on liberty- 第20部分

These　conditions　society　is　justified　in　enforcing；　at　all　costs　to



those　who　endeavour　to　withhold　fulfilment。　Nor　is　this　all　that



society　may　do。　The　acts　of　an　individual　may　be　hurtful　to　others；　or



wanting　in　due　consideration　for　their　welfare；　without　going　to　the



length　of　violating　any　of　their　constituted　rights。　The　offender



may　then　be　justly　punished　by　opinion；　though　not　by　law。　As　soon



as　any　part　of　a　person's　conduct　affects　prejudicially　the



interests　of　others；　society　has　jurisdiction　over　it；　and　the



question　whether　the　general　welfare　will　or　will　not　be　promoted　by



interfering　with　it；　becomes　open　to　discussion。　But　there　is　no



room　for　entertaining　any　such　question　when　a　person's　conduct



affects　the　interests　of　no　persons　besides　himself；　or　needs　not



affect　them　unless　they　like　（all　the　persons　concerned　being　of



full　age；　and　the　ordinary　amount　of　understanding）。　In　all　such



cases；　there　should　be　perfect　freedom；　legal　and　social；　to　do　the



action　and　stand　the　consequences。



　　It　would　be　a　great　misunderstanding　of　this　doctrine　to　suppose



that　it　is　one　of　selfish　indifference；　which　pretends　that　human



beings　have　no　business　with　each　other's　conduct　in　life；　and　that



they　should　not　concern　themselves　about　the　well…doing　or



well…being　of　one　another；　unless　their　own　interest　is　involved。



Instead　of　any　diminution；　there　is　need　of　a　great　increase　of



disinterested　exertion　to　promote　the　good　of　others。　But



disinterested　benevolence　can　find　other　instruments　to　persuade



people　to　their　good　than　whips　and　scourges；　either　of　the　literal　or



the　metaphorical　sort。　I　am　the　last　person　to　undervalue　the



self…regarding　virtues；　they　are　only　second　in　importance；　if　even



second；　to　the　social。　It　is　equally　the　business　of　education　to



cultivate　both。　But　even　education　works　by　conviction　and



persuasion　as　well　as　by　compulsion；　and　it　is　by　the　former　only



that；　when　the　period　of　education　is　passed；　the　self…regarding



virtues　should　be　inculcated。　Human　beings　owe　to　each　other　help　to



distinguish　the　better　from　the　worse；　and　encouragement　to　choose　the



former　and　avoid　the　latter。　They　should　be　for　ever　stimulating



each　other　to　increased　exercise　of　their　higher　faculties；　and



increased　direction　of　their　feelings　and　aims　towards　wise　instead　of



foolish；　elevating　instead　of　degrading；　objects　and　contemplations。



But　neither　one　person；　nor　any　number　of　persons；　is　warranted　in



saying　to　another　human　creature　of　ripe　years；　that　he　shall　not　do



with　his　life　for　his　own　benefit　what　he　chooses　to　do　with　it。　He　is



the　person　most　interested　in　his　own　well…being：　the　interest　which



any　other　person；　except　in　cases　of　strong　personal　attachment；　can



have　in　it；　is　trifling；　compared　with　that　which　he　himself　has；



the　interest　which　society　has　in　him　individually　（except　as　to　his



conduct　to　others）　is　fractional；　and　altogether　indirect；　while



with　respect　to　his　own　feelings　and　circumstances；　the　most



ordinary　man　or　woman　has　means　of　knowledge　immeasurably　surpassing



those　that　can　be　possessed　by　any　one　else。　The　interference　of



society　to　overrule　his　judgment　and　purposes　in　what　only　regards



himself　must　be　grounded　on　general　presumptions；　which　may　be



altogether　wrong；　and　even　if　right；　are　as　likely　as　not　to　be



misapplied　to　individual　cases；　by　persons　no　better　acquainted　with



the　circumstances　of　such　cases　than　those　are　who　look　at　them　merely



from　without。　In　this　department；　therefore；　of　human　affairs；



Individuality　has　its　proper　field　of　action。　In　the　conduct　of



human　beings　towards　one　another　it　is　necessary　that　general　rules



should　for　the　most　part　be　observed；　in　order　that　people　may　know



what　they　have　to　expect：　but　in　each　person's　own　concerns　his



individual　spontaneity　is　entitled　to　free　exercise。　Considerations　to



aid　his　judgment；　exhortations　to　strengthen　his　will；　may　be



offered　to　him；　even　obtruded　on　him；　by　others：　but　he　himself　is　the



final　judge。　All　errors　which　he　is　likely　to　commit　against　advice



and　warning　are　far　outweighed　by　the　evil　of　allowing　others　to



constrain　him　to　what　they　deem　his　good。



　　I　do　not　mean　that　the　feelings　with　which　a　person　is　regarded　by



others　ought　not　to　be　in　any　way　affected　by　his　self…regarding



qualities　or　deficiencies。　This　is　neither　possible　nor　desirable。



If　he　is　eminent　in　any　of　the　qualities　which　conduce　to　his　own



good；　he　is；　so　far；　a　proper　object　of　admiration。　He　is　so　much



the　nearer　to　the　ideal　perfection　of　human　nature。　If　he　is　grossly



deficient　in　those　qualities；　a　sentiment　the　opposite　of　admiration



will　follow。　There　is　a　degree　of　folly；　and　a　degree　of　what　may　be



called　（though　the　phrase　is　not　unobjectionable）　lowness　or



depravation　of　taste；　which；　though　it　cannot　justify　doing　harm　to



the　person　who　manifests　it；　renders　him　necessarily　and　properly　a



subject　of　distaste；　or；　in　extreme　cases；　even　of　contempt：　a



person　could　not　have　the　opposite　qualities　in　due　strength　without



entertaining　these　feelings。　Though　doing　no　wrong　to　any　one；　a



person　may　so　act　as　to　compel　us　to　judge　him；　and　feel　to　him；　as



a　fool；　or　as　a　being　of　an　inferior　order：　and　since　this　judgment



and　feeling　are　a　fact　which　he　would　prefer　to　avoid；　it　is　doing　him



a　service　to　warn　him　of　it　beforehand；　as　of　any　other　disagreeable



consequence　to　which　he　exposes　himself。　It　would　be　well；　indeed；



if　this　good　office　were　much　more　freely　rendered　than　the　common



notions　of　politeness　at　present　permit；　and　if　one　person　could



honestly　point　out　to　another　that　he　thinks　him　in　fault；　without



being　considered　unmannerly　or　presuming。　We　have　a　right；　also；　in



various　ways；　to　act　upon　our　unfavourable　opinion　of　any　one；　not



to　the　oppression　of　his　individuality；　but　in　the　exercise　of　ours。



We　are　not　bound；　for　example；　to　seek　his　society；　we　have　a　right　to



avoid　it　（though　not　to　parade　the　avoidance）；　for　we　have　a　right



to　choose　the　society　most　acceptable　to　us。　We　have　a　right；　and　it



may　be　our　duty；　to　caution　others　against　him；　if　we　think　his



example　or　conversation　likely　to　have　a　pernicious　effect　on　those



with　whom　he　associates。　We　may　give　others　a　preference　over　him　in



optional　good　offices；　except　those　which　tend　to　his　improvement。



In　these　various　modes　a　person　may　suffer　very　severe　penalties　at



the　hands　of　others　for　faults　which　directly　concern　only　himself；



but　he　suffers　these　penalties　only　in　so　far　as　they　are　the



natural　and；　as　it　were；　the　spontaneous　consequences　of　the　faults



themselves；　not　because　they　are　purposely　inflicted　on　him　for　the



sake　of　punishment。　A　person　who　shows　rashness；　obstinacy；



self…conceit…　who　cannot　live　within　moderate　means…　who　cannot



restrain　himself　from　hurtful　indulgences…　who　pursues　animal



pleasures　at　the　expense　of　those　of　feeling　and　intellect…　must



expect　to　be　lowered　in　the　opinion　of　others；　and　to　have　a　less



share　of　their　favourable　sentiments；　but　of　this　he　has　no　right　to



complain；　unless　he　has　merited　their　favour　by　special　excellence　in



his　social　relations；　and　has　thus　established　a　title　to　their　good



offices；　which　is　not　affected　by　his　demerits　towards　himself。



　　What　I　contend　for　is；　that　the　inconveniences　which　are　strictly



inseparable　from　the　unfavourable　judgment　of　others；　are　the　only



ones　to　which　a　person　should　ever　be　subjected　for　that　portion　of



his　conduct　and　character　which　concerns　his　own　good；　but　which



does　not　affect　the　interest　of　others　in　their　relations　with　him。



Acts　injurious　to　others　require　a　totally　different　treatment。



Encroachment　on　their　rights；　infliction　on　them　of　any　loss　or　damage



not　justified　by　his　own　rights；　falsehood　or　duplicity　in　dealing



with　them；　unfair　or　ungenerous　use　of　advantages　over　them；　even



selfish　abstinence　from　defending　them　against　injury…　these　are　fit



objects　of　moral　reprobation；　and；　in　grave　cases；　of　moral



retribution　and　punishment。　And　not　only　these　acts；　but　the



dispositions　which　lead　to　them；　are　properly　immoral；　and　fit



subjects　of　disapprobation　which　may　rise　to　abhorrence。　Cruelty　of



disposition；　malice　and　ill…nature；　that　most　anti…social　and　odious



of　all　passions；　envy；　dissimulation　and　insincerity；　irascibility



on　insufficient　cause；　and　resentment　disproportioned　to　the



provocation；　the　love　of　domineering　over　others；　the　desire　to



engross　more　than　one's　share　of　advantages　（the　pleonexia　of　the



Greeks）；　the　pride　which　derives　gratification　from　the　abasement　of



others；　the　egotism　which　thinks　self　and　its　concerns　more



important　than　everything　else；　and　decides　all　doubtful　questions



in　its　own　favour；…　these　are　moral　vices；　and　constitute　a　bad　and



odious　moral　character：　unlike　the　self…regarding　faults　previously



mentioned；　which　are　not　properly　immoralities；　and　to　whatever



pitch　they　may　be　carried；　do　not　constitute　wickedness。　They　may　be



proofs　of　any　amount　of　folly；　or　want　of　personal　dignity　and



self…respect；　but　they　are　only　a　subject　of　moral　reprobation　when



they　involve　a　breach　of　duty　to　others；　for　whose　sake　the　individual



is　bound　to　have　care　for　himself。　What　are　called　duties　to　ourselves



are　not　socially　obligatory；　unless　circumstances　render　them　at　the



same　time　duties　to　others。　The　term　duty　to　oneself；　when　it　means



anything　more　than　prudence；　means　self…respect　or　self…development；



and　for　none　of　these　is　any　one　accountable　to　his　fellow



creatures；　because　for　none　of　them　is　it　for　the　good　of　mankind　that



he　be　held　accountable