on liberty- 第26部分

if　done　publicly；　are　a　violation　of　good　manners；　and　coming　thus



within　the　category　of　offences　against　others；　may　rightly　be



prohibited。　Of　this　kind　are　offences　against　decency；　on　which　it



is　unnecessary　to　dwell；　the　rather　as　they　are　only　connected



indirectly　with　our　subject；　the　objection　to　publicity　being



equally　strong　in　the　case　of　many　actions　not　in　themselves



condemnable；　nor　supposed　to　be　so。



　　There　is　another　question　to　which　an　answer　must　be　found；



consistent　with　the　principles　which　have　been　laid　down。　In　cases



of　personal　conduct　supposed　to　be　blamable；　but　which　respect　for



liberty　precludes　society　from　preventing　or　punishing；　because　the



evil　directly　resulting　falls　wholly　on　the　agent；　what　the　agent　is



free　to　do；　ought　other　persons　to　be　equally　free　to　counsel　or



instigate？　This　question　is　not　free　from　difficulty。　The　case　of　a



person　who　solicits　another　to　do　an　act　is　not　strictly　a　case　of



self…regarding　conduct。　To　give　advice　or　offer　inducements　to　any　one



is　a　social　act；　and　may；　therefore；　like　actions　in　general　which



affect　others；　be　supposed　amenable　to　social　control。　But　a　little



reflection　corrects　the　first　impression；　by　showing　that　if　the



case　is　not　strictly　within　the　definition　of　individual　liberty；



yet　the　reasons　on　which　the　principle　of　individual　liberty　is



grounded　are　applicable　to　it。　If　people　must　be　allowed；　in



whatever　concerns　only　themselves；　to　act　as　seems　best　to　themselves；



at　their　own　peril；　they　must　equally　be　free　to　consult　with　one



another　about　what　is　fit　to　be　so　done；　to　exchange　opinions；　and



give　and　receive　suggestions。　Whatever　it　is　permitted　to　do；　it



must　be　permitted　to　advise　to　do。　The　question　is　doubtful　only



when　the　instigator　derives　a　personal　benefit　from　his　advice；　when



he　makes　it　his　occupation；　for　subsistence　or　pecuniary　gain；　to



promote　what　society　and　the　State　consider　to　be　an　evil。　Then；



indeed；　a　new　element　of　complication　is　introduced；　namely；　the



existence　of　classes　of　persons　with　an　interest　opposed　to　what　is



considered　as　the　public　weal；　and　whose　mode　of　living　is　grounded　on



the　counteraction　of　it。　Ought　this　to　be　interfered　with；　or　not？



Fornication；　for　example；　must　be　tolerated；　and　so　must　gambling；　but



should　a　person　be　free　to　be　a　pimp；　or　to　keep　a　gambling…house？　The



case　is　one　of　those　which　lie　on　the　exact　boundary　line　between



two　principles；　and　it　is　not　at　once　apparent　to　which　of　the　two



it　properly　belongs。



　　There　are　arguments　on　both　sides。　On　the　side　of　toleration　it



may　be　said　that　the　fact　of　following　anything　as　an　occupation；



and　living　or　profiting　by　the　practice　of　it；　cannot　make　that



criminal　which　would　otherwise　be　admissible；　that　the　act　should



either　be　consistently　permitted　or　consistently　prohibited；　that　if



the　principles　which　we　have　hitherto　defended　are　true；　society　has



no　business；　as　society；　to　decide　anything　to　be　wrong　which　concerns



only　the　individual；　that　it　cannot　go　beyond　dissuasion；　and　that　one



person　should　be　as　free　to　persuade　as　another　to　dissuade。　In



opposition　to　this　it　may　be　contended；　that　although　the　public；　or



the　State；　are　not　warranted　in　authoritatively　deciding；　for　purposes



of　repression　or　punishment；　that　such　or　such　conduct　affecting



only　the　interests　of　the　individual　is　good　or　bad；　they　are　fully



justified　in　assuming；　if　they　regard　it　as　bad；　that　its　being　so



or　not　is　at　least　a　disputable　question：　That；　this　being　supposed；



they　cannot　be　acting　wrongly　in　endeavouring　to　exclude　the　influence



of　solicitations　which　are　not　disinterested；　of　instigators　who



cannot　possibly　be　impartial…　who　have　a　direct　personal　interest　on



one　side；　and　that　side　the　one　which　the　State　believes　to　be



wrong；　and　who　confessedly　promote　it　for　personal　objects　only。　There



can　surely；　it　may　be　urged；　be　nothing　lost；　no　sacrifice　of　good；　by



so　ordering　matters　that　persons　shall　make　their　election；　either



wisely　or　foolishly；　on　their　own　prompting；　as　free　as　possible



from　the　arts　of　persons　who　stimulate　their　inclinations　for



interested　purposes　of　their　own。　Thus　（it　may　be　said）　though　the



statutes　respecting　unlawful　games　are　utterly　indefensible…　though



all　persons　should　be　free　to　gamble　in　their　own　or　each　other's



houses；　or　in　any　place　of　meeting　established　by　their　own



subscriptions；　and　open　only　to　the　members　and　their　visitors…　yet



public　gambling…houses　should　not　be　permitted。　It　is　true　that　the



prohibition　is　never　effectual；　and　that；　whatever　amount　of



tyrannical　power　may　be　given　to　the　police；　gambling…houses　can



always　be　maintained　under　other　pretences；　but　they　may　be



compelled　to　conduct　their　operations　with　a　certain　degree　of　secrecy



and　mystery；　so　that　nobody　knows　anything　about　them　but　those　who



seek　them；　and　more　than　this　society　ought　not　to　aim　at。



　　There　is　considerable　force　in　these　arguments。　I　will　not　venture



to　decide　whether　they　are　sufficient　to　justify　the　moral　anomaly



of　punishing　the　accessary；　when　the　principal　is　（and　must　be）



allowed　to　go　free；　of　fining　or　imprisoning　the　procurer；　but　not　the



fornicator…　the　gambling…house　keeper；　but　not　the　gambler。　Still　less



ought　the　common　operations　of　buying　and　selling　to　be　interfered



with　on　analogous　grounds。　Almost　every　article　which　is　bought　and



sold　may　be　used　in　excess；　and　the　sellers　have　a　pecuniary



interest　in　encouraging　that　excess；　but　no　argument　can　be　founded　on



this；　in　favour；　for　instance；　of　the　Maine　Law；　because　the　class



of　dealers　in　strong　drinks；　though　interested　in　their　abuse；　are



indispensably　required　for　the　sake　of　their　legitimate　use。　The



interest；　however；　of　these　dealers　in　promoting　intemperance　is　a



real　evil；　and　justifies　the　State　in　imposing　restrictions　and



requiring　guarantees　which；　but　for　that　justification；　would　be



infringements　of　legitimate　liberty。



　　A　further　question　is；　whether　the　State；　while　it　permits；　should



nevertheless　indirectly　discourage　conduct　which　it　deems　contrary



to　the　best　interests　of　the　agent；　whether；　for　example；　it　should



take　measures　to　render　the　means　of　drunkenness　more　costly；　or　add



to　the　difficulty　of　procuring　them　by　limiting　the　number　of　the



places　of　sale。　On　this　as　on　most　other　practical　questions；　many



distinctions　require　to　be　made。　To　tax　stimulants　for　the　sole



purpose　of　making　them　more　difficult　to　be　obtained；　is　a　measure



differing　only　in　degree　from　their　entire　prohibition；　and　would　be



justifiable　only　if　that　were　justifiable。　Every　increase　of　cost　is　a



prohibition；　to　those　whose　means　do　not　come　up　to　the　augmented



price；　and　to　those　who　do；　it　is　a　penalty　laid　on　them　for



gratifying　a　particular　taste。　Their　choice　of　pleasures；　and　their



mode　of　expending　their　income；　after　satisfying　their　legal　and　moral



obligations　to　the　State　and　to　individuals；　are　their　own　concern；



and　must　rest　with　their　own　judgment。　These　considerations　may　seem



at　first　sight　to　condemn　the　selection　of　stimulants　as　special



subjects　of　taxation　for　purposes　of　revenue。　But　it　must　be



remembered　that　taxation　for　fiscal　purposes　is　absolutely　inevitable；



that　in　most　countries　it　is　necessary　that　a　considerable　part　of



that　taxation　should　be　indirect；　that　the　State；　therefore；　cannot



help　imposing　penalties；　which　to　some　persons　may　be　prohibitory；



on　the　use　of　some　articles　of　consumption。　It　is　hence　the　duty　of



the　State　to　consider；　in　the　imposition　of　taxes；　what　commodities



the　consumers　can　best　spare；　and　a　fortiori；　to　select　in



preference　those　of　which　it　deems　the　use；　beyond　a　very　moderate



quantity；　to　be　positively　injurious。　Taxation；　therefore；　of



stimulants；　up　to　the　point　which　produces　the　largest　amount　of



revenue　（supposing　that　the　State　needs　all　the　revenue　which　it



yields）　is　not　only　admissible；　but　to　be　approved　of。



　　The　question　of　making　the　sale　of　these　commodities　a　more　or



less　exclusive　privilege；　must　be　answered　differently；　according　to



the　purposes　to　which　the　restriction　is　intended　to　be　subservient。



All　places　of　public　resort　require　the　restraint　of　a　police；　and



places　of　this　kind　peculiarly；　because　offences　against　society　are



especially　apt　to　originate　there。　It　is；　therefore；　fit　to　confine



the　power　of　selling　these　commodities　（at　least　for　consumption　on



the　spot）　to　persons　of　known　or　vouched…for　respectability　of



conduct；　to　make　such　regulations　respecting　hours　of　opening　and



closing　as　may　be　requisite　for　public　surveillance；　and　to　withdraw



the　licence　if　breaches　of　the　peace　repeatedly　take　place　through　the



connivance　or　incapacity　of　the　keeper　of　the　house；　or　if　it



becomes　a　rendezvous　for　concocting　and　preparing　offences　against　the



law。　Any　further　restriction　I　do　not　conceive　to　be；　in　principle；



justifiable。　The　limitation　in　number；　for　instance；　of　beer　and



spirit　houses；　for　the　express　purpose　of　rendering　them　more



difficult　of　access；　and　diminishing　the　occasions　of　temptation；



not　only　exposes　all　to　an　inconvenience　because　there　are　some　by



whom　the　facility　would　be　abused；　but　is　suited　only　to　a　state　of



society　in　which　the　labouring　classes　are　avowedly　treated　as



children　or　savages；　and　placed　under　an　education　of　restraint；　to



fit　them　for　future　admission　to　the　privileges　of　freedom。　This　is



not　the　principle　on　which　the　labouring　classes　are　professedly



governed　in　any　free　country；　and　no　person　who　sets　due　value　on



freedom　will　give　his　adhesion　to　their　being　so　governed；　unless