the ethics(part ii)- 第10部分

in　God。　　For　although　　each　particular　thing　be　conditioned　by



another　particular　thing　to　exist　in　a　given　way；　yet　　the　force



whereby　each　particular　thing　perseveres　in　existing　follows　from



the　eternal　　necessity　of　God's　nature　（cf。　I。　xxiv。　Cor。）。







XLVI。　　The　knowledge　of　the　eternal　and　infinite　essence　of　God



which　every　idea　　involves　is　adequate　and　perfect。







》》》》》ProofThe　proof　of　the　last　proposition　is　universal；　and



whether　a　thing　be　　considered　as　a　part　or　a　whole；　the　idea



thereof；　whether　of　the　whole　or　of　a　part　（by　　the　last　Prop。）；



will　involve　God's　eternal　and　infinite　essence。　　Wherefore；



that；　which　　gives　knowledge　of　the　eternal　and　infinite　essence



of　God；　is　common　to　all；　and　is　equally　　in　the　part　and　in　the



whole；　therefore　（II。　xxxviii。）　this　knowledge　will　be　adequate。　



　Q。E。D。







XLVII。　The　human　mind　has　an　adequate　knowledge　of　the　eternal



and　infinite　essence　of　　God。







》》》》》ProofThe　human　mind　has　ideas　（II。　xxii。）；　from　which　（II。



xxiii。）　it　perceives　　itself　and　its　own　body　（II。　xix。）　and



external　bodies　（II。　xvi。　Cor。　i。　and　II。　xvii。）　as　actually　



existing；　therefore　（II。　xlv。　and　xlvi。）　it　has　an　adequate



knowledge　of　the　eternal　and　　infinite　essence　of　God。　　Q。E。D。







*****NoteHence　we　see；　that　the　infinite　essence　and　the



eternity　of　God　are　known　to　　all。　　Now　as　all　things　are　in　God；



and　are　conceived　through　God；　we　can　from　this　　knowledge　infer



many　things；　which　we　may　adequately　know；　and　we　may　form　that



third　　kind　of　knowledge　of　which　we　spoke　in　the　note　to　II。



xl。；　and　of　the　excellence　and　use　of　　which　we　shall　have



occasion　to　speak　in　Part　V。　　Men　have　not　so　clear　a　knowledge



of　　God　as　they　have　of　general　notions；　because　they　are　unable



to　imagine　God　as　they　do　　bodies；　and　also　because　they　have



associated　the　name　God　with　images　of　things　that　　they　are　in



the　habit　of　seeing；　as　indeed　they　can　hardly　avoid　doing；



being；　as　they　are；　　men；　and　continually　affected　by　external



bodies。　　Many　errors；　in　truth；　can　be　traced　to　　this　head；



namely；　that　we　do　not　apply　names　to　things　rightly。　　For



instance；　when　a　man　　says　that　the　lines　drawn　from　the　centre



of　a　circle　to　its　circumference　are　not　equal；　he　　then；　at　all



events；　assuredly　attaches　a　meaning　to　the　word　circle　different



from　that　　assigned　by　mathematicians。　　So　again；　when　men　make



mistakes　in　calculation；　they　have　　one　set　of　figures　in　their



mind；　and　another　on　the　paper。　　If　we　could　see　into　their



minds；　　they　do　not　make　a　mistake；　they　seem　to　do　so；　because



we　think；　that　they　have　the　same　　numbers　in　their　mind　as　they



have　on　the　paper。　　If　this　were　not　so；　we　should　not　　believe



them　to　be　in　error；　any　more　than　I　thought　that　a　man　was　in



error；　whom　I　lately　　heard　exclaiming　that　his　entrance　hall　had



flown　into　a　neighbour's　hen；　for　his　meaning　　seemed　to　me



sufficiently　clear。　　Very　many　controversies　have　arisen　from　the



fact；　that　　men　do　not　rightly　explain　their　meaning；　or　do　not



rightly　interpret　the　meaning　of　others。　　　For；　as　a　matter　of



fact；　as　they　flatly　contradict　themselves；　they　assume　now　one



side；　　now　another；　of　the　argument；　so　as　to　oppose　the



opinions；　which　they　consider　mistaken　　and　absurd　in　their



opponents。







XLVIII。　In　the　mind　there　is　no　absolute　or　free　will；　but　the



mind　is　determined　to　wish　　this　or　that　by　a　cause；　which　has



also　been　determined　by　another　cause；　and　this　last　by　　another



cause；　and　so　on　to　infinity。







》》》》》ProofThe　mind　is　a　fixed　and　definite　mode　of　thought　（II。



xi。）；　therefore　it　cannot　　be　the　free　cause　of　its　actions　（I。



xvii。　Cor。　ii。）；　in　other　words；　it　cannot　have　an　absolute　



faculty　of　positive　or　negative　volition；　but　（by　I。　xxviii。）　it



must　be　determined　by　a　cause；　　which　has　also　been　determined　by



another　cause；　and　this　last　by　another；　&c。　　Q。E。D。







*****NoteIn　the　same　way　it　is　proved；　that　there　is　in　the



mind　no　absolute　faculty　of　　understanding；　desiring；　loving；　&c。　



Whence　it　follows；　that　these　and　similar　faculties　are　　either



entirely　fictitious；　or　are　merely　abstract　and　general　terms；



such　as　we　are　　accustomed　to　put　together　from　particular



things。　　Thus　the　intellect　and　the　will　stand　in　　the　same



relation　to　this　or　that　idea；　or　this　or　that　volition；　as



〃lapidity〃　to　this　or　that　　stone；　or　as　〃man〃　to　Peter　and



Paul。　　The　cause　which　leads　men　to　consider　themselves　　free　has



been　set　forth　in　the　Appendix　to　Part　I。　　But；　before　I　proceed



further；　I　would　　here　remark　that；　by　the　will　to　affirm　and



decide；　I　mean　the　faculty；　not　the　desire。　　I　　mean；　I　repeat；



the　faculty；　whereby　the　mind　affirms　or　denies　what　is　true　or



false；　not　　the　desire；　wherewith　the　mind　wishes　for　or　turns



away　from　any　given　thing。　　After　we　　have　proved；　that　these



faculties　of　ours　are　general　notions；　which　cannot　be



distinguished　　from　the　particular　instances　on　which　they　are



based；　we　must　inquire　whether　volitions　　themselves　are　anything



besides　the　ideas　of　things。　　We　must　inquire；　I　say；　whether



there　　is　in　the　mind　any　affirmation　or　negation　beyond　that；



which　the　idea；　in　so　far　as　it　is　an　　idea；　involves。　　On　which



subject　see　the　following　proposition；　and　II。　Def。　iii。；　lest



the　　idea　of　pictures　should　suggest　itself。　　For　by　ideas　I　do



not　mean　images　such　as　are　　formed　at　the　back　of　the　eye；　or　in



the　midst　of　the　brain；　but　the　conceptions　of　thought。







XLIX。　There　is　in　the　mind　no　volition　or　affirmation　and



negation；　save　that　which　an　　idea；　inasmuch　as　it　is　an　idea；



involves。







》》》》》ProofThere　is　in　the　mind　no　absolute　faculty　of　positive



or　negative　volition；　but　　only　particular　volitions；　namely；



this　or　that　affirmation；　and　this　or　that　negation。　　Now　let　　us



conceive　a　particular　volition；　namely；　the　mode　of　thinking



whereby　the　mind　affirms；　　that　the　three　interior　angles　of　a



triangle　are　equal　to　two　right　angles。　　This　affirmation　



involves　the　conception　or　idea　of　a　triangle；　that　is；　without



the　idea　of　a　triangle　it　cannot　　be　conceived。　　It　is　the　same



thing　to　say；　that　the　concept　A　must　involve　the　concept　B；　　as



it　is　to　say；　that　A　cannot　be　conceived　without　B。　　Further；



this　affirmation　cannot　be　　made　（II。　Ax。　iii。）　without　the　idea



of　a　triangle。　　Therefore；　this　affirmation　can　neither　be　　nor



be　conceived；　without　the　idea　of　a　triangle。　　Again；　this　idea



of　a　triangle　must　involve　　this　same　affirmation；　namely；　that



its　three　interior　angles　are　equal　to　two　right　angles。　　



Wherefore；　and　vice　versa；　this　idea　of　a　triangle　can　neither　be



nor　be　conceived　without　　this　affirmation；　therefore；　this



affirmation　belongs　to　the　essence　of　the　idea　of　a　triangle；　



and　is　nothing　besides。　　What　we　have　said　of　this　volition



（inasmuch　as　we　have　selected　　it　at　random）　may　be　said　of　any



other　volition；　namely；　that　it　is　nothing　but　an　idea。　　　Q。E。D。







ProofWill　and　understanding　are　nothing　beyond　the



individual　volitions　and　ideas　　（II。　xlviii。　and　note）。　　But　a



particular　volition　and　a　particular　idea　are　one　and　the　same　



（by　the　foregoing　Prop。）；　therefore；　will　and　understanding　are



one　and　the　same。　　Q。E。D。







*****NoteWe　have　thus　removed　the　cause　which　is　commonly



assigned　for　error。　　For　　we　have　shown　above；　that　falsity



consists　solely　in　the　privation　of　knowledge　involved　in　　ideas



which　are　fragmentary　and　confused。　　Wherefore；　a　false　idea；



inasmuch　as　it　is　false；　　does　not　involve　certainty。　　When　we



say；　then；　that　a　man　acquiesces　in　what　is　false；　and　　that　he



has　no　doubts　on　the　subject；　we　do　not　say　that　he　is　certain；



but　only　that　he　does　　not　doubt；　or　that　he　acquiesces　in　what



is　false；　inasmuch　as　there　are　no　reasons；　which　　should　cause



his　imagination　to　waver　（see　II。　xliv。　note）。　　Thus；　although



the　man　be　　assumed　to　acquiesce　in　what　is　false；　we　shall　never



say　that　he　is　certain。　　For　by　certainty　　we　mean　something



positive　（II。　xliii。　and　note）；　not　merely　the　absence　of　doubt。







However；　in　order　that　the　foregoing　proposition　may　be　fully



explained；　I　will　draw　　attention　to　a　few　additional　points；　and



I　will　furthermore　answer　the　objections　which　　may　be　advanced



against　our　doctrine。　　Lastly；　in　order　to　remove　every　scruple；



I　have　　thought　it　worth　while　to　point　out　some　of　the



advantages；　which　follow　therefrom。　　I　say　　〃some；〃　for　they　will



be　better　appreciated　from　what　we　shall　set　forth　in　the　fifth



part。







I　begin；　then；　with　the　first　point；　and　warn　my　readers　to　make



an　accurate　distinction　　between　an　idea；　or　conception　of　the



mind；　and　the　images　of　things　which　we　imagine。　　　It　is　further



necessary　that　they　should　distinguish　between　idea　and　words；



whereby　we　　signify　things。　　These　threenamely；　images；　words；



and　ideasare　by　many　persons　either　　entirely　confused



together；　or　not　distinguished　with　sufficient　accuracy　or　care；



and　hence　　people　are　generally　in　ignorance；　how　absolutely



necessary　is　a　knowledge　of　this　doctrine　　of　the　will；　both　for



philosophic　purposes　and　for　the　wise　ordering　of　life。　　Those



who　　think　that　ideas　consist　in　images　which　are　formed　in　us　by



conta