is in place and actually appears only in exceptional circumstances or when one obligation clashes
with another。 The clash； however； must be a genuine one； because moral reflection can
manufacture clashes of all sorts to suit its purpose and give itself a consciousness of being
something special and having。 made sacrifices。 It is for this reason that the phenomenon of virtue
proper is commoner when societies and communities are uncivilised； since in those circumstances
ethical conditions and their actualisation are more a matter of private choice or the natural genius
of an exceptional individual。 For instance； it was especially to Hercules that the ancients ascribed
virtue。 In the states of antiquity； ethical life had not grown into this free system of an objective
order self…subsistently developed； and consequently it was by the personal genius of individuals
that this defect had to be made good。 It follows that if a 'doctrine of virtues' is not a mere 'doctrine
of duties'； and if therefore it embraces the particular facet of character； the facet grounded in
natural endowment； it will be a natural history of mind。
Since virtues are ethical principles applied to the particular； and since in this their subjective aspect
they are something indeterminate； there turns up here for determining them the quantitative
principle of more or less。 The result is that consideration of them introduces their corresponding
defects or vices； as in Aristotle； who defined each particular virtue as strictly a mean between an
excess and a deficiency。
The content which assumes the form of duties and then virtues is the same as that which also has
the form of impulses （see Remark to § 19）。 Impulses have the same basic content as duties and
virtues； but in impulses this content still belongs to the immediate will and to instinctive feeling； it
has not been developed to the point of； becoming ethical。 Consequently； impulses have in common
with the content of duties and virtues only the abstract object on which they are directed； an
object indeterminate in itself； and so devoid of anything to discriminate them as good or evil。 Or in
other words； impulses； considered abstractly in their positive aspect alone； are good； while；
considered abstractly in their negative aspect alone； they are evil （see § 18）。
Addition： To conform to the ethical order on this or that particular occasion is hardly enough to
make a man virtuous； he is virtuous only when this mode of behaviour is a fixed element in his
character。 Virtue is rather like ethical virtuosity； ＇Heroes （'ethical virtuosi'） lived in uncivilised
conditions （see Addition to § 93） and there was no ethical life in society as they found it； but since
they introduced ethical institutions for the first time （see Remarks to §§ 167 and 203）； they
displayed virtue as a kind of virtuosity。 Nowadays； ethical life is common to everyone and consists
in conformity to the existing order； not in divergence from it。＇ and the reason why we speak of
virtue less nowadays than formerly is that ethical living is less like the form of a particular
individuals character。 The French are par excellence the people who speak most of virtue； and
the reason is that amongst them ethical life in the individuals is more a matter of his own
idiosyncrasies or a natural mode of conduct。 The Germans； on the other hand； are more
thoughtful； and amongst them the same content acquires the form of universality。
§ 151。
But when individuals are simply identified with the actual order； ethical life （das
Sittliche） appears as their general mode of conduct； i。e。 as custom （Sitte）； while
the habitual practice of ethical living appears as a second nature which； put in the
place of the initial； purely natural will； is the soul of custom permeating it through
and through； the significance and the actuality of its existence。 It is mind living
and present as a world； and the substance of mind thus exists now for the first
time as mind。
Addition： Just as nature has its laws； and as animals； trees； and the sun fulfil their law； so
custom （Sitte） is the law appropriate to free mind。 Right and morality are not yet what ethics
（Sitte） is； namely mind。 In right； particularity is still not the particularity of the concept； but only that
of the natural will。 So； too； at the standpoint of morality； self…consciousness is not yet mind's
consciousness of itself。 At that level it is only the worth of the subject in himself that is in question；
i。e。 the subject who determines himself by reference to good in contrast with evil； who still has
self…will as the form of his willing。 Here； however； at the standpoint of ethics； the will is mind's will
and it has a content which is substantive and in conformity with itself。
Education is the art of making men ethical。 It begins with pupils whose life is at the instinctive level
and shows them the way to a second birth； the way to change their instinctive nature into a
second； intellectual； nature； and makes this intellectual level habitual to them。 At this point the clash
between the natural and the subjective will disappears； the subject's internal struggle dies away。 To
this extent； habit is part of ethical life as it is of philosophic thought also； since such thought
demands that mind be trained against capricious fancies； and that these be destroyed and
overcome to leave the way clear for rational thinking。 It is true that a man is killed by habit； i。e。 if
he has once come to feel completely at home in life； if he has become mentally and physically dull；
and if the clash between subjective consciousness and mental activity has disappeared； for man is
active only in so far as he has not attained his end and wills to develop his potentialities and
vindicate himself in struggling to attain it。 When this has been fully achieved； activity and vitality are
at an end； and the result … loss of interest in life … is mental or physical death。
§ 152。
In this way the ethical substantial order has attained its right； and its right its
validity。 That is to say； the self…will of the individual has vanished together with
his private conscience which had claimed independence and opposed itself to the
ethical substance。 For； when his character is ethical； he recognises as the end
which moves him to act the universal which is itself unmoved but is disclosed in
its specific determinations as rationality actualised。 He knows that his own dignity
and the whole stability of his particular ends are grounded in this same universal；
and it is therein that he actually attains these。 Subjectivity is itself the absolute
form and existent actuality of the substantial order； and the distinction between
subject on the one hand and substance on the other； as the object； end； and
controlling power of the subject； is the same as； and has vanished directly along
with； the distinction between them in form。
Remark： Subjectivity。 is the ground wherein the concept of freedom is realised （see § 106）。 At
the level of morality； subjectivity is still distinct from freedom； the concept of subjectivity； but at the
level of ethical life it is the realisation of the concept in a way adequate to the concept itself。
§ 153。
The right of individuals to be subjectively destined to freedom is fulfilled when
they belong to an actual ethical order； because their conviction of their freedom
finds its truth in such an objective order； and it is in an ethical order that they are
actually in possession of their own essence or their own inner universality （see §
147）。
Remark： When a father inquired about the best method of educating his son in ethical conduct；
a Pythagorean replied： 'Make him a citizen of a state with good laws。' （The phrase has also been
attributed to others。）
Addition： The educational experiments； advocated by Rousseau in Emile； of withdrawing
children from the common life of every day and bringing them up in the country； have turned out to
be futile； since no success can attend an attempt to estrange people from the laws of the world。
Even if the young have to be educated in solitude； it is still useless to hope that the fragrance of the
intellectual world will not ultimately permeate this solitude or that the power of the world mind is
too feeble to gain the mastery of those outlying regions。 It is by becoming a citizen of a good state
that the individual first comes into his right。
§ 154。
The right of individuals to their particular satisfaction is also contained in the
ethical substantial order； since particularity is the outward appearance of the
ethical order — a mode in which that order is existent。
§ 155。
Hence in this identity of the universal will with the particular will； right and duty
coalesce； and by being in the ethical order a man has rights in so far as he has
duties； and duties in so far as he has rights。 In the sphere of abstract right； I have
the right and another has the corresponding duty。 In the moral sphere； the right of
my private judgement and will； as well as of my happiness； has not； but only
ought to have； coalesced with duties and become objective。
Addition： A slave can have no duties； only a free man has them。 If all rights were put on one
side and all duties on the other； the whole would be dissolved； since their identity alone is the
fundamental thing； and it is to this that we have here to hold fast。
§ 156。
The ethical substance； as containing independent self…consciousness united with
its concept； is the actual mind of a family and a nation。
Addition： Ethical life is not abstract like the good； but is intensely actual。 Mind has actuality； and
individuals are accidents of this actuality。 Thus in dealing with ethical life； only two views are
possible： either we start from the substantiality of the ethical order； or else we proceed
atomistically and build on the basis of s ingle individuals。 This second point of view excludes mind
because it leads only to a juxtaposit