the critique of pure reason- 第128部分

concreto…　but　at　the　same　time　a　priori…　that　is；　in　pure　and；

therefore；　infallible　intuition；　and　thus　all　causes　of　illusion　and

error　are　excluded。　Of　all　the　a　priori　sciences　of　reason；　therefore；

mathematics　alone　can　be　learned。　Philosophy…　unless　it　be　in　an

historical　manner…　cannot　be　learned；　we　can　at　most　learn　to

philosophize。

　　Philosophy　is　the　system　of　all　philosophical　cognition。　We　must　use

this　term　in　an　objective　sense；　if　we　understand　by　it　the

archetype　of　all　attempts　at　philosophizing；　and　the　standard　by　which

all　subjective　philosophies　are　to　be　judged。　In　this　sense；

philosophy　is　merely　the　idea　of　a　possible　science；　which　does　not

exist　in　concreto；　but　to　which　we　endeavour　in　various　ways　to

approximate；　until　we　have　discovered　the　right　path　to　pursue…　a　path

overgrown　by　the　errors　and　illusions　of　sense…　and　the　image　we

have　hitherto　tried　in　vain　to　shape　has　become　a　perfect　copy　of

the　great　prototype。　Until　that　time；　we　cannot　learn　philosophy…　it

does　not　exist；　if　it　does；　where　is　it；　who　possesses　it；　and　how

shall　we　know　it？　We　can　only　learn　to　philosophize；　in　other　words；

we　can　only　exercise　our　powers　of　reasoning　in　accordance　with

general　principles；　retaining　at　the　same　time；　the　right　of

investigating　the　sources　of　these　principles；　of　testing；　and　even　of

rejecting　them。

　　Until　then；　our　conception　of　philosophy　is　only　a　scholastic

conception…　a　conception；　that　is；　of　a　system　of　cognition　which　we

are　trying　to　elaborate　into　a　science；　all　that　we　at　present　know

being　the　systematic　unity　of　this　cognition；　and　consequently　the

logical　completeness　of　the　cognition　for　the　desired　end。　But　there

is　also　a　cosmical　conception　（conceptus　cosmicus）　of　philosophy；

which　has　always　formed　the　true　basis　of　this　term；　especially　when

philosophy　was　personified　and　presented　to　us　in　the　ideal　of　a

philosopher。　In　this　view　philosophy　is　the　science　of　the　relation　of

all　cognition　to　the　ultimate　and　essential　aims　of　human　reason

（teleologia　rationis　humanae）；　and　the　philosopher　is　not　merely　an

artist…　who　occupies　himself　with　conceptions…　but　a　lawgiver；

legislating　for　human　reason。　In　this　sense　of　the　word；　it　would　be

in　the　highest　degree　arrogant　to　assume　the　title　of　philosopher；　and

to　pretend　that　we　had　reached　the　perfection　of　the　prototype　which

lies　in　the　idea　alone。

　　The　mathematician；　the　natural　philosopher；　and　the　logician…　how

far　soever　the　first　may　have　advanced　in　rational；　and　the　two　latter

in　philosophical　knowledge…　are　merely　artists；　engaged　in　the

arrangement　and　formation　of　conceptions；　they　cannot　be　termed

philosophers。　Above　them　all；　there　is　the　ideal　teacher；　who

employs　them　as　instruments　for　the　advancement　of　the　essential

aims　of　human　reason。　Him　alone　can　we　call　philosopher；　but　he

nowhere　exists。　But　the　idea　of　his　legislative　power　resides　in　the

mind　of　every　man；　and　it　alone　teaches　us　what　kind　of　systematic

unity　philosophy　demands　in　view　of　the　ultimate　aims　of　reason。

This　idea　is；　therefore；　a　cosmical　conception。*



　　*By　a　cosmical　conception；　I　mean　one　in　which　all　men　necessarily

take　an　interest；　the　aim　of　a　science　must　accordingly　be

determined　according　to　scholastic　conceptions；　if　it　is　regarded

merely　as　a　means　to　certain　arbitrarily　proposed　ends。



　　In　view　of　the　complete　systematic　unity　of　reason；　there　can　only

be　one　ultimate　end　of　all　the　operations　of　the　mind。　To　this　all

other　aims　are　subordinate；　and　nothing　more　than　means　for　its

attainment。　This　ultimate　end　is　the　destination　of　man；　and　the

philosophy　which　relates　to　it　is　termed　moral　philosophy。　The

superior　position　occupied　by　moral　philosophy；　above　all　other

spheres　for　the　operations　of　reason；　sufficiently　indicates　the

reason　why　the　ancients　always　included　the　idea…　and　in　an　especial

manner…　of　moralist　in　that　of　philosopher。　Even　at　the　present　day；

we　call　a　man　who　appears　to　have　the　power　of　self…government；　even

although　his　knowledge　may　be　very　limited；　by　the　name　of

philosopher。

　　The　legislation　of　human　reason；　or　philosophy；　has　two　objects…

nature　and　freedom…　and　thus　contains　not　only　the　laws　of　nature；　but

also　those　of　ethics；　at　first　in　two　separate　systems；　which；

finally；　merge　into　one　grand　philosophical　system　of　cognition。　The

philosophy　of　nature　relates　to　that　which　is；　that　of　ethics　to

that　which　ought　to　be。

　　But　all　philosophy　is　either　cognition　on　the　basis　of　pure

reason；　or　the　cognition　of　reason　on　the　basis　of　empirical

principles。　The　former　is　termed　pure；　the　latter　empirical

philosophy。

　　The　philosophy　of　pure　reason　is　either　propaedeutic；　that　is；　an

inquiry　into　the　powers　of　reason　in　regard　to　pure　a　priori

cognition；　and　is　termed　critical　philosophy；　or　it　is；　secondly；

the　system　of　pure　reason…　a　science　containing　the　systematic

presentation　of　the　whole　body　of　philosophical　knowledge；　true　as

well　as　illusory；　given　by　pure　reason…　and　is　called　metaphysic。　This

name　may；　however；　be　also　given　to　the　whole　system　of　pure

philosophy；　critical　philosophy　included；　and　may　designate　the

investigation　into　the　sources　or　possibility　of　a　priori　cognition；

as　well　as　the　presentation　of　the　a　priori　cognitions　which　form　a

system　of　pure　philosophy…　excluding；　at　the　same　time；　all

empirical　and　mathematical　elements。

　　Metaphysic　is　divided　into　that　of　the　speculative　and　that　of　the

practical　use　of　pure　reason；　and　is；　accordingly；　either　the

metaphysic　of　nature；　or　the　metaphysic　of　ethics。　The　former　contains

all　the　pure　rational　principles…　based　upon　conceptions　alone　（and

thus　excluding　mathematics）…　of　all　theoretical　cognition；　the　latter；

the　principles　which　determine　and　necessitate　a　priori　all　action。

Now　moral　philosophy　alone　contains　a　code　of　laws…　for　the　regulation

of　our　actions…　which　are　deduced　from　principles　entirely　a　priori。

Hence　the　metaphysic　of　ethics　is　the　only　pure　moral　philosophy；　as

it　is　not　based　upon　anthropological　or　other　empirical

considerations。　The　metaphysic　of　speculative　reason　is　what　is

commonly　called　metaphysic　in　the　more　limited　sense。　But　as　pure

moral　philosophy　properly　forms　a　part　of　this　system　of　cognition；　we

must　allow　it　to　retain　the　name　of　metaphysic；　although　it　is　not

requisite　that　we　should　insist　on　so　terming　it　in　our　present

discussion。

　　It　is　of　the　highest　importance　to　separate　those　cognitions　which

differ　from　others　both　in　kind　and　in　origin；　and　to　take　great

care　that　they　are　not　confounded　with　those　with　which　they　are

generally　found　connected。　What　the　chemist　does　in　the　analysis　of

substances；　what　the　mathematician　in　pure　mathematics；　is；　in　a　still

higher　degree；　the　duty　of　the　philosopher；　that　the　value　of　each

different　kind　of　cognition；　and　the　part　it　takes　in　the　operations

of　the　mind；　may　be　clearly　defined。　Human　reason　has　never　wanted　a

metaphysic　of　some　kind；　since　it　attained　the　power　of　thought；　or

rather　of　reflection；　but　it　has　never　been　able　to　keep　this　sphere

of　thought　and　cognition　pure　from　all　admixture　of　foreign

elements。　The　idea　of　a　science　of　this　kind　is　as　old　as

speculation　itself；　and　what　mind　does　not　speculate…　either　in　the

scholastic　or　in　the　popular　fashion？　At　the　same　time；　it　must　be

admitted　that　even　thinkers　by　profession　have　been　unable　clearly

to　explain　the　distinction　between　the　two　elements　of　our

cognition…　the　one　completely　a　priori；　the　other　a　posteriori；　and

hence　the　proper　definition　of　a　peculiar　kind　of　cognition；　and

with　it　the　just　idea　of　a　science　which　has　so　long　and　so　deeply

engaged　the　attention　of　the　human　mind；　has　never　been　established。

When　it　was　said：　〃Metaphysic　is　the　science　of　the　first　principles

of　human　cognition；〃　this　definition　did　not　signalize　a　peculiarity

in　kind；　but　only　a　difference　in　degree；　these　first　principles

were　thus　declared　to　be　more　general　than　others；　but　no　criterion　of

distinction　from　empirical　principles　was　given。　Of　these　some　are

more　general；　and　therefore　higher；　than　others；　and…　as　we　cannot

distinguish　what　is　completely　a　priori　from　that　which　is　known　to　be

a　posteriori…　where　shall　we　draw　the　line　which　is　to　separate　the

higher　and　so…called　first　principles；　from　the　lower　and

subordinate　principles　of　cognition？　What　would　be　said　if　we　were

asked　to　be　satisfied　with　a　division　of　the　epochs　of　the　world

into　the　earlier　centuries　and　those　following　them？　〃Does　the

fifth；　or　the　tenth　century　belong　to　the　earlier　centuries？〃　it　would

be　asked。　In　the　same　way　I　ask：　Does　the　conception　of　extension

belong　to　metaphysics？　You　answer；　〃Yes。〃　Well；　that　of　body　too？

〃Yes。〃　And　that　of　a　fluid　body？　You　stop；　you　are　unprepared　to　admit

this；　for　if　you　do；　everything　will　belong　to　metaphysics。　From

this　it　is　evident　that　the　mere　degree　of　subordination…　of　the

particular　to　the　general…　cannot　determine　the　limits　of　a　science；

and　that；　in　the　present　case；　we　must　expect　to　find　a　difference

in　the　conceptions　of　metaphysics　both　in　kind　and　in　origin。　The

fundamental　idea　of　metaphysics　was　obscured　on　another　side　by　the

fact　that　this　kind　of　a　priori　cognition　showed　a　certain

similarity　in　character　with　the　science　of　mathematics。　Both　have　the

property　in　common　of　possessing　an　a　priori　origin；　but；　in　the

one；　our　knowledge　is　based　upon　conceptions；　in　the　other；　on　the

construction　of　conceptions。　Thus　a　decided　dissimilarity　between

philosophical　and　mathematical　cognition　comes　out…　a　dissimilarity

which　was　always　felt；　but　which　could　not　be　made　distinct　for　want

of　an　insight　into　the　criteria　of　the　difference。　And　thus　it

happened　that；　as　philosophers　themselves　failed　in　the　proper

development　of　the　idea　of　their　science；　the　elaboration　of