have been laid out； whether in Germany or the East Indies； ought
justly to be stated to the account of the colonies。 It amounted
to more than ninety millions sterling； including not only the new
debt which was contracted； but the two shillings in the pound
additional land tax； and the sums which were every year borrowed
from the sinking fund。 The Spanish war； which began in 1739； was
principally a colony quarrel。 Its principal object was to prevent
the search of the colony ships which carried on a contraband
trade with the Spanish Main。 This whole expense is； in reality； a
bounty which has been given in order to support a monopoly。 The
pretended purpose of it was to encourage the manufactures； and to
increase the commerce of Great Britain。 But its real effect has
been to raise the rate of mercantile profit； and to enable our
merchants to turn into a branch of trade； of which the returns
are more slow and distant than those of the greater part of other
trades； a greater proportion of their capital than they otherwise
would have done； two events which； if a bounty could have
prevented； it might perhaps have been very well worth while to
give such a bounty。
Under the present system of management； therefore； Great
Britain derives nothing but loss from the dominion which she
assumes over her colonies。
To propose that Great Britain should voluntarily give up all
authority over her colonies； and leave them to elect their own
magistrates； to enact their own laws； and to make peace and war
as they might think proper； would be to propose such a measure as
never was； and never will be adopted； by any nation in the world。
No nation ever voluntarily gave up the dominion of any province；
how troublesome soever it might be to govern it； and how small
soever the revenue which it afforded might be in proportion to
the expense which it occasioned。 Such sacrifices； though they
might frequently be agreeable to the interest； are always
mortifying to the pride of every nation； and what is perhaps of
still greater consequence； they are always contrary to the
private interest of the governing part of it； who would thereby
be deprived of the disposal of many places of trust and profit；
of many opportunities of acquiring wealth and distinction； which
the possession of the most turbulent； and； to the great body of
the people； the most unprofitable province seldom fails to
afford。 The most visionary enthusiast would scarce be capable of
proposing such a measure with any serious hopes at least of its
ever being adopted。 If it was adopted； however； Great Britain
would not only be immediately freed from the whole annual expense
of the peace establishment of the colonies； but might settle with
them such a treaty of commerce as would effectually secure to her
a free trade； more advantageous to the great body of the people；
though less so to the merchants； than the monopoly which she at
present enjoys。 By thus parting good friends； the natural
affection of the colonies to the mother country which； perhaps；
our late dissensions have well nigh extinguished； would quickly
revive。 It might dispose them not only to respect； for whole
centuries together； that treaty of commerce which they had
concluded with us at parting； but to favour us in war as well as
in trade； and； instead of turbulent and factious subjects； to
become our most faithful； affectionate； and generous allies； and
the same sort of parental affection on the one side； and filial
respect on the other； might revive between Great Britain and her
colonies； which used to subsist between those of ancient Greece
and the mother city from which they descended。
In order to render any province advantageous to the empire
to which it belongs； it ought to afford； in time of peace； a
revenue to the public sufficient not only for defraying the whole
expense of its own peace establishment； but for contributing its
proportion to the support of the general government of the
empire。 Every province necessarily contributes； more or less； to
increase the expense of that general government。 If any
particular province； therefore； does not contribute its share
towards defraying this expense； an unequal burden must be thrown
upon some other part of the empire。 The extraordinary revenue；
too； which every province affords to the public in time of war；
ought； from parity of reason； to bear the same proportion to the
extraordinary revenue of the whole empire which its ordinary
revenue does in time of peace。 That neither the ordinary nor
extraordinary revenue which Great Britain derives from her
colonies； bears this proportion to the whole revenue of the
British empire； will readily be allowed。 The monopoly； it has
been supposed； indeed； by increasing the private revenue of the
people of Great Britain； and thereby enabling them to pay greater
taxes； compensates the deficiency of the public revenue of the
colonies。 But this monopoly； I have endeavoured to show； though a
very grievous tax upon the colonies； and though it may increase
the revenue of a particular order of men in Great Britain；
diminishes instead of increasing that of the great body of the
people； and consequently diminishes instead of increasing the
ability of the great body of the people to pay taxes。 The men；
too； whose revenue the monopoly increases； constitute a
particular order； which it is both absolutely impossible to tax
beyond the proportion of other orders； and extremely impolitic
even to attempt to tax beyond that proportion； as I shall
endeavour to show in the following book。 No particular resource；
therefore； can be drawn from this particular order。
The colonies may be taxed either by their own assemblies； or
by the Parliament of Great Britain。
That the colony assemblies can ever be so managed as to levy
upon their constituents a public revenue sufficient not only to
maintain at all times their own civil and military establishment；
but to pay their proper proportion of the expense of the general
government of the British empire seems not very probable。 It was
a long time before even the Parliament of England； though placed
immediately under the eye of the sovereign； could be brought
under such a system of management； or could be rendered
sufficiently liberal in their grants for supporting the civil and
military establishments even of their own country。 It was only by
distributing among the particular Members of Parliament a great
part either of the offices； or of the disposal of the offices
arising from this civil and military establishment； that such a
system of management could be established even with regard to the
Parliament of England。 But the distance of the colony assemblies
from the eye of the sovereign； their number； their dispersed
situation； and their various constitutions； would render it very
difficult to manage them in the same manner； even though the
sovereign had the same means of doing it； and those means are
wanting。 It would be absolutely impossible to distribute among
all the leading members of all the colony assemblies such a
share； either of the offices or of the disposal of the offices
arising from the general government of the British empire； as to
dispose them to give up their popularity at home； and to tax
their constituents for the support of that general government； of
which almost the whole emoluments were to be divided among people
who were strangers to them。 The unavoidable ignorance of
administration； besides； concerning the relative importance of
the different members of those different assemblies； the offences
which must frequently be given； the blunders which must
constantly be committed in attempting to manage them in this
manner； seems to render such a system of management altogether
impracticable with regard to them。
The colony assemblies； besides； cannot be supposed the
proper judges of what is necessary for the defence and support of
the whole empire。 The care of that defence and support is not
entrusted to them。 It is not their business； and they have no
regular means of information concerning it。 The assembly of a
province； like the vestry of a parish； may judge very properly
concerning the affairs of its own particular district； but can
have no proper means of judging concerning those of the whole
empire。 It cannot even judge properly concerning the proportion
which its own province bears to the whole empire； or concerning
the relative degree of its wealth and importance compared with
the other provinces； because those other provinces are not under
the inspection and superintendency of the assembly of a
particular province。 What is necessary for the defence and
support of the whole empire； and in what proportion each part
ought to contribute； can be judged of only by that assembly which
inspects and superintends the affairs of the whole empire。
It has been proposed； accordingly； that the colonies should
be taxed by requisition； the Parliament of Great Britain
determining the sum which each colony ought to pay； and the
provincial assembly assessing and levying it in the way that
suited best the circumstances of the province。 What concerned the
whole empire would in this way be determined by the assembly
which inspects and superintends the affairs of the whole empire；
and the provincial affairs of each colony might still be
regulated by its own assembly。 Though the colonies should in this
case have no representatives in the British Parliament； yet； if
we may judge by experience； there is no probability that the
Parliamentary requisition would be unreasonable。 The Parliament
of England has not upon any occasion shown the smallest
disposition to overburden those parts of the empire which are not
represented in Parliament。 The islands of Guernsey and Jersey；
without any means of resisting the authority of Parliament； are
more lightly taxed than any part of Great Britain。 Parliament in
attempting to exercise its supposed right； whether well or ill
grounded； of taxing the colonies； has n