protagoras- 第7部分

I　said；　we　must　finish　the　enquiry；　and　not　faint。　Do　you　think　that



an　unjust　man　can　be　temperate　in　his　injustice？



　　I　should　be　ashamed；　Socrates；　he　said；　to　acknowledge　this　which



nevertheless　many　may　be　found　to　assert。



　　And　shall　I　argue　with　them　or　with　you？　I　replied。



　　I　would　rather；　he　said；　that　you　should　argue　with　the　many



first；　if　you　will。



　　Whichever　you　please；　if　you　will　only　answer　me　and　say　whether　you



are　of　their　opinion　or　not。　My　object　is　to　test　the　validity　of



the　argument；　and　yet　the　result　may　be　that　I　who　ask　and　you　who



answer　may　both　be　put　on　our　trial。



　　Protagoras　at　first　made　a　show　of　refusing；　as　he　said　that　the



argument　was　not　encouraging；　at　length；　he　consented　to　answer。



　　Now　then；　I　said；　begin　at　the　beginning　and　answer　me。　You　think



that　some　men　are　temperate；　and　yet　unjust？



　　Yes；　he　said；　let　that　be　admitted。



　　And　temperance　is　good　sense？



　　Yes。



　　And　good　sense　is　good　counsel　in　doing　injustice？



　　Granted。



　　If　they　succeed；　I　said；　or　if　they　do　not　succeed？



　　If　they　succeed。



　　And　you　would　admit　the　existence　of　goods？



　　Yes。



　　And　is　the　good　that　which　is　expedient　for　man？



　　Yes；　indeed；　he　said：　and　there　are　some　things　which　may　be



inexpedient；　and　yet　I　call　them　good。



　　I　thought　that　Protagoras　was　getting　ruffled　and　excited；　he　seemed



to　be　setting　himself　in　an　attitude　of　war。　Seeing　this；　I　minded



my　business；　and　gently　said：…



　　When　you　say；　Protagoras；　that　things　inexpedient　are　good；　do　you



mean　inexpedient　for　man　only；　or　inexpedient　altogether？　and　do　you



call　the　latter　good？



　　Certainly　not　the　last；　he　replied；　for　I　know　of　many　things…meats；



drinks；　medicines；　and　ten　thousand　other　things；　which　are



inexpedient　for　man；　and　some　which　are　expedient；　and　some　which



are　neither　expedient　nor　inexpedient　for　man；　but　only　for　horses；



and　some　for　oxen　only；　and　some　for　dogs；　and　some　for　no　animals；



but　only　for　trees；　and　some　for　the　roots　of　trees　and　not　for



their　branches；　as　for　example；　manure；　which　is　a　good　thing　when



laid　about　the　roots　of　a　tree；　but　utterly　destructive　if　thrown　upon



the　shoots　and　young　branches；　or　I　may　instance　olive　oil；　which　is



mischievous　to　all　plants；　and　generally　most　injurious　to　the　hair　of



every　animal　with　the　exception　of　man；　but　beneficial　to　human　hair



and　to　the　human　body　generally；　and　even　in　this　application　（so



various　and　changeable　is　the　nature　of　the　benefit）；　that　which　is



the　greatest　good　to　the　outward　parts　of　a　man；　is　a　very　great



evil　to　his　inward　parts：　and　for　this　reason　physicians　always　forbid



their　patients　the　use　of　oil　in　their　food；　except　in　very　small



quantities；　just　enough　to　extinguish　the　disagreeable　sensation　of



smell　in　meats　and　sauces。



　　When　he　had　given　this　answer；　the　company　cheered　him。　And　I



said：　Protagoras；　I　have　a　wretched　memory；　and　when　any　one　makes　a



long　speech　to　me　I　never　remember　what　he　is　talking　about。　As



then；　if　I　had　been　deaf；　and　you　were　going　to　converse　with　me；



you　would　have　had　to　raise　your　voice；　so　now；　having　such　a　bad



memory；　I　will　ask　you　to　cut　your　answers　shorter；　if　you　would



take　me　with　you。



　　What　do　you　mean？　he　said：　how　am　I　to　shorten　my　answers？　shall　I



make　them　too　short？



　　Certainly　not；　I　said。



　　But　short　enough？



　　Yes；　I　said。



　　Shall　I　answer　what　appears　to　me　to　be　short　enough；　or　what



appears　to　you　to　be　short　enough？



　　I　have　heard；　I　said；　that　you　can　speak　and　teach　others　to　speak



about　the　same　things　at　such　length　that　words　never　seemed　to



fail；　or　with　such　brevity　that　no　one　could　use　fewer　of　them。　Please



therefore；　if　you　talk　with　me；　to　adopt　the　latter　or　more



compendious　method。



　　Socrates；　he　replied；　many　a　battle　of　words　have　I　fought；　and　if　I



had　followed　the　method　of　disputation　which　my　adversaries　desired；



as　you　want　me　to　do；　I　should　have　been　no　better　than　another；　and



the　name　of　Protagoras　would　have　been　nowhere。



　　I　saw　that　he　was　not　satisfied　with　his　previous　answers；　and



that　he　would　not　play　the　part　of　answerer　any　more　if　he　could　help；



and　I　considered　that　there　was　no　call　upon　me　to　continue　the



conversation；　so　I　said：　Protagoras；　I　do　not　wish　to　force　the



conversation　upon　you　if　you　had　rather　not；　but　when　you　are



willing　to　argue　with　me　in　such　a　way　that　I　can　follow　you；　then　I



will　argue　with　you。　Now　you；　as　is　said　of　you　by　others　and　as　you



say　of　yourself；　are　able　to　have　discussions　in　shorter　forms　of



speech　as　well　as　in　longer；　for　you　are　a　master　of　wisdom；　but　I



cannot　manage　these　long　speeches：　I　only　wish　that　I　could。　You；　on



the　other　hand；　who　are　capable　of　either；　ought　to　speak　shorter　as　I



beg　you；　and　then　we　might　converse。　But　I　see　that　you　are



disinclined；　and　as　I　have　an　engagement　which　will　prevent　my　staying



to　hear　you　at　greater　length　（for　I　have　to　be　in　another　place）；　I



will　depart；　although　I　should　have　liked　to　have　heard　you。



　　Thus　I　spoke；　and　was　rising　from　my　seat；　when　Callias　seized　me　by



the　right　hand；　and　in　his　left　hand　caught　hold　of　this　old　cloak



of　mine。　He　said：　We　cannot　let　you　go；　Socrates；　for　if　you　leave



us　there　will　be　an　end　of　our　discussions：　I　must　therefore　beg　you



to　remain；　as　there　is　nothing　in　the　world　that　I　should　like



better　than　to　hear　you　and　Protagoras　discourse。　Do　not　deny　the



company　this　pleasure。



　　Now　I　had　got　up；　and　was　in　the　act　of　departure。　Son　of



Hipponicus；　I　replied；　I　have　always　admired；　and　do　now　heartily



applaud　and　love　your　philosophical　spirit；　and　I　would　gladly



comply　with　your　request；　if　I　could。　But　the　truth　is　that　I



cannot。　And　what　you　ask　is　as　great　an　impossibility　to　me；　as　if　you



bade　me　run　a　race　with　Crison　of　Himera；　when　in　his　prime；　or　with



some　one　of　the　long　or　day　course　runners。　To　such　a　request　I　should



reply　that　I　would　fain　ask　the　same　of　my　own　legs；　but　they　refuse



to　comply。　And　therefore　if　you　want　to　see　Crison　and　me　in　the



same　stadium；　you　must　bid　him　slacken　his　speed　to　mine；　for　I　cannot



run　quickly；　and　he　can　run　slowly。　And　in　like　manner　if　you　want



to　hear　me　and　Protagoras　discoursing；　you　must　ask　him　to　shorten　his



answers；　and　keep　to　the　point；　as　he　did　at　first；　if　not；　how　can



there　be　any　discussion？　For　discussion　is　one　thing；　and　making　an



oration　is　quite　another；　in　my　humble　opinion。



　　But　you　see；　Socrates；　said　Callias；　that　Protagoras　may　fairly



claim　to　speak　in　his　own　way；　just　as　you　claim　to　speak　in　yours。



　　Here　Alcibiades　interposed；　and　said：　That；　Callias；　is　not　a　true



statement　of　the　case。　For　our　friend　Socrates　admits　that　he　cannot



make　a　speech…in　this　he　yields　the　palm　to　Protagoras：　but　I　should



be　greatly　surprised　if　he　yielded　to　any　living　man　in　the　power　of



holding　and　apprehending　an　argument。　Now　if　Protagoras　will　make　a



similar　admission；　and　confess　that　he　is　inferior　to　Socrates　in



argumentative　skill；　that　is　enough　for　Socrates；　but　if　he　claims　a



superiority　in　argument　as　well；　let　him　ask　and　answer…not；　when　a



question　is　asked；　slipping　away　from　the　point；　and　instead　of



answering；　making　a　speech　at　such　length　that　most　of　his　hearers



forget　the　question　at　issue　（not　that　Socrates　is　likely　to



forget…I　will　be　bound　for　that；　although　he　may　pretend　in　fun　that



he　has　a　bad　memory）。　And　Socrates　appears　to　me　to　be　more　in　the



right　than　Protagoras；　that　is　my　view；　and　every　man　ought　to　say



what　he　thinks。



　　When　Alcibiades　had　done　speaking；　some　one…Critias；　I



believe…went　on　to　say：　O　Prodicus　and　Hippias；　Callias　appears　to



me　to　be　a　partisan　of　Protagoras：　and　this　led　Alcibiades；　who



loves　opposition；　to　take　the　other　side。　But　we　should　not　be



partisans　either　of　Socrates　or　of　Protagoras；　let　us　rather　unite



in　entreating　both　of　them　not　to　break　up　the　discussion。



　　Prodicus　added：　That；　Critias；　seems　to　me　to　be　well　said；　for



those　who　are　present　at　such　discussions　ought　to　be　impartial



hearers　of　both　the　speakers；　remembering；　however；　that



impartiality　is　not　the　same　as　equality；　for　both　sides　should　be



impartially　heard；　and　yet　an　equal　meed　should　not　be　assigned　to



both　of　them；　but　to　the　wiser　a　higher　meed　should　be　given；　and　a



lower　to　the　less　wise。　And　I　as　well　as　Critias　would　beg　you；



Protagoras　and　Socrates；　to　grant　our　request；　which　is；　that　you　will



argue　with　one　another　and　not　wrangle；　for　friends　argue　with　friends



out　of　goodwill；　but　only　adversaries　and　enemies　wrangle。　And　then



our　meeting　will　be　delightful；　for　in　this　way　you；　who　are　the



speakers；　will　be　most　likely　to　win　esteem；　and　not　praise　only；



among　us　who　are　your　audience；　for　esteem　is　a　sincere　conviction



of　the　hearers'　souls；　but　praise　is　often　an　insincere　expression



of　men　uttering　falsehoods　contrary　to　their　conviction。　And　thus　we



who　are　the　hearers　will　be　gratified　and　not　pleased；　for



gratification　is　of　the　mind　when　receiving　wisdom　and　knowledge；



but　pleasure　is　of　the　body　when　eating　or　experiencing　some　other



bodily　delight。　Thus　spoke　Prodicus；　and　many　of　the　company　applauded



his　words。



　　Hippias　the　sage　spoke　next。　He　said：　All　of　you　who　are　here



present　I　reckon　to　be　kinsmen　and　friends　and　fellow…citizens；　by



nature　and　not　by　law；　for　by　nature　like　is　akin　to　like；　whereas　law



is　the　tyrant　of　mankind；　and　often　compels　us　to　do　many　things　which



are　against　nature。　How　great　would　be　the　disgrace　then；　if　we；　who



know　the　nature　of　things；　and　are　the　wisest　of　the　Hellenes；　and