which subjectivity claims to be absolute。
Remark： This final； most abstruse； form of evil； whereby evil is perverted into good and good
into evil； and consciousness； in being aware of its power to effect this perversion； is also made
aware of itself as absolute； is the high…water mark of subjectivity at the level of morality； it is the
form into which evil has blossomed in our present epoch； a result due to philosophy； i。e。 to a
shallowness of thought which has twisted a profound concept into this shape and usurped the
name of philosophy； just as it has arrogated to evil the name of good。
In this Remark； I will indicate briefly the chief forms of this subjectivity which have become
current。
（a） In hypocrisy the following moments are contained：
＇a＇ knowledge of the true universal； whether knowledge in the form merely of a feeling for
right and duty； or of a deeper cognition and apprehension of them；
＇b＇ volition of the particular which conflicts with this universal；
＇c＇ conscious comparison of both moments ＇a＇ and ＇b＇； so that the conscious subject is
aware in willing that his particular volition is evil in character。
These points are descriptive of acting with a bad conscience； hypocrisy proper involves something
more。
At one time great importance was attached to the question whether an action was evil only in so
far as it was done with a bad conscience； i。e。 with explicit knowledge of the three moments just
specified。 The inference from an affirmative answer is admirably drawn by Pascal： Ils seront tous
damnés ces demi…pécheurs； qui ont quelque amour pour la vertu。 Mais pour ces
franc…pécheurs； pécheurs endurcis； pécheurs sans mélange； pleins et achevés； 1'enfer ne
les tient pas； ils ont trompé le diable à force de s'y abandonner。
Footnote： Lettres provinciales； iv。 In the same context； Pascal also quotes Christ's intercession on the
Cross for his enemies： 'Father； forgive them； for they know not what they do' … a superfluous prayer if the fact
that they did not know what they did made their action innocent and so took away the need of forgiveness。
Pascal quotes there too Aristotle's distinction between the man who acts ouk eidos and the one who acts
agnoon； in the former type of ignorance； his action is not freely willed （here the ignorance depends on external
circumstances； see above； § 117） and his action is not imputable to him。 But of the latter Aristotle says： 'Every
wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what he ought to refrain from doing； and it is this kind of
failure which makes men unjust and in general bad。。。。 An ignorant choice' between good and evil 'is the cause
not of the action's being involuntary' （of being non…imputable） 'but only of its being wicked'。 Aristotle
evidently had a deeper insight into the connection between knowing and willing than has become common in a
superficial philosophy which teaches that the opposite of knowledge； the heart and enthusiasm； are the true
principles of ethical action。
The subjective right of self…consciousness to know whether an action is truly good or evil in
character must not be thought of as so colliding with the absolute right of the objectivity of this
character that the two rights are represented as separable； indifferent to one another； and related
only accidentally。 It was such a conception of their relation that lay in particular at the root of the
old questions about efficacious grace。 On its formal side； evil is most peculiarly the individual's
own； since （a） it is precisely his subjectivity establishing itself purely and simply for itself； and for
that reason it is purely and simply the individual's own responsibility （see § 139 and the Remark
thereto）； （b） on his objective side man accords with his concept inasmuch as he is mind； in a word
a rational entity； and has in his own nature as such the character of self…knowing universality。
Therefore it means failing to treat him with the respect due to his concept if his good side is
divorced from him； so that the character of his evil action as evil is divorced from him too and is
not imputed to him as evil。 How determinate is the consciousness of these moments in distinction
from one another； or to what extent it has developed or failed to develop in clarity so as to
become a recognition of them； and to what degree an evil action has been done with a conscience
more or less downright evil … all these questions are the more trivial aspect of the matter； the
aspect mainly concerned with the empirical。
（b） Evil and doing evil with a bad conscience； however； is not quite hypocrisy。 Into hypocrisy
there enters in addition the formal character of falsity； first the falsity of holding up evil as good in
the eyes of others； of setting oneself up to all appearance as good； conscientious； pious； and so on
… conduct which in these circumstances is only a trick to deceive others。 Secondly； however； the
had man may find in his good conduct on other occasions； or in his piety； or； in a word； in good
reasons； a justification in his own eyes for the evil he does； because he can use these reasons to
pervert its apparent character from evil into good。 His ability to do this depends on the subjectivity
which； as abstract negativity； knows that all determinations are subordinate to itself and issue from
its own will。
（c） In this perversion of evil into good we may prima facie include the form of subjectivism known
as Probabilism。 Its guiding principle is that an action is permissible； and may be done with an easy
conscience； provided that the agent can hunt out any single good reason for it； be it only the
authority of a single theologian； and even if other theologians are known by the agent to dissent
ever so widely from that authority。 Even in this idea there is still present the correct apprehension
that authority and a reason based on authority gives probability only； although this is supposed to
be enough to produce an easy conscience； it is granted in Probabilism that a good reason is
inevitably of such a character that there may exist along with it different reasons at least as good。
Even here we must recognise a vestige of objectivity in the admission that it is a reason which
should be the determining factor。 But since the discrimination between good and evil is made to
depend on all those good reasons； including theological authorities too； despite the fact that they
are so numerous and contradictory； the implication is that it is not this objectivity of the thing； but
subjectivity； which has the last word。 This means that caprice and self…will are made the arbiters of
good and evil； and the result is that ethics as well as religious feeling is undermined。 But the fact
that it is private subjectivity to which the decision falls is one which Probabilism does not openly
avow as its principle； on the contrary； as has already been stated； it gives out that it is some reason
or other which is decisive； and Probabilism is to that extent still a form of hypocrisy。
（d） In the stages of subjectivism； the next in ascending order is the view that the goodness of the
will consists in its willing the good； this willing of the abstract good is supposed to suffice； in fact
to be the sole requisite； to make its action good。 As the willing of something determinate； action
has a content； but good in the abstract determines nothing； and hence it devolves on particular
subjectivity to give this content its character and constituents。 just as in Probabilism anyone who is
not himself a learned Révérend Père may have the subsumption of a determinate content under
the universal predicate 'good' effected for him by the sole authority of one such theologian； so here
every subject； without any further qualification； is invested with this honour of giving a content to
good in the abstract； or in other words subsuming a content under a universal。 This content is only
one of the many elements in an action as a concrete whole； and the others may perhaps entail its
description as 'criminal' and 'bad'。 That determinate content which 1； as subject； give to the good；
however； is the good known to me in the action； i。e。 it is my good intention （see § 114）。 Thus
there arises a contradiction between descriptions： according to one the action is good； according
to the other it is criminal。 Hence also there seems to arise； in connection with a concrete action； the
question whether in such circumstances the intention behind it is actually good。 It may generally be
the case that the good is what is actually intended； but this in fact must always be the case if it is
held that good in the abstract is the subject's determining motive。 Where wrong is done through an
action which is well intentioned but in other respects criminal and bad； the wrong so done must； of
course； also be good； and the important question would seem to be： which of these sides of the
action is really the essential one？ This objective question； however； is here out of place； or rather it
is the subjective consciousness alone whose decision constitutes objectivity at this point。 Besides；
'essential' and 'good' mean the same thing； one is just as much an abstraction as the other。 Good is
that which is essential in respect of the will； and the essential in this respect should be precisely
this； that my action be characterised as good in my eyes。 But the subsumption under the good of
any content one pleases is the direct and explicit result of the fact that this abstract good is totally
devoid of content and so is simply reduced to meaning anything positive； i。e。 to something which is
valid from some single point of view and which in its immediate character may even be valid as an
essential end； as for example to do good to the poor； to take thought for myself； my life； my
family； and so forth。 Further； just as the good is the abstract； so the bad too must be without
content and derive its specification from my subjectivity； and it is in this way also that there arises
the moral end of hating and uprooting the bad； the nature of the bad being left unspecified。
Theft； cowardice； murder； and so forth； as actions； i。e。 as