charmides- 第6部分

superficial　and；　except　in　the　case　of　the　Republic　and　the　Laws；　have　no



philosophical　importance。　　They　do　not　affect　the　substance　of　the　work。　



It　may　be　remarked　further　that　several　of　the　dialogues；　such　as　the



Phaedrus；　the　Sophist；　and　the　Parmenides；　have　more　than　one　subject。　　But



it　does　not　therefore　follow　that　Plato　intended　one　dialogue　to　succeed



another；　or　that　he　begins　anew　in　one　dialogue　a　subject　which　he　has　left



unfinished　in　another；　or　that　even　in　the　same　dialogue　he　always　intended



the　two　parts　to　be　connected　with　each　other。　　We　cannot　argue　from　a



casual　statement　found　in　the　Parmenides　to　other　statements　which　occur　in



the　Philebus。　　Much　more　truly　is　his　own　manner　described　by　himself　when



he　says　that　'words　are　more　plastic　than　wax'　（Rep。）；　and　'whither　the



wind　blows；　the　argument　follows'。　　The　dialogues　of　Plato　are　like　poems；



isolated　and　separate　works；　except　where　they　are　indicated　by　the　author



himself　to　have　an　intentional　sequence。







It　is　this　method　of　taking　passages　out　of　their　context　and　placing　them



in　a　new　connexion　when　they　seem　to　confirm　a　preconceived　theory；　which



is　the　defect　of　Dr。　Jackson's　procedure。　　It　may　be　compared；　though　not



wholly　the　same　with　it；　to　that　method　which　the　Fathers　practised；



sometimes　called　'the　mystical　interpretation　of　Scripture；'　in　which



isolated　words　are　separated　from　their　context；　and　receive　any　sense



which　the　fancy　of　the　interpreter　may　suggest。　　It　is　akin　to　the　method



employed　by　Schleiermacher　of　arranging　the　dialogues　of　Plato　in



chronological　order　according　to　what　he　deems　the　true　arrangement　of　the



ideas　contained　in　them。　　（Dr。　Jackson　is　also　inclined；　having　constructed



a　theory；　to　make　the　chronology　of　Plato's　writings　dependent　upon　it　



（See　J。　of　Philol。and　elsewhere。）。）　　It　may　likewise　be　illustrated　by　the



ingenuity　of　those　who　employ　symbols　to　find　in　Shakespeare　a　hidden



meaning。　　In　the　three　cases　the　error　is　nearly　the　same：words　are　taken



out　of　their　natural　context；　and　thus　become　destitute　of　any　real



meaning。







（4）　According　to　Dr。　Jackson's　'Later　Theory；'　Plato's　Ideas；　which　were



once　regarded　as　the　summa　genera　of　all　things；　are　now　to　be　explained　as



Forms　or　Types　of　some　things　only；that　is　to　say；　of　natural　objects：　



these　we　conceive　imperfectly；　but　are　always　seeking　in　vain　to　have　a



more　perfect　notion　of　them。　　He　says　（J。　of　Philol。）　that　'Plato　hoped　by



the　study　of　a　series　of　hypothetical　or　provisional　classifications　to



arrive　at　one　in　which　nature's　distribution　of　kinds　is　approximately



represented；　and　so　to　attain　approximately　to　the　knowledge　of　the　ideas。　



But　whereas　in　the　Republic；　and　even　in　the　Phaedo；　though　less　hopefully；



he　had　sought　to　convert　his　provisional　definitions　into　final　ones　by



tracing　their　connexion　with　the　summum　genus；　the　（Greek）；　in　the



Parmenides　his　aspirations　are　less　ambitious；'　and　so　on。　　But　where　does



Dr。　Jackson　find　any　such　notion　as　this　in　Plato　or　anywhere　in　ancient



philosophy？　　Is　it　not　an　anachronism；　gracious　to　the　modern　physical



philosopher；　and　the　more　acceptable　because　it　seems　to　form　a　link



between　ancient　and　modern　philosophy；　and　between　physical　and



metaphysical　science；　but　really　unmeaning？







（5）　To　this　'Later　Theory'　of　Plato's　Ideas　I　oppose　the　authority　of



Professor　Zeller；　who　affirms　that　none　of　the　passages　to　which　Dr。



Jackson　appeals　（Theaet。；　Phil。；　Tim。；　Parm。）　'in　the　smallest　degree　prove



his　point'；　and　that　in　the　second　class　of　dialogues；　in　which　the　'Later



Theory　of　Ideas'　is　supposed　to　be　found；　quite　as　clearly　as　in　the　first；



are　admitted　Ideas；　not　only　of　natural　objects；　but　of　properties；



relations；　works　of　art；　negative　notions　（Theaet。；　Parm。；　Soph。）；　and　that



what　Dr。　Jackson　distinguishes　as　the　first　class　of　dialogues　from　the



second　equally　assert　or　imply　that　the　relation　of　things　to　the　Ideas；　is



one　of　participation　in　them　as　well　as　of　imitation　of　them　（Prof。



Zeller's　summary　of　his　own　review　of　Dr。　Jackson；　Archiv　fur　Geschichte



der　Philosophie。）







In　conclusion　I　may　remark　that　in　Plato's　writings　there　is　both　unity；



and　also　growth　and　development；　but　that　we　must　not　intrude　upon　him



either　a　system　or　a　technical　language。







Balliol　College；



October；　1891。











NOTE







The　chief　additions　to　the　Introductions　in　the　Third　Edition　consist　of



Essays　on　the　following　subjects：







1。　　Language。







2。　　The　decline　of　Greek　Literature。







3。　　The　'Ideas'　of　Plato　and　Modern　Philosophy。







4。　　The　myths　of　Plato。







5。　　The　relation　of　the　Republic；　Statesman　and　Laws。







6。　　The　legend　of　Atlantis。







7。　　Psychology。







8。　　Comparison　of　the　Laws　of　Plato　with　Spartan　and　Athenian　Laws　and



Institutions。











CHARMIDES。







INTRODUCTION。







The　subject　of　the　Charmides　is　Temperance　or　（Greek）；　a　peculiarly　Greek



notion；　which　may　also　be　rendered　Moderation　（Compare　Cic。　Tusc。　'（Greek）；



quam　soleo　equidem　tum　temperantiam；　tum　moderationem　appellare；　nonnunquam



etiam　modestiam。'）；　Modesty；　Discretion；　Wisdom；　without　completely



exhausting　by　all　these　terms　the　various　associations　of　the　word。　　It　may



be　described　as　'mens　sana　in　corpore　sano；'　the　harmony　or　due　proportion



of　the　higher　and　lower　elements　of　human　nature　which　'makes　a　man　his　own



master；'　according　to　the　definition　of　the　Republic。　　In　the　accompanying



translation　the　word　has　been　rendered　in　different　places　either



Temperance　or　Wisdom；　as　the　connection　seemed　to　require：　　for　in　the



philosophy　of　Plato　（Greek）　still　retains　an　intellectual　element　（as



Socrates　is　also　said　to　have　identified　（Greek）　with　（Greek）：　　Xen。　Mem。）　



and　is　not　yet　relegated　to　the　sphere　of　moral　virtue；　as　in　the



Nicomachean　Ethics　of　Aristotle。







The　beautiful　youth；　Charmides；　who　is　also　the　most　temperate　of　human



beings；　is　asked　by　Socrates；　'What　is　Temperance？'　　He　answers



characteristically；　（1）　'Quietness。'　　'But　Temperance　is　a　fine　and　noble



thing；　and　quietness　in　many　or　most　cases　is　not　so　fine　a　thing　as



quickness。'　　He　tries　again　and　says　（2）　that　temperance　is　modesty。　　But



this　again　is　set　aside　by　a　sophistical　application　of　Homer：　　for



temperance　is　good　as　well　as　noble；　and　Homer　has　declared　that　'modesty



is　not　good　for　a　needy　man。'　　（3）　Once　more　Charmides　makes　the　attempt。　



This　time　he　gives　a　definition　which　he　has　heard；　and　of　which　Socrates



conjectures　that　Critias　must　be　the　author：　　'Temperance　is　doing　one's



own　business。'　　But　the　artisan　who　makes　another　man's　shoes　may　be



temperate；　and　yet　he　is　not　doing　his　own　business；　and　temperance　defined



thus　would　be　opposed　to　the　division　of　labour　which　exists　in　every



temperate　or　well…ordered　state。　　How　is　this　riddle　to　be　explained？







Critias；　who　takes　the　place　of　Charmides；　distinguishes　in　his　answer



between　'making'　and　'doing；'　and　with　the　help　of　a　misapplied　quotation



from　Hesiod　assigns　to　the　words　'doing'　and　'work'　an　exclusively　good



sense：　　Temperance　is　doing　one's　own　business；（4）　is　doing　good。







Still　an　element　of　knowledge　is　wanting　which　Critias　is　readily　induced



to　admit　at　the　suggestion　of　Socrates；　and；　in　the　spirit　of　Socrates　and



of　Greek　life　generally；　proposes　as　a　fifth　definition；　（5）　Temperance　is



self…knowledge。　　But　all　sciences　have　a　subject：　　number　is　the　subject　of



arithmetic；　health　of　medicinewhat　is　the　subject　of　temperance　or



wisdom？　　The　answer　is　that　（6）　Temperance　is　the　knowledge　of　what　a　man



knows　and　of　what　he　does　not　know。　　But　this　is　contrary　to　analogy；　there



is　no　vision　of　vision；　but　only　of　visible　things；　no　love　of　loves；　but



only　of　beautiful　things；　how　then　can　there　be　a　knowledge　of　knowledge？　



That　which　is　older；　heavier；　lighter；　is　older；　heavier；　and　lighter　than



something　else；　not　than　itself；　and　this　seems　to　be　true　of　all　relative



notionsthe　object　of　relation　is　outside　of　them；　at　any　rate　they　can



only　have　relation　to　themselves　in　the　form　of　that　object。　　Whether　there



are　any　such　cases　of　reflex　relation　or　not；　and　whether　that　sort　of



knowledge　which　we　term　Temperance　is　of　this　reflex　nature；　has　yet　to　be



determined　by　the　great　metaphysician。　　But　even　if　knowledge　can　know



itself；　how　does　the　knowledge　of　what　we　know　imply　the　knowledge　of　what



we　do　not　know？　　Besides；　knowledge　is　an　abstraction　only；　and　will　not



inform　us　of　any　particular　subject；　such　as　medicine；　building；　and　the



like。　　It　may　tell　us　that　we　or　other　men　know　something；　but　can　never



tell　us　what　we　know。







Admitting　that　there　is　a　knowledge　of　what　we　know　and　of　what　we　do　not



know；　which　would　supply　a　rule　and　measure　of　all　things；　still　there



would　be　no　good　in　this；　and　the　knowledge　which　temperance　gives　must　be



of　a　kind　which　will　do　us　good；　for　temperance　is　a　good。　　But　this



universal　knowledge　does　not　tend　to　our　happiness　and　good：　　the　only　kind



of　knowledge　which　brings　happiness　is　the　knowledge　of　good　and　evil。　　To



this　Critias　replies　that　the　science　or　knowledge　of　good　and　evil；　and



all　the　other　sciences；　are　regulated　by　the　higher　science　or　knowledge　of



knowledge。　　Socrates　replies　by　again　dividing　the