the critique of pure reason- 第5部分

with　which　speculative　reason　endeavours　to　transcend　its　limits

lead　inevitably；　not　to　the　extension；　but　to　the　contraction　of　the

use　of　reason；　inasmuch　as　they　threaten　to　extend　the　limits　of

sensibility；　which　is　their　proper　sphere；　over　the　entire　realm　of

thought　and；　thus；　to　supplant　the　pure　（practical）　use　of　reason。

So　far；　then；　as　this　criticism　is　occupied　in　confining　speculative

reason　within　its　proper　bounds；　it　is　only　negative；　but；　inasmuch　as

it　thereby；　at　the　same　time；　removes　an　obstacle　which　impedes　and

even　threatens　to　destroy　the　use　of　practical　reason；　it　possesses

a　positive　and　very　important　value。　In　order　to　admit　this；　we　have

only　to　be　convinced　that　there　is　an　absolutely　necessary　use　of　pure

reason…　the　moral　use…　in　which　it　inevitably　transcends　the　limits　of

sensibility；　without　the　aid　of　speculation；　requiring　only　to　be

insured　against　the　effects　of　a　speculation　which　would　involve　it　in

contradiction　with　itself。　To　deny　the　positive　advantage　of　the

service　which　this　criticism　renders　us　would　be　as　absurd　as。　to

maintain　that　the　system　of　police　is　productive　of　no　positive

benefit；　since　its　main　business　is　to　prevent　the　violence　which

citizen　has　to　apprehend　from　citizen；　that　so　each　may　pursue　his

vocation　in　peace　and　security。　That　space　and　time　are　only　forms

of　sensible　intuition；　and　hence　are　only　conditions　of　the

existence　of　things　as　phenomena；　that；　moreover；　we　have　no

conceptions　of　the　understanding；　and；　consequently；　no　elements　for

the　cognition　of　things；　except　in　so　far　as　a　corresponding　intuition

can　be　given　to　these　conceptions；　that；　accordingly；　we　can　have　no

cognition　of　an　object；　as　a　thing　in　itself；　but　only　as　an　object　of

sensible　intuition；　that　is；　as　phenomenon…　all　this　is　proved　in

the　analytical　part　of　the　Critique；　and　from　this　the　limitation　of

all　possible　speculative　cognition　to　the　mere　objects　of

experience；　follows　as　a　necessary　result。　At　the　same　time；　it　must

be　carefully　borne　in　mind　that；　while　we　surrender　the　power　of

cognizing；　we　still　reserve　the　power　of　thinking　objects；　as　things

in　themselves。*　For；　otherwise；　we　should　require　to　affirm　the

existence　of　an　appearance；　without　something　that　appears…　which

would　be　absurd。　Now　let　us　suppose；　for　a　moment；　that　we　had　not

undertaken　this　criticism　and；　accordingly；　had　not　drawn　the

necessary　distinction　between　things　as　objects　of　experience　and

things　as　they　are　in　themselves。　The　principle　of　causality；　and；

by　consequence；　the　mechanism　of　nature　as　determined　by　causality；

would　then　have　absolute　validity　in　relation　to　all　things　as

efficient　causes。　I　should　then　be　unable　to　assert；　with　regard　to

one　and　the　same　being；　e。g。；　the　human　soul；　that　its　will　is　free；

and　yet；　at　the　same　time；　subject　to　natural　necessity；　that　is；

not　free；　without　falling　into　a　palpable　contradiction；　for　in　both

propositions　I　should　take　the　soul　in　the　same　signification；　as　a

thing　in　general；　as　a　thing　in　itself…　as；　without　previous

criticism；　I　could　not　but　take　it。　Suppose　now；　on　the　other　hand；

that　we　have　undertaken　this　criticism；　and　have　learnt　that　an　object

may　be　taken　in　two　senses；　first；　as　a　phenomenon；　secondly；　as　a

thing　in　itself；　and　that；　according　to　the　deduction　of　the

conceptions　of　the　understanding；　the　principle　of　causality　has

reference　only　to　things　in　the　first　sense。　We　then　see　how　it　does

not　involve　any　contradiction　to　assert；　on　the　one　hand；　that　the

will；　in　the　phenomenal　sphere…　in　visible　action…　is　necessarily

obedient　to　the　law　of　nature；　and；　in　so　far；　not　free；　and；　on　the

other　hand；　that；　as　belonging　to　a　thing　in　itself；　it　is　not　subject

to　that　law；　and；　accordingly；　is　free。　Now；　it　is　true　that　I　cannot；

by　means　of　speculative　reason；　and　still　less　by　empirical

observation；　cognize　my　soul　as　a　thing　in　itself　and　consequently；

cannot　cognize　liberty　as　the　property　of　a　being　to　which　I　ascribe

effects　in　the　world　of　sense。　For；　to　do　so；　I　must　cognize　this

being　as　existing；　and　yet　not　in　time；　which…　since　I　cannot

support　my　conception　by　any　intuition…　is　impossible。　At　the　same

time；　while　I　cannot　cognize；　I　can　quite　well　think　freedom；　that

is　to　say；　my　representation　of　it　involves　at　least　no　contradiction；

if　we　bear　in　mind　the　critical　distinction　of　the　two　modes　of

representation　（the　sensible　and　the　intellectual）　and　the

consequent　limitation　of　the　conceptions　of　the　pure　understanding　and

of　the　principles　which　flow　from　them。　Suppose　now　that　morality

necessarily　presupposed　liberty；　in　the　strictest　sense；　as　a　property

of　our　will；　suppose　that　reason　contained　certain　practical；　original

principles　a　priori；　which　were　absolutely　impossible　without　this

presupposition；　and　suppose；　at　the　same　time；　that　speculative　reason

had　proved　that　liberty　was　incapable　of　being　thought　at　all。　It

would　then　follow　that　the　moral　presupposition　must　give　way　to　the

speculative　affirmation；　the　opposite　of　which　involves　an　obvious

contradiction；　and　that　liberty　and；　with　it；　morality　must　yield　to

the　mechanism　of　nature；　for　the　negation　of　morality　involves　no

contradiction；　except　on　the　presupposition　of　liberty。　Now　morality

does　not　require　the　speculative　cognition　of　liberty；　it　is　enough

that　I　can　think　it；　that　its　conception　involves　no　contradiction；

that　it　does　not　interfere　with　the　mechanism　of　nature。　But　even　this

requirement　we　could　not　satisfy；　if　we　had　not　learnt　the　twofold

sense　in　which　things　may　be　taken；　and　it　is　only　in　this　way　that

the　doctrine　of　morality　and　the　doctrine　of　nature　are　confined

within　their　proper　limits。　For　this　result；　then；　we　are　indebted

to　a　criticism　which　warns　us　of　our　unavoidable　ignorance　with　regard

to　things　in　themselves；　and　establishes　the　necessary　limitation　of

our　theoretical　cognition　to　mere　phenomena。



　　*In　order　to　cognize　an　object；　I　must　be　able　to　prove　its

possibility；　either　from　its　reality　as　attested　by　experience；　or　a

priori；　by　means　of　reason。　But　I　can　think　what　I　please；　provided

only　I　do　not　contradict　myself；　that　is；　provided　my　conception　is

a　possible　thought；　though　I　may　be　unable　to　answer　for　the　existence

of　a　corresponding　object　in　the　sum　of　possibilities。　But　something

more　is　required　before　I　can　attribute　to　such　a　conception　objective

validity；　that　is　real　possibility…　the　other　possibility　being　merely

logical。　We　are　not；　however；　confined　to　theoretical　sources　of

cognition　for　the　means　of　satisfying　this　additional　requirement；　but

may　derive　them　from　practical　sources。



　　The　positive　value　of　the　critical　principles　of　pure　reason　in

relation　to　the　conception　of　God　and　of　the　simple　nature　of　the

soul；　admits　of　a　similar　exemplification；　but　on　this　point　I　shall

not　dwell。　I　cannot　even　make　the　assumption…　as　the　practical

interests　of　morality　require…　of　God；　freedom；　and　immortality；　if

I　do　not　deprive　speculative　reason　of　its　pretensions　to　transcendent

insight。　For　to　arrive　at　these；　it　must　make　use　of　principles　which；

in　fact；　extend　only　to　the　objects　of　possible　experience；　and

which　cannot　be　applied　to　objects　beyond　this　sphere　without

converting　them　into　phenomena；　and　thus　rendering　the　practical

extension　of　pure　reason　impossible。　I　must；　therefore；　abolish

knowledge；　to　make　room　for　belief。　The　dogmatism　of　metaphysics；　that

is；　the　presumption　that　it　is　possible　to　advance　in　metaphysics

without　previous　criticism；　is　the　true　source　of　the　unbelief　（always

dogmatic）　which　militates　against　morality。

　　Thus；　while　it　may　be　no　very　difficult　task　to　bequeath　a　legacy　to

posterity；　in　the　shape　of　a　system　of　metaphysics　constructed　in

accordance　with　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason；　still　the　value　of　such　a

bequest　is　not　to　be　depreciated。　It　will　render　an　important

service　to　reason；　by　substituting　the　certainty　of　scientific

method　for　that　random　groping　after　results　without　the　guidance　of

principles；　which　has　hitherto　characterized　the　pursuit　of

metaphysical　studies。　It　will　render　an　important　service　to　the

inquiring　mind　of　youth；　by　leading　the　student　to　apply　his　powers　to

the　cultivation　of。　genuine　science；　instead　of　wasting　them；　as　at

present；　on　speculations　which　can　never　lead　to　any　result；　or　on　the

idle　attempt　to　invent　new　ideas　and　opinions。　But；　above　all；　it　will

confer　an　inestimable　benefit　on　morality　and　religion；　by　showing

that　all　the　objections　urged　against　them　may　be　silenced　for　ever　by

the　Socratic　method；　that　is　to　say；　by　proving　the　ignorance　of　the

objector。　For；　as　the　world　has　never　been；　and；　no　doubt；　never

will　be　without　a　system　of　metaphysics　of　one　kind　or　another；　it

is　the　highest　and　weightiest　concern　of　philosophy　to　render　it

powerless　for　harm；　by　closing　up　the　sources　of　error。

　　This　important　change　in　the　field　of　the　sciences；　this　loss　of　its

fancied　possessions；　to　which　speculative　reason　must　submit；　does　not

prove　in　any　way　detrimental　to　the　general　interests　of　humanity。　The

advantages　which　the　world　has　derived　from　the　teachings　of　pure

reason　are　not　at　all　impaired。　The　loss　falls；　in　its　whole　extent；

on　the　monopoly　of　the　schools；　but　does　not　in　the　slightest　degree

touch　the　interests　of　mankind。　I　appeal　to　the　most　obstinate

dogmatist；　whether　the　proof　of　the　continued　existence　of　the　soul

after　death；　derived　from　the　simplicity　of　its　substance；　of　the

freedom　of　the　will　in　opposition　to　the　general　mechanism　of

nature；　drawn　from　the　subtle　but　impotent　distinction　of　subjective

and　objective　practical　necessity；　or　of　the　existence　of　God；　deduced

from　the　conception　of　an　ens　realissimum…　the　contingency　of　the

changeable；　and　the　necessity　of　a　prime　mover；　has　ever　been　able

to　pass　b