lf
once more。 Everything which arises in the ethical sphere is produced by this activity of mind。 The
moral point of view； however； is defective because it is purely abstract。 When I am aware of my
freedom as the substance of my being； I am inactive and do nothing。 But if I proceed to act and
look for principles on which to act； I grope for something determinate and then demand its
deduction from the concept of the free will。 While； therefore； it is right enough to evaporate right
and duty into subjectivity； it is wrong if this abstract groundwork is not then condensed out again。
It is only in times when the world of actuality is hollow； spiritless； and unstable； that an individual
may be allowed to take refuge from actuality in his inner life。 Socrates lived at the time of the ruin
of the Athenian democracy。 His thought vaporised the world around him and he withdrew into
himself to search there for the right and the good。 Even in our day there are cases when reverence
for the established order is more or less lacking； man insists on having the authoritative as his will；
as that to which he has granted recognition。
§ 139。
Once self…consciousness has reduced all otherwise valid duties to emptiness and
itself to the sheer inwardness of the will； it has become the potentiality of either
making the absolutely universal its principle； or equally well of elevating above the
universal the self…will of private particularity； taking that as its principle and
realising it through its actions； i。e。 it has become potentially evil。
Remark： To have a conscience； if conscience is only formal subjectivity； is simply to be on the
verge of slipping into evil； in independent self…certainty； with its independence of knowledge and
decision； both morality and evil have their common root。
The origin of evil in general is to be found in the mystery of freedom （i。e。 in the speculative aspect
of freedom）； the mystery whereby freedom of necessity arises out of the natural level of the will
and is something inward in comparison with that level。 It is this natural level of the will which
comes into existence as a self…contradiction； as incompatible with itself in this opposition； and so it
is just this particularity of the will which later makes itself evil。 That is to say； particularity is always
duality； here it is the opposition of the natural level and the inwardness of the will。 In this
opposition； the latter is only a relative and abstract subjectivity which can draw its content only
from the determinate content of the natural will； from desire； impulse； inclination； &c。 Now it is
said of these desires； impulses； &c。； that they may be either good or evil。 But since the will here
makes into a determinant of its content both these impulses in this contingent character which they
possess as natural； and also； therefore； the form which it has at this point； the form of particularity
itself； it follows that it is set in opposition to the universal as inner objectivity； to the good； which
comes on the scene as the opposite extreme to immediate objectivity； the natural pure and simple；
as soon as the will is reflected into itself and consciousness is a knowing consciousness。 It is in this
opposition that this inwardness of the will is evil。 Man is therefore evil by a conjunction between
his natural or undeveloped character and his reflection into himself； and therefore evil belongs
neither to nature as such by itself … unless nature were supposed to be the natural character of the
will which rests in its particular content … nor to introverted reflection by itself； i。e。 cognition in
general； unless this were to maintain itself in that opposition to the universal。
With this facet of evil； its necessity； there is inevitably combined the fact that this same evil is
condemned to be that which of necessity ought not to be； i。e。 the fact that evil ought to be
annulled。 It is not that there ought never to be a diremption of any sort in the will … on the contrary；
it is just this level of diremption which distinguishes man from the unreasoning animal； the point is
that the will should not rest at that level and cling to the particular as if that and not the universal
were the essential thing； it should overcome the diremption as a nullity。 Further； as to this necessity
of evil； it is subjectivity； as infinite self…reflection； which is present in and confronted by this
opposition of universal and particular； if it rests in this opposition； i。e。 if it is evil； then it is eo ipso
independent； regarding itself as isolated； and is itself this Self…Will。 Therefore if the individual
subject as such does evil； the evil is purely and simply his own responsibility。
Addition： The abstract self…certainty which knows itself as the basis of everything has in it the
potentiality either of willing the universality of the concept or alternatively of taking a particular
content as a principle and realising that。 The second alternative is evil； which therefore always
includes the abstraction of self…certainty。 It is only man who is good； and he is good only because
he can also be evil。 Good and evil are inseparable； and their inseparability is rooted in the fact that
the concept becomes an object to itself； and as object it eo ipso acquires the character of
difference。 The evil will wills something opposed to the universality of the will； while the good will
acts in accordance with its true concept。
The difficulty of the question as to how the will can be evil as well as good usually arises because
we think of the will as related to itself purely positively and because we represent its volition as
something determinate confronting it； as the good。 But the problem of the origin of evil may be
more precisely put in the form： 'How does the negative come into the positive？' If we begin by
presupposing that in the creation of the world God is the absolutely positive； then； turn where we
will； we shall never discover the negative within that positive； since to talk of God's 'Permitting' evil
is to ascribe to him a passive relation to evil which is unsatisfactory and meaningless。 In the
representative thinking of religious mythology there is no comprehension of the origin of evil； i。e。
the positive and the negative are not discovered in one another； there is only a representation of
their succession and juxtaposition； so that it is from outside that the negative comes to the positive。
But this cannot satisfy thought； which demands a reason and a necessity and insists on
apprehending the negative as itself rooted in the positive。 Now the solution of the problem； the
way the concept treats the matter； is already contained in the concept； since the concept； or to
speak more concretely； the Idea； has it in its essence to differentiate itself and to posit itself
negatively。 If we adhere to the purely positive； i。e。 if we rest in the unmixed good which is
supposed to be good at its source； then we are accepting an empty category of the Understanding
which clings to abstractions and one…sided categories of this kind and by the very asking of this
question makes it a difficult one。 If we begin with the standpoint of the concept； however； we
apprehend the positive as activity and as self…distinction。 Evil and good alike have their origin in the
will and the will in its concept is both good and evil。
The natural will is implicitly the contradiction of self…distinction； of being both inwardness and also
self…awareness。 To maintain then that evil implies the further point that man is evil in so far as his
will is natural would be to contradict the usual idea that it is just the natural will which is guiltless
and good。 But the natural will stands in opposition to the content of freedom； and the child and the
uneducated man； whose wills are only natural； are for that very reason liable to be called to
account for their actions only in a less degree。 Now when we speak of man； we mean not the child
but the self…conscious adult； and when we speak of good； we mean the knowledge of it。 It is
doubtless true that the natural is inherently innocent； neither good nor bad； but when it is drawn
into the orbit of the will which is free and knows that it is free； it acquires the character of not being
free and is therefore evil。 When man wills the natural； it is no longer merely natural； but the
negative opposed to the good； i。e。 to the concept of the will。
On the other hand； if it is now objected that since evil is rooted in the concept and inevitable； man
would be guiltless if he committed it； our reply must be that a man's decision is his own act； and his
own act is freely chosen and his own responsibility。 In the religious legend it is said that man is as
God when he knows good and evil； and it is true that this likeness to God is present in such
knowledge in that the inevitability here is no natural inevitability since on the contrary the decision
is really the transcendence of this duality of good and evil。 When both good and evil are placed
before me； I have a choice between the two； I can decide between them and endow my
subjective character with either。 Thus the nature of evil is that man may will it but need not。
§ 140。
In every end of a self…conscious subject； there is a positive aspect （see § 135）
necessarily present because the end is what is purposed in an actual concrete
action。 This aspect he knows how to elicit and emphasise； and he may then
proceed to regard it as a duty or a fine intention。 By so interpreting it； he is
enabled to pass off his action as good in the eyes both of himself and others；
despite the fact that； owing to his reflective character and his knowledge of the
universal aspect of the will； he is aware of the contrast between this aspect and
the essentially negative content of his action。 To impose in this way on others is
hypocrisy； while to impose on oneself is a stage beyond hypocrisy； a stage at
which subjectivity claims to be absolute。
Remark： This final； most abstruse； form of evil； whereby evil is perverted into good and good
into evil； and consciousness； in being aware of its p