several times while you were speaking； justice； and temperance； and
holiness； and all these qualities； were described by you as if
together they made up virtue。 Now I want you to tell me truly
whether virtue is one whole； of which justice and temperance and
holiness are parts； or whether all these are only the names of one and
the same thing： that is the doubt which still lingers in my mind。
There is no difficulty； Socrates； in answering that the qualities of
which you are speaking are the parts of virtue which is one。
And are they parts； I said； in the same sense in which mouth；
nose； and eyes； and ears； are the parts of a face； or are they like
the parts of gold； which differ from the whole and from one another
only in being larger or smaller？
I should say that they differed； Socrates； in the first way； they
are related to one another as the parts of a face are related to the
whole face。
And do men have some one part and some another part of virtue？ Of if
a man has one part； must he also have all the others？
By no means； he said； for many a man is brave and not just； or
just and not wise。
You would not deny； then； that courage and wisdom are also parts
of virtue？
Most undoubtedly they are； he answered； and wisdom is the noblest of
the parts。
And they are all different from one another？ I said。
Yes。
And has each of them a distinct function like the parts of the
face；…the eye； for example； is not like the ear； and has not the
same functions； and the other parts are none of them like one another；
either in their functions； or in any other way？ I want to know whether
the comparison holds concerning the parts of virtue。 Do they also
differ from one another in themselves and in their functions？ For that
is clearly what the simile would imply。
Yes； Socrates； you are right in supposing that they differ。
Then； I said； no other part of virtue is like knowledge； or like
justice； or like courage； or like temperance； or like holiness？
No； he answered。
Well then； I said； suppose that you and I enquire into their
natures。 And first； you would agree with me that justice is of the
nature of a thing； would you not？ That is my opinion： would it not
be yours also？
Mine also； he said。
And suppose that some one were to ask us； saying； 〃O Protagoras； and
you； Socrates； what about this thing which you were calling justice；
is it just or unjust？〃…and I were to answer； just： would you vote with
me or against me？
With you； he said。
Thereupon I should answer to him who asked me； that justice is of
the nature of the just： would not you？
Yes； he said。
And suppose that he went on to say： 〃Well now； is there also such
a thing as holiness？ 〃we should answer； 〃Yes；〃 if I am not mistaken？
Yes； he said。
Which you would also acknowledge to be a thing…should we not say so？
He assented。
〃And is this a sort of thing which is of the nature of the holy；
or of the nature of the unholy？〃 I should be angry at his putting such
a question； and should say； 〃Peace； man； nothing can be holy if
holiness is not holy。〃 What would you say？ Would you not answer in the
same way？
Certainly； he said。
And then after this suppose that he came and asked us； 〃What were
you saying just now？ Perhaps I may not have heard you rightly； but you
seemed to me to be saying that the parts of virtue were not the same
as one another。〃 I should reply； 〃You certainly heard that said； but
not； as you imagine； by me； for I only asked the question；
Protagoras gave the answer。〃 And suppose that he turned to you and
said； 〃Is this true； Protagoras？ and do you maintain that one part
of virtue is unlike another； and is this your position？〃…how would you
answer him？
I could not help acknowledging the truth of what he said； Socrates。
Well then； Protagoras； we will assume this； and now supposing that
he proceeded to say further； 〃Then holiness is not of the nature of
justice； nor justice of the nature of holiness； but of the nature of
unholiness； and holiness is of the nature of the not just； and
therefore of the unjust； and the unjust is the unholy〃： how shall we
answer him？ I should certainly answer him on my own behalf that
justice is holy； and that holiness is just； and I would say in like
manner on your behalf also； if you would allow me； that justice is
either the same with holiness； or very nearly the same； and above
all I would assert that justice is like holiness and holiness is
like justice； and I wish that you would tell me whether I may be
permitted to give this answer on your behalf； and whether you would
agree with me。
He replied； I cannot simply agree； Socrates； to the proposition that
justice is holy and that holiness is just； for there appears to me
to be a difference between them。 But what matter？ if you please I
please； and let us assume； if you will I； that justice is holy； and
that holiness is just。
Pardon me； I replied； I do not want this 〃if you wish〃 or 〃if you
will〃 sort of conclusion to be proven； but I want you and me to be
proven： I mean to say that the conclusion will be best proven if there
be no 〃if。〃
Well； he said； I admit that justice bears a resemblance to holiness；
for there is always some point of view in which everything is like
every other thing； white is in a certain way like black； and hard is
like soft； and the most extreme opposites have some qualities in
common； even the parts of the face which； as we were saying before；
are distinct and have different functions； are still in a certain
point of view similar； and one of them is like another of them。 And
you may prove that they are like one another on the same principle
that all things are like one another； and yet things which are like in
some particular ought not to be called alike； nor things which are
unlike in some particular； however slight； unlike。
And do you think； I said in a tone of surprise； that justice and
holiness have but a small degree of likeness？
Certainly not； any more than I agree with what I understand to be
your view。
Well； I said； as you appear to have a difficulty about this； let
us take another of the examples which you mentioned instead。 Do you
admit the existence of folly？
I do。
And is not wisdom the。 very opposite of folly？
That is true； he said。
And when men act rightly and advantageously they seem to you to be
temperate？
Yes； he said。
And temperance makes them temperate？
Certainly。
And they who do not act rightly act foolishly； and in acting thus
are not temperate？
I agree； he said。
Then to act foolishly is the opposite of acting temperately？
He assented。
And foolish actions are done by folly； and temperate actions by
temperance？
He agreed。
And that is done strongly which is done by strength； and that
which is weakly done； by weakness？
He assented。
And that which is done with swiftness is done swiftly； and that
which is done with slowness； slowly？
He assented again。
And that which is done in the same manner； is done by the same；
and that which is done in an opposite manner by the opposite？
He agreed。
Once more； I said； is there anything beautiful？
Yes。
To which the only opposite is the ugly？
There is no other。
And is there anything good？
There is。
To which the only opposite is the evil？
There is no other。
And there is the acute in sound？
True。
To which the only opposite is the grave？
There is no other； he said； but that。
Then every opposite has one opposite only and no more？
He assented。
Then now； I said； let us recapitulate our admissions。 First of all
we admitted that everything has one opposite and not more than one？
We did so。
And we admitted also that what was done in opposite ways was done by
opposites？
Yes。
And that which was done foolishly； as we further admitted； was
done in the opposite way to that which was done temperately？
Yes。
And that which was done temperately was done by temperance； and that
which was done foolishly by folly？
He agreed。
And that which is done in opposite ways is done by opposites？
Yes。
And one thing is done by temperance； and quite another thing by
folly？
Yes。
And in opposite ways？
Certainly。
And therefore by opposites：…then folly is the opposite of
temperance？
Clearly。
And do you remember that folly has already been acknowledged by us
to be the opposite of wisdom？
He assented。
And we said that everything has only one opposite？
Yes。
Then； Protagoras； which of the two assertions shall we renounce？ One
says that everything has but one opposite； the other that wisdom is
distinct from temperance； and that both of them are parts of virtue；
and that they are not only distinct； but dissimilar； both in
themselves and in their functions； like the parts of a face。 Which
of these two assertions shall we renounce？ For both of them together
are certainly not in harmony； they do not accord or agree： for how can
they be said to agree if everything is assumed to have only one
opposite and not more than one； and yet folly； which is one； has
clearly the two opposites wisdom and temperance？ Is not that true；
Protagoras？ What else would you say？
He assented； but with great reluctance。
Then temperance and wisdom are the same； as before justice and
holiness appeared to us to be nearly the same。 And now； Protagoras；
I said； we must finish the enquiry； and not faint。 Do you think that