the ethics(part ii)- 第11部分

who　　think　that　ideas　consist　in　images　which　are　formed　in　us　by



contact　with　external　bodies；　　persuade　themselves　that　the　ideas



of　those　things；　whereof　we　can　form　no　mental　picture；　　are　not



ideas；　but　only　figments；　which　we　invent　by　the　free　decree　of



our　will；　they　thus　　regard　ideas　as　though　they　were　inanimate



pictures　on　a　panel；　and；　filled　with　this　　misconception；　do　not



see　that　an　idea；　inasmuch　as　it　is　an　idea；　involves　an



affirmation　or　　negation。　　Again；　those　who　confuse　words　with



ideas；　or　with　the　affirmation　which　an　　idea　involves；　think



that　they　can　wish　something　contrary　to　what　they　feel；　affirm；



or　　deny。　　This　misconception　will　easily　be　laid　aside　by　one；



who　reflects　on　the　nature　of　　knowledge；　and　seeing　that　it　in



no　wise　involves　the　conception　of　extension；　will　therefore　



clearly　understand；　that　an　idea　（being　a　mode　of　thinking）　does



not　consist　in　the　image　of　　anything；　nor　in　words。　　The　essence



of　words　and　images　is　put　together　by　bodily　　motions；　which　in



no　wise　involve　the　conception　of　thought。







These　few　words　on　this　subject　will　suffice：　　I　will　therefore



pass　on　to　consider　the　　objections；　which　may　be　raised　against



our　doctrine。　　Of　these；　the　first　is　advanced　by　　those；　who



think　that　the　will　has　a　wider　scope　than　the　understanding；　and



that　therefore　　it　is　different　therefrom。　　The　reason　for　their



holding　the　belief；　that　the　will　has　wider　　scope　than　the



understanding；　is　that　they　assert；　that　they　have　no　need　of　an



increase　in　　their　faculty　of　assent；　that　is　of　affirmation　or



negation；　in　order　to　assent　to　an　infinity　of　　things　which　we



do　not　perceive；　but　that　they　have　need　of　an　increase　in　their



faculty　of　　understanding。　　The　will　is　thus　distinguished　from



the　intellect；　the　latter　being　finite　and　　the　former　infinite。　



Secondly；　it　may　be　objected　that　experience　seems　to　teach　us　



especially　clearly；　that　we　are　able　to　suspend　our　judgment



before　assenting　to　things　　which　we　perceive；　this　is　confirmed



by　the　fact　that　no　one　is　said　to　be　deceived；　in　so　　far　as　he



perceives　anything；　but　only　in　so　far　as　he　assents　or



dissents。







For　instance；　he　who　feigns　a　winged　horse；　does　not　therefore



admit　that　a　winged　horse　　exists；　that　is；　he　is　not　deceived；



unless　he　admits　in　addition　that　a　winged　horse　does　　exist。　



Nothing　therefore　seems　to　be　taught　more　clearly　by　experience；



than　that　the　will　　or　faculty　of　assent　is　free　and　different



from　the　faculty　of　understanding。　　Thirdly；　it　may　　be　objected



that　one　affirmation　does　not　apparently　contain　more　reality



than　another；　in　　other　words；　that　we　do　not　seem　to　need　for



affirming；　that　what　is　true　is　true；　any　　greater　power　than　for



affirming；　that　what　is　false　is　true。　　We　have；　however；　seen



that　　one　idea　has　more　reality　or　perfection　than　another；　for



as　objects　are　some　more　　excellent　than　others；　so　also　are　the



ideas　of　them　some　more　excellent　than　others；　this　　also　seems



to　point　to　a　difference　between　the　understanding　and　the　will。　



Fourthly；　it　　may　be　objected；　if　man　does　not　act　from　free



will；　what　will　happen　if　the　incentives　to　　action　are　equally



balanced；　as　in　the　case　of　Buridan's　ass？　　Will　he　perish　of



hunger　and　　thirst？　　If　I　say　that　he　would　not；　he　would　then



determine　his　own　action；　and　would　　consequently　possess　the



faculty　of　going　and　doing　whatever　he　liked。　　Other　objections　



might　also　be　raised；　but；　as　I　am　not　bound　to　put　in　evidence



everything　that　anyone　may　　dream；　I　will　only　set　myself　to　the



task　of　refuting　those　I　have　mentioned；　and　that　as　　briefly　as



possible。







To　the　first　objection　I　answer；　that　I　admit　that　the　will　has　a



wider　scope　than　the　　understanding；　if　by　the　understanding　be



meant　only　clear　and　distinct　ideas；　but　I　deny　　that　the　will



has　a　wider　scope　than　the　perceptions；　and　the　faculty　of



forming　　conceptions；　nor　do　I　see　why　the　faculty　of　volition



should　be　called　infinite；　any　more　　than　the　faculty　of　feeling：　



for；　as　we　are　able　by　the　same　faculty　of　volition　to　affirm　an　



infinite　number　of　things　（one　after　the　other；　for　we　cannot



affirm　an　infinite　number　　simultaneously）；　so　also　can　we；　by



the　same　faculty　of　feeling；　feel　or　perceive　（in　　succession）　an



infinite　number　of　bodies。　　If　it　be　said　that　there　is　an



infinite　number　of　　things　which　we　cannot　perceive；　I　answer；



that　we　cannot　attain　to　such　things　by　any　　thinking；　nor；



consequently；　by　any　faculty　of　volition。　　But；　it　may　still　be



urged；　if　God　　wished　to　bring　it　about　that　we　should　perceive



them；　he　would　be　obliged　to　endow　us　　with　a　greater　faculty　of



perception；　but　not　a　greater　faculty　of　volition　than　we　have　



already。　　This　is　the　same　as　to　say　that；　if　God　wished　to　bring



it　about　that　we　should　　understand　an　infinite　number　of　other



entities；　it　would　be　necessary　for　him　to　give　us　a　　greater



understanding；　but　not　a　more　universal　idea　of　entity　than　that



which　we　have　　already；　in　order　to　grasp　such　infinite　entities。　



We　have　shown　that　will　is　a　universal　　entity　or　idea；　whereby



we　explain　all　particular　volitionsin　other　words；　that　which



is　　common　to　all　such　volitions。







As；　then；　our　opponents　maintain　that　this　idea；　common　or



universal　to　all　volitions；　is　a　　faculty；　it　is　little　to　be



wondered　at　that　they　assert；　that　such　a　faculty　extends　itself



into　　the　infinite；　beyond　the　limits　of　the　understanding：　　for



what　is　universal　is　predicated　alike　　of　one；　of　many；　and　of　an



infinite　number　of　individuals。







To　the　second　objection　I　reply　by　denying；　that　we　have　a　free



power　of　suspending　　our　judgment：　　for；　when　we　say　that　anyone



suspends　his　judgment；　we　merely　mean　that　　he　sees；　that　he　does



not　perceive　the　matter　in　question　adequately。　　Suspension　of　



judgment　is；　therefore；　strictly　speaking；　a　perception；　and　not



free　will。　　In　order　to　　illustrate　the　point；　let　us　suppose　a



boy　imagining　a　horse；　and　perceive　nothing　else。　　　Inasmuch　as



this　imagination　involves　the　existence　of　the　horse　（II。　xvii。



Cor。）；　and　the　boy　　does　not　perceive　anything　which　would



exclude　the　existence　of　the　horse；　he　will　　necessarily　regard



the　horse　as　present：　　he　will　not　be　able　to　doubt　of　its



existence；　　although　he　be　not　certain　thereof。　　We　have　daily



experience　of　such　a　state　of　things　in　　dreams；　and　I　do　not



suppose　that　there　is　anyone；　who　would　maintain　that；　while　he



is　　dreaming；　he　has　the　free　power　of　suspending　his　judgment



concerning　the　things　in　his　　dream；　and　bringing　it　about　that



he　should　not　dream　those　things；　which　he　dreams　that　　he　sees；



yet　it　happens；　notwithstanding；　that　even　in　dreams　we　suspend



our　judgment；　　namely；　when　we　dream　that　we　are　dreaming。







Further；　I　grant　that　no　one　can　be　deceived；　so　far　as　actual



perception　extendsthat　is；　I　　grant　that　the　mind's



imaginations；　regarded　in　themselves；　do　not　involve　error　（II。



xvii。　　note）；　but　I　deny；　that　a　man　does　not；　in　the　act　of



perception；　make　any　affirmation。　　For　　what　is　the　perception　of



a　winged　horse；　save　affirming　that　a　horse　has　wings？　　If　the　



mind　could　perceive　nothing　else　but　the　winged　horse；　it　would



regard　the　same　as　present　　to　itself：　　it　would　have　no　reasons



for　doubting　its　existence；　nor　any　faculty　of　dissent；　　unless



the　imagination　of　a　winged　horse　be　joined　to　an　idea　which



precludes　the　　existence　of　the　said　horse；　or　unless　the　mind



perceives　that　the　idea　which　it　possess　of　a　　winged　horse　is



inadequate；　in　which　case　it　will　either　necessarily　deny　the



existence　of　　such　a　horse；　or　will　necessarily　be　in　doubt　on



the　subject。







I　think　that　I　have　anticipated　my　answer　to　the　third　objection；



namely；　that　the　will　is　　something　universal　which　is　predicated



of　all　ideas；　and　that　it　only　signifies　that　which　is　　common　to



all　ideas；　namely；　an　affirmation；　whose　adequate　essence　must；



therefore；　in　　so　far　as　it　is　thus　conceived　in　the　abstract；　be



in　every　idea；　and　be；　in　this　respect　alone；　　the　same　in　all；



not　in　so　far　as　it　is　considered　as　constituting　the　idea's



essence：　　for；　in　　this　respect；　particular　affirmations　differ



one　from　the　other；　as　much　as　do　ideas。　　For　　instance；　the



affirmation　which　involves　the　idea　of　a　circle；　differs　from



that　which　　involves　the　idea　of　a　triangle；　as　much　as　the　idea



of　a　circle　differs　from　the　idea　of　a　　triangle。







Further；　I　absolutely　deny；　that　we　are　in　need　of　an　equal　power



of　thinking；　to　affirm　　that　that　which　is　true　is　true；　and　to



affirm　that　that　which　is　false　is　true。　　These　two　



affirmations；　if　we　regard　the　mind；　are　in　the　same　relation　to



one　another　as　being　and　　not…being；　for　there　is　nothing



positive　in　ideas；　which　constitutes　the　actual　reality　of　



falsehood　（II。　xxxv。　note；　and　xlvii。　note）。







We　must　therefore　conclude；　that　we　are　easily　deceived；　when　we



confuse　universals　with　　singulars；　and　the　entities　of　reason



and　abstractions　with　realities。　　As　for　the　fourth　　objection；　I



am　quite　ready　to　admit；　that　a　man　placed　in　the　equilibrium



described　　（namely；　as　perceiving　nothing　but　hunger　and　thirst；



a　certain　food　and　a　certain　drink；　　each　equally　distant　from



him）　would　die　of　hunger　and　thir