the critique of pure reason- 第6部分

from　the　conception　of　an　ens　realissimum…　the　contingency　of　the

changeable；　and　the　necessity　of　a　prime　mover；　has　ever　been　able

to　pass　beyond　the　limits　of　the　schools；　to　penetrate　the　public

mind；　or　to　exercise　the　slightest　influence　on　its　convictions。　It

must　be　admitted　that　this　has　not　been　the　case　and　that；　owing　to

the　unfitness　of　the　common　understanding　for　such　subtle

speculations；　it　can　never　be　expected　to　take　place。　On　the　contrary；

it　is　plain　that　the　hope　of　a　future　life　arises　from　the　feeling；

which　exists　in　the　breast　of　every　man；　that　the　temporal　is

inadequate　to　meet　and　satisfy　the　demands　of　his　nature。　In　like

manner；　it　cannot　be　doubted　that　the　clear　exhibition　of　duties　in

opposition　to　all　the　claims　of　inclination；　gives　rise　to　the

consciousness　of　freedom；　and　that　the　glorious　order；　beauty；　and

providential　care；　everywhere　displayed　in　nature；　give　rise　to　the

belief　in　a　wise　and　great　Author　of　the　Universe。　Such　is　the　genesis

of　these　general　convictions　of　mankind；　so　far　as　they　depend　on

rational　grounds；　and　this　public　property　not　only　remains

undisturbed；　but　is　even　raised　to　greater　importance；　by　the　doctrine

that　the　schools　have　no　right　to　arrogate　to　themselves　a　more

profound　insight　into　a　matter　of　general　human　concernment　than

that　to　which　the　great　mass　of　men；　ever　held　by　us　in　the　highest

estimation；　can　without　difficulty　attain；　and　that　the　schools

should；　therefore；　confine　themselves　to　the　elaboration　of　these

universally　comprehensible　and；　from　a　moral　point　of　view；　amply

satisfactory　proofs。　The　change；　therefore；　affects　only　the

arrogant　pretensions　of　the　schools；　which　would　gladly　retain；　in

their　own　exclusive　possession；　the　key　to　the　truths　which　they

impart　to　the　public。



　　　　　　　　　　Quod　mecum　nescit；　solus　vult　scire　videri。



At　the　same　time　it　does　not　deprive　the　speculative　philosopher　of

his　just　title　to　be　the　sole　depositor　of　a　science　which　benefits

the　public　without　its　knowledge…　I　mean；　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason。

This　can　never　become　popular　and；　indeed；　has　no　occasion　to　be　so；

for　finespun　arguments　in　favour　of　useful　truths　make　just　as

little　impression　on　the　public　mind　as　the　equally　subtle

objections　brought　against　these　truths。　On　the　other　hand；　since　both

inevitably　force　themselves　on　every　man　who　rises　to　the　height　of

speculation；　it　becomes　the　manifest　duty　of　the　schools　to　enter　upon

a　thorough　investigation　of　the　rights　of　speculative　reason　and；

thus；　to　prevent　the　scandal　which　metaphysical　controversies　are

sure；　sooner　or　later；　to　cause　even　to　the　masses。　It　is　only　by

criticism　that　metaphysicians　（and；　as　such；　theologians　too）　can　be

saved　from　these　controversies　and　from　the　consequent　perversion　of

their　doctrines。　Criticism　alone　can　strike　a　blow　at　the　root　of

materialism；　fatalism；　atheism；　free…thinking；　fanaticism；　and

superstition；　which　are　universally　injurious…　as　well　as　of

idealism　and　scepticism；　which　are　dangerous　to　the　schools；　but　can

scarcely　pass　over　to　the　public。　If　governments　think　proper　to

interfere　with　the　affairs　of　the　learned；　it　would　be　more　consistent

with　a　wise　regard　for　the　interests　of　science；　as　well　as　for

those　of　society；　to　favour　a　criticism　of　this　kind；　by　which　alone

the　labours　of　reason　can　be　established　on　a　firm　basis；　than　to

support　the　ridiculous　despotism　of　the　schools；　which　raise　a　loud

cry　of　danger　to　the　public　over　the　destruction　of　cobwebs；　of

which　the　public　has　never　taken　any　notice；　and　the　loss　of　which；

therefore；　it　can　never　feel。

　　This　critical　science　is　not　opposed　to　the　dogmatic　procedure　of

reason　in　pure　cognition；　for　pure　cognition　must　always　be

dogmatic；　that　is；　must　rest　on　strict　demonstration　from　sure

principles　a　priori…　but　to　dogmatism；　that　is；　to　the　presumption

that　it　is　possible　to　make　any　progress　with　a　pure　cognition；

derived　from　（philosophical）　conceptions；　according　to　the

principles　which　reason　has　long　been　in　the　habit　of　employing…

without　first　inquiring　in　what　way　and　by　what　right　reason　has

come　into　the　possession　of　these　principles。　Dogmatism　is　thus　the

dogmatic　procedure　of　pure　reason　without　previous　criticism　of　its

own　powers；　and　in　opposing　this　procedure；　we　must　not　be　supposed　to

lend　any　countenance　to　that　loquacious　shallowness　which　arrogates　to

itself　the　name　of　popularity；　nor　yet　to　scepticism；　which　makes

short　work　with　the　whole　science　of　metaphysics。　On　the　contrary；　our

criticism　is　the　necessary　preparation　for　a　thoroughly　scientific

system　of　metaphysics　which　must　perform　its　task　entirely　a　priori；

to　the　complete　satisfaction　of　speculative　reason；　and　must；

therefore；　be　treated；　not　popularly；　but　scholastically。　In

carrying　out　the　plan　which　the　Critique　prescribes；　that　is；　in　the

future　system　of　metaphysics；　we　must　have　recourse　to　the　strict

method　of　the　celebrated　Wolf；　the　greatest　of　all　dogmatic

philosophers。　He　was　the　first　to　point　out　the　necessity　of

establishing　fixed　principles；　of　clearly　defining　our　conceptions；

and　of　subjecting　our　demonstrations　to　the　most　severe　scrutiny；

instead　of　rashly　jumping　at　conclusions。　The　example　which　he　set

served　to　awaken　that　spirit　of　profound　and　thorough　investigation

which　is　not　yet　extinct　in　Germany。　He　would　have　been　peculiarly

well　fitted　to　give　a　truly　scientific　character　to　metaphysical

studies；　had　it　occurred　to　him　to　prepare　the　field　by　a　criticism　of

the　organum；　that　is；　of　pure　reason　itself。　That　be　failed　to

perceive　the　necessity　of　such　a　procedure　must　be　ascribed　to　the

dogmatic　mode　of　thought　which　characterized　his　age；　and　on　this

point　the　philosophers　of　his　time；　as　well　as　of　all　previous

times；　have　nothing　to　reproach　each　other　with。　Those　who　reject　at

once　the　method　of　Wolf；　and　of　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason；　can

have　no　other　aim　but　to　shake　off　the　fetters　of　science；　to　change

labour　into　sport；　certainty　into　opinion；　and　philosophy　into

philodoxy。

　　In　this　second　edition；　I　have　endeavoured；　as　far　as　possible；　to

remove　the　difficulties　and　obscurity　which；　without　fault　of　mine

perhaps；　have　given　rise　to　many　misconceptions　even　among　acute

thinkers。　In　the　propositions　themselves；　and　in　the　demonstrations　by

which　they　are　supported；　as　well　as　in　the　form　and　the　entire　plan

of　the　work；　I　have　found　nothing　to　alter；　which　must　be　attributed

partly　to　the　long　examination　to　which　I　had　subjected　the　whole

before　offering　it　to　the　public　and　partly　to　the　nature　of　the　case。

For　pure　speculative　reason　is　an　organic　structure　in　which　there

is　nothing　isolated　or　independent；　but　every　Single　part　is　essential

to　all　the　rest；　and　hence；　the　slightest　imperfection；　whether　defect

or　positive　error；　could　not　fail　to　betray　itself　in　use。　I

venture；　further；　to　hope；　that　this　system　will　maintain　the　same

unalterable　character　for　the　future。　I　am　led　to　entertain　this

confidence；　not　by　vanity；　but　by　the　evidence　which　the　equality　of

the　result　affords；　when　we　proceed；　first；　from　the　simplest　elements

up　to　the　complete　whole　of　pure　reason　and；　and　then；　backwards

from　the　whole　to　each　part。　We　find　that　the　attempt　to　make　the

slightest　alteration；　in　any　part；　leads　inevitably　to　contradictions；

not　merely　in　this　system；　but　in　human　reason　itself。　At　the　same

time；　there　is　still　much　room　for　improvement　in　the　exposition　of

the　doctrines　contained　in　this　work。　In　the　present　edition；　I　have

endeavoured　to　remove　misapprehensions　of　the　aesthetical　part；

especially　with　regard　to　the　conception　of　time；　to　clear　away　the

obscurity　which　has　been　found　in　the　deduction　of　the　conceptions

of　the　understanding；　to　supply　the　supposed　want　of　sufficient

evidence　in　the　demonstration　of　the　principles　of　the　pure

understanding；　and；　lastly；　to　obviate　the　misunderstanding　of　the

paralogisms　which　immediately　precede　the　rational　psychology。

Beyond　this　point…　the　end　of　the　second　main　division　of　the

〃Transcendental　Dialectic〃…　I　have　not　extended　my　alterations；*

partly　from　want　of　time；　and　partly　because　I　am　not　aware　that　any

portion　of　the　remainder　has　given　rise　to　misconceptions　among

intelligent　and　impartial　critics；　whom　I　do　not　here　mention　with

that　praise　which　is　their　due；　but　who　will　find　that　their

suggestions　have　been　attended　to　in　the　work　itself。



　　*The　only　addition；　properly　so　called…　and　that　only　in　the

method　of　proof…　which　I　have　made　in　the　present　edition；　consists　of

a　new　refutation　of　psychological　idealism；　and　a　strict

demonstration…　the　only　one　possible；　as　I　believe…　of　the　objective

reality　of　external　intuition。　However　harmless　idealism　may　be

considered…　although　in　reality　it　is　not　so…　in　regard　to　the

essential　ends　of　metaphysics；　it　must　still　remain　a　scandal　to

philosophy　and　to　the　general　human　reason　to　be　obliged　to　assume；　as

an　article　of　mere　belief；　the　existence　of　things　external　to

ourselves　（from　which；　yet；　we　derive　the　whole　material　of

cognition　for　the　internal　sense）；　and　not　to　be　able　to　oppose　a

satisfactory　proof　to　any　one　who　may　call　it　in　question。　As　there　is

some　obscurity　of　expression　in　the　demonstration　as　it　stands　in

the　text；　I　propose　to　alter　the　passage　in　question　as　follows：

〃But　this　permanent　cannot　be　an　intuition　in　me。　For　all　the

determining　grounds　of　my　existence　which　can　be　found　in　me　are

representations　and；　as　such；　do　themselves　require　a　permanent；

distinct　from　them；　which　may　determine　my　existence　in　relation　to

their　changes；　that　is；　my　existence　in　time；　wherein　they　change。〃　It

may；　probably；　be　urged　in　opposition　to　this　proof　that；　after　all；　I

am　only　conscious　immediately　of　that　which　is　in　me；　that　is；　of　my

representation　of　externa