the quarter； besides； though it may be considered as a very high
price； yet in years of scarcity it is a price which frequently
takes place immediately after harvest； when scarce any part of
the new crop can be sold off； and when it is impossible even for
ignorance to suppose that any part of it can be so engrossed as
to hurt the people。
Secondly； it supposes that there is a certain price at which
corn is likely to be forestalled； that is； bought up in order to
be sold again soon after in the same market； so as to hurt the
people。 But if a merchant ever buys up corn； either going to a
particular market or in a particular market； in order to sell it
again soon after in the same market； it must be because he judges
that the market cannot be so liberally supplied through the whole
season as upon that particular occasion； and that the price；
therefore； must soon rise。 If he judges wrong in this； and if the
price does not rise； he not only loses the whole profit of the
stock which he employs in this manner； but a part of the stock
itself； by the expense and loss which necessarily attend the
storing and keeping of corn。 He hurts himself； therefore； much
more essentially than he can hurt even the particular people whom
he may hinder from supplying themselves upon that particular
market day； because they may afterwards supply themselves just as
cheap upon any other market day。 If he judges right； instead of
hurting the great body of the people； he renders them a most
important service。 By making them feel the inconveniencies of a
dearth somewhat earlier than they otherwise might do； he prevents
their feeling them afterwards so severely as they certainly would
do； if the cheapness of price encouraged them to consume faster
than suited the real scarcity of the season。 When the scarcity is
real； the best thing that can be done for the people is to divide
the inconveniencies of it as equally as possible through all the
different months； and weeks； and days of the year。 The interest
of the corn merchant makes him study to do this as exactly as he
can： and as no other person can have either the same interest； or
the same knowledge； or the same abilities to do it so exactly as
he； this most important operation of commerce ought to be trusted
entirely to him； or； in other words； the corn trade； so far at
least as concerns the supply of the home market； ought to be left
perfectly free。
The popular fear of engrossing and forestalling may be
compared to the popular terrors and suspicions of witchcraft。 The
unfortunate wretches accused of this latter crime were not more
innocent of the misfortunes imputed to them than those who have
been accused of the former。 The law which put an end to all
prosecutions against witchcraft； which put it out of any man's
power to gratify his own malice by accusing his neighbour of that
imaginary crime； seems effectually to have put an end to those
fears and suspicions by taking away the great cause which
encouraged and supported them。 The law which should restore
entire freedom to the inland trade of corn would probably prove
as effectual to put an end to the popular fears of engrossing and
forestalling。
The 15th of Charles II； c。 7； however； with all its
imperfections； has perhaps contributed more both to the plentiful
supply of the home market； and to the increase of tillage； than
any other law in the statute book。 It is from this law that the
inland corn trade has derived all the liberty and protection
which it has ever yet enjoyed； and both the supply of the home
market； and the interest of tillage； are much more effectually
promoted by the inland than either by the importation or
exportation trade。
The proportion of the average quantity of all sorts of grain
imported into Great Britain to that of all sorts of grain
consumed； it has been computed by the author of the tracts upon
the corn trade； does not exceed that of one to five hundred and
seventy。 For supplying the home market； therefore； the importance
of the inland trade must be to that of the importation trade as
five hundred and seventy to one。
The average quantity of all sorts of grain exported from
Great Britain does not； according to the same author； exceed the
one…and…thirtieth part of the annual produce。 For the
encouragement of tillage； therefore； by providing a market for
the home produce； the importance of the inland trade must be to
that of the exportation。
I have no great faith in political arithmetic； computations。
I mention them only in order to show of how much less
consequence； in the opinion of the most judicious and experienced
persons； the foreign trade of corn is than the home trade。 The
great cheapness of corn in the years immediately preceding the
establishment of the bounty may perhaps； with reason； be ascribed
in some measure to the operation of this statute of Charles II；
which had been enacted about five…and…twenty years before； and
which had therefore full time to produce its effect。
A very few words will sufficiently explain all that I have
to say concerning the other three branc