on liberty- 第27部分

freedom　will　give　his　adhesion　to　their　being　so　governed；　unless



after　all　efforts　have　been　exhausted　to　educate　them　for　freedom



and　govern　them　as　freemen；　and　it　has　been　definitively　proved　that



they　can　only　be　governed　as　children。　The　bare　statement　of　the



alternative　shows　the　absurdity　of　supposing　that　such　efforts　have



been　made　in　any　case　which　needs　be　considered　here。　It　is　only



because　the　institutions　of　this　country　are　a　mass　of



inconsistencies；　that　things　find　admittance　into　our　practice　which



belong　to　the　system　of　despotic；　or　what　is　called　paternal；



government；　while　the　general　freedom　of　our　institutions　precludes



the　exercise　of　the　amount　of　control　necessary　to　render　the



restraint　of　any　real　efficacy　as　a　moral　education。



　　It　was　pointed　out　in　an　early　part　of　this　Essay；　that　the



liberty　of　the　individual；　in　things　wherein　the　individual　is　alone



concerned；　implies　a　corresponding　liberty　in　any　number　of



individuals　to　regulate　by　mutual　agreement　such　things　as　regard　them



jointly；　and　regard　no　persons　but　themselves。　This　question



presents　no　difficulty；　so　long　as　the　will　of　all　the　persons



implicated　remains　unaltered；　but　since　that　will　may　change；　it　is



often　necessary；　even　in　things　in　which　they　alone　are　concerned；



that　they　should　enter　into　engagements　with　one　another；　and　when



they　do；　it　is　fit；　as　a　general　rule；　that　those　engagements　should



be　kept。　Yet；　in　the　laws；　probably；　of　every　country；　this　general



rule　has　some　exceptions。　Not　only　persons　are　not　held　to　engagements



which　violate　the　rights　of　third　parties；　but　it　is　sometimes



considered　a　sufficient　reason　for　releasing　them　from　an



engagement；　that　it　is　injurious　to　themselves。　In　this　and　most　other



civilised　countries；　for　example；　an　engagement　by　which　a　person



should　sell　himself；　or　allow　himself　to　be　sold；　as　a　slave；　would　be



null　and　void；　neither　enforced　by　law　nor　by　opinion。　The　ground



for　thus　limiting　his　power　of　voluntarily　disposing　of　his　own　lot　in



life；　is　apparent；　and　is　very　clearly　seen　in　this　extreme　case。



The　reason　for　not　interfering；　unless　for　the　sake　of　others；　with



a　person's　voluntary　acts；　is　consideration　for　his　liberty。　His



voluntary　choice　is　evidence　that　what　he　so　chooses　is　desirable；



or　at　least　endurable；　to　him；　and　his　good　is　on　the　whole　best



provided　for　by　allowing　him　to　take　his　own　means　of　pursuing　it。　But



by　selling　himself　for　a　slave；　be　abdicates　his　liberty；　he



foregoes　any　future　use　of　it　beyond　that　single　act。　He　therefore



defeats；　in　his　own　case；　the　very　purpose　which　is　the



justification　of　allowing　him　to　dispose　of　himself。　He　is　no　longer



free；　but　is　thenceforth　in　a　position　which　has　no　longer　the



presumption　in　its　favour；　that　would　be　afforded　by　his　voluntarily



remaining　in　it。　The　principle　of　freedom　cannot　require　that　he



should　be　free　not　to　be　free。　It　is　not　freedom　to　be　allowed　to



alienate　his　freedom。　These　reasons；　the　force　of　which　is　so



conspicuous　in　this　peculiar　case；　are　evidently　of　far　wider



application；　yet　a　limit　is　everywhere　set　to　them　by　the



necessities　of　life；　which　continually　require；　not　indeed　that　we



should　resign　our　freedom；　but　that　we　should　consent　to　this　and



the　other　limitation　of　it。　The　principle；　however；　which　demands



uncontrolled　freedom　of　action　in　all　that　concerns　only　the　agents



themselves；　requires　that　those　who　have　become　bound　to　one



another；　in　things　which　concern　no　third　party；　should　be　able　to



release　one　another　from　the　engagement：　and　even　without　such



voluntary　release　there　are　perhaps　no　contracts　or　engagements；



except　those　that　relate　to　money　or　money's　worth；　of　which　one　can



venture　to　say　that　there　ought　to　be　no　liberty　whatever　of



retractation。



　　Baron　Wilhelm　von　Humboldt；　in　the　excellent　essay　from　which　I　have



already　quoted；　states　it　as　his　conviction；　that　engagements　which



involve　personal　relations　or　services　should　never　be　legally　binding



beyond　a　limited　duration　of　time；　and　that　the　most　important　of



these　engagements；　marriage；　having　the　peculiarity　that　its　objects



are　frustrated　unless　the　feelings　of　both　the　parties　are　in



harmony　with　it；　should　require　nothing　more　than　the　declared　will　of



either　party　to　dissolve　it。　This　subject　is　too　important；　and　too



complicated；　to　be　discussed　in　a　parenthesis；　and　I　touch　on　it



only　so　far　as　is　necessary　for　purposes　of　illustration。　If　the



conciseness　and　generality　of　Baron　Humboldt's　dissertation　had　not



obliged　him　in　this　instance　to　content　himself　with　enunciating　his



conclusion　without　discussing　the　premises；　he　would　doubtless　have



recognised　that　the　question　cannot　be　decided　on　grounds　so　simple　as



those　to　which　he　confines　himself。　When　a　person；　either　by　express



promise　or　by　conduct；　has　encouraged　another　to　rely　upon　his



continuing　to　act　in　a　certain　way…　to　build　expectations　and



calculations；　and　stake　any　part　of　his　plan　of　life　upon　that



supposition…　a　new　series　of　moral　obligations　arises　on　his　part



towards　that　person；　which　may　possibly　be　overruled；　but　cannot　be



ignored。　And　again；　if　the　relation　between　two　contracting　parties



has　been　followed　by　consequences　to　others；　if　it　has　placed　third



parties　in　any　peculiar　position；　or；　as　in　the　case　of　marriage；



has　even　called　third　parties　into　existence；　obligations　arise　on　the



part　of　both　the　contracting　parties　towards　those　third　persons；



the　fulfilment　of　which；　or　at　all　events　the　mode　of　fulfilment；　must



be　greatly　affected　by　the　continuance　or　disruption　of　the　relation



between　the　original　parties　to　the　contract。　It　does　not　follow；



nor　can　I　admit；　that　these　obligations　extend　to　requiring　the



fulfilment　of　the　contract　at　all　costs　to　the　happiness　of　the



reluctant　party；　but　they　are　a　necessary　element　in　the　question；　and



even　if；　as　Von　Humboldt　maintains；　they　ought　to　make　no　difference



in　the　legal　freedom　of　the　parties　to　release　themselves　from　the



engagement　（and　I　also　hold　that　they　ought　not　to　make　much



difference）；　they　necessarily　make　a　great　difference　in　the　moral



freedom。　A　person　is　bound　to　take　all　these　circumstances　into



account　before　resolving　on　a　step　which　may　affect　such　important



interests　of　others；　and　if　he　does　not　allow　proper　weight　to　those



interests；　he　is　morally　responsible　for　the　wrong。　I　have　made



these　obvious　remarks　for　the　better　illustration　of　the　general



principle　of　liberty；　and　not　because　they　are　at　all　needed　on　the



particular　question；　which；　on　the　contrary；　is　usually　discussed　as



if　the　interest　of　children　was　everything；　and　that　of　grown



persons　nothing。



　　I　have　already　observed　that；　owing　to　the　absence　of　any　recognised



general　principles；　liberty　is　often　granted　where　it　should　be



withheld；　as　well　as　withheld　where　it　should　be　granted；　and　one　of



the　cases　in　which；　in　the　modern　European　world；　the　sentiment　of



liberty　is　the　strongest；　is　a　case　where；　in　my　view；　it　is



altogether　misplaced。　A　person　should　be　free　to　do　as　he　likes　in　his



own　concerns；　but　he　ought　not　to　be　free　to　do　as　he　likes　in



acting　for　another；　under　the　pretext　that　the　affairs　of　the　other



are　his　own　affairs。　The　State；　while　it　respects　the　liberty　of



each　in　what　specially　regards　himself；　is　bound　to　maintain　a



vigilant　control　over　his　exercise　of　any　power　which　it　allows　him　to



possess　over　others。　This　obligation　is　almost　entirely　disregarded　in



the　case　of　the　family　relations；　a　case；　in　its　direct　influence　on



human　happiness；　more　important　than　all　others　taken　together。　The



almost　despotic　power　of　husbands　over　wives　needs　not　be　enlarged



upon　here；　because　nothing　more　is　needed　for　the　complete　removal



of　the　evil　than　that　wives　should　have　the　same　rights；　and　should



receive　the　protection　of　law　in　the　same　manner；　as　all　other



persons；　and　because；　on　this　subject；　the　defenders　of　established



injustice　do　not　avail　themselves　of　the　plea　of　liberty；　but　stand



forth　openly　as　the　champions　of　power。　It　is　in　the　case　of



children　that　misapplied　notions　of　liberty　are　a　real　obstacle　to　the



fulfilment　by　the　State　of　its　duties。　One　would　almost　think　that　a



man's　children　were　supposed　to　be　literally；　and　not



metaphorically；　a　part　of　himself；　so　jealous　is　opinion　of　the



smallest　interference　of　law　with　his　absolute　and　exclusive　control



over　them；　more　jealous　than　of　almost　any　interference　with　his　own



freedom　of　action：　so　much　less　do　the　generality　of　mankind　value



liberty　than　power。　Consider；　for　example；　the　case　of　education。　Is



it　not　almost　a　self…evident　axiom；　that　the　State　should　require



and　compel　the　education；　up　to　a　certain　standard；　of　every　human



being　who　is　born　its　citizen？　Yet　who　is　there　that　is　not　afraid



to　recognise　and　assert　this　truth？　Hardly　any　one　indeed　will　deny



that　it　is　one　of　the　most　sacred　duties　of　the　parents　（or；　as　law



and　usage　now　stand；　the　father）；　after　summoning　a　human　being　into



the　world；　to　give　to　that　being　an　education　fitting　him　to　perform



his　part　well　in　life　towards　others　and　towards　himself。　But　while



this　is　unanimously　declared　to　be　the　father's　duty；　scarcely



anybody；　in　this　country；　will　bear　to　hear　of　obliging　him　to　perform



it。　Instead　of　his　being　required　to　make　any　exertion　or　sacrifice



for　securing　education　to　his　child；　it　is　left　to　his　choice　to



accept　it　or　not　when　it　is　provided　gratis！　It　still　remains



unrecognised；　that　to　bring　a　child　into　existence　without　a　fair



prospect　of　being　able；　not　only　to　provid