atomistically and build on the basis of s ingle individuals。 This second point of view excludes mind
because it leads only to a juxtaposition。 Mind； however； is not something single； but is the unity of
the single and the universal。
§ 157。
The concept of this Idea has being only as mind； as something knowing itself and
actual； because it is the objectification of itself； the movement running through the
form of its moments。 It is therefore
（A） ethical mind in its natural or immediate phase — the Family。 This
substantiality loses its unity； passes over into division； and into the phase of
relation； i。e。 into
（B） Civil Society — an association of members as self…subsistent individuals in a
universality which； because of their self…subsistence； is only abstract。 Their
association is brought about by their needs； by the legal system — the means to
security of person and property — and by an external organisation for attaining
their particular and common interests。 This external state
（C） is brought back； to and welded into unity in the Constitution of the State
which is the end and actuality of both the substantial universal order and the
public life devoted thereto。
Third Part： Ethical Life
i The Family
（a）： Marriage … （b） Family Capital … C： Children & Dissolution
§ 158。
The family； as the immediate substantiality of mind； is specifically characterised
by love； which is mind's feeling of its own unity。 Hence in a family； one's frame
of mind is to have self…consciousness of one's individuality within this unity as the
absolute essence of oneself； with the result that one is in it not as an independent
person but as a member。
Addition： Love means in general terms the consciousness of my unity with another； so that I am
not in selfish isolation but win my self…consciousness only as the renunciation of my independence
and through knowing myself as the unity of myself with another and of the other with me。 Love；
however； is feeling； i。e。 ethical life in the form of something natural。 In the state； feeling disappears；
there we are conscious of unity as law； there the content must be rational and known to us。 The
first moment in love is that I do not wish to be a self…subsistent and independent person and that； if
I were； then I would feel defective and incomplete。 The second moment is that I find myself in
another person； that I count for something in the other； while the other in turn comes to count for
something in me。 Love； therefore； is the most tremendous contradiction； the Understanding cannot
resolve it since there is nothing more stubborn than this point （Punktualit？t） of self…consciousness
which is negated and which nevertheless I ought to possess as affirmative。 Love is at once the
propounding and the resolving of this contradiction。 As the resolving of it； love is unity of an ethical
type。
§ 159。
The right which the individual enjoys on the strength of the family unity and
which is in the first place simply the individual's life within this unity； takes on the
form of right （as the abstract moment of determinate individuality） only when the
family begins to dissolve。 At that point those who should be family…members both
in their inclination and in actuality begin to be self…subsistent persons； and
whereas they formerly constituted one specific moment within the whole； they
now receive their share separately and so only in an external fashion by way of
money； food； educational expenses； and the like。
Addition： The right of the family properly consists in the fact that its substantiality should have
determinate existence。 Thus it is a right against externality and against secessions from the family
unity。 On the other hand； to repeat； love is a feeling； something subjective； against which unity
cannot make itself effective。 The demand for unity can be sustained； then； only in relation to such
things as are by nature external and not conditioned by feeling。
§ 160。
The family is completed in these three phases：
（a） Marriage； the form assumed by the concept of the family in its immediate
phase；
（b） Family Property and Capital （the external embodiment of the concept） and
attention to these；
（c） The Education of Children and the Dissolution of the Family。
A。 Marriage
§ 161。
Marriage； as the immediate type of ethical relationship； contains first； the moment
of physical life； and since marriage is a substantial tie； the life involved in it is life
in its totality； i。e。 as the actuality of the race and its life…process。 But； secondly； in
self…consciousness the natural sexual union…a union purely inward or implicit and
for that very reason existent as purely external …is changed into a union on the
level of mind； into self…conscious love。
Addition： Marriage is in essence an ethical tie。 Formerly； especially in most systems of natural
law； attention was paid only to the physical side of marriage or to its natural character。
Consequently； it was treated only as a sex relationship； and this completely barred the way to its
other characteristics。 This is crude enough； but it is no less so to think of it as only a civil contract；
and even Kant does this。 On this view； the parties are bound by a contract of mutual caprice； and
marriage is thus degraded to the level of a contract for reciprocal use。 A third view of marriage is
that which bases it on love alone； but this must be rejected like the other two； since love is only a
feeling and so is exposed in every respect to contingency； a guise which ethical life may not
assume。 Marriage； therefore； is to be more precisely characterised as ethico…legal （rechtlich
sittliche） love； and this eliminates from marriage the transient； fickle； and purely subjective aspects
of love。
§ 162。
On the subjective side； marriage may have a more obvious source in the
particular inclination of the two persons who are entering upon the marriage tie；
or in the foresight and contrivance of the parents； and so forth。 But its objective
source lies in the free consent of the persons； especially in their consent to make
themselves one person； to renounce their natural and individual personality to this
unity of one with the other。 From this point of view； their union is a
self…restriction； but in fact it is their liberation； because in it they attain their
substantive self…consciousness。
Remark： Our objectively appointed end and so our ethical duty is to enter the married state。
The external origin of any particular marriage is in the lure of the case contingent； and it depends
principally on the extent which reflective thought has been developed。 At one extreme； the step is
that the marriage is arranged by the contrivance of benevolent parents； the appointed end of the
parties is a union of mutual love； their inclination to marry arises from the fact that each grows
acquainted with the other from the first as a destined partner。 At the other extreme； it is the
inclination of the parties which comes first； appearing in them as these two infinitely particularised
individuals。 The more ethical way to matrimony may be taken to be the former extreme or any
way at all whereby the decision to marry comes first and the inclination to do so follows； so that in
the actual wedding both decision and inclination coalesce。 In the latter extreme； it is the uniqueness
of the infinitely particularised which makes good its claims in accordance with the subjective
principle of the modern world （see Remark to § 124）。
But those works of modern art； dramatic and other； in which the love of the sexes is the main
interest； are pervaded by a chill despite the heat of passion they portray； for they associate the
passion with accident throughout and represent the entire dramatic interest as if it rested solely on
the characters as these individuals； what rests on them may indeed be of infinite importance to
them； but is of none whatever in itself。
Addition： Amongst peoples who hold the female sex in scant respect； marriages are arranged
by the parents at will without consulting the young people。 The latter raise no objection； since at
that level of culture the particularity of feeling makes no claims for itself。 For the woman it is only a
matter of getting a husband； for the man； of getting a wife。 In other social conditions；
considerations of wealth； connections； political ends； may be the determining factor。 In such
circumstances； great hardships may arise through making marriage a means to other ends。
Nowadays； however； the subjective origin of marriage； the state of being in love； is regarded as
the only important originating factor。 Here the position is represented to be that a man must wait
until his hour has struck and that he can bestow his love only on one specific individual。
§ 163。
The ethical aspect of marriage consists in the parties' consciousness of this unity
as their substantive aim； and so in their love； trust； and common sharing of their
entire existence as individuals。 When the parties are in this frame of mind and
their union is actual； their physical passion sinks to the level of a physical
moment； destined to vanish in its very satisfaction。 On the other hand； the
spiritual bond of union secures its rights as the substance of marriage and thus
rises； inherently indissoluble； to a plane above the contingency of passion and the
transience of particular caprice。
Remark： It was noted above （in § 75） that marriage； so far as its essential basis is concerned； is
not a contractual relation。 On the contrary； though marriage begins in contract； it is precisely a
contract to transcend the standpoint of contract； the standpoint from which persons are regarded
in their individuality as self…subsistent units。 The identification of personalities； whereby the family
becomes one person and its members become its accidents （though substance is in essence the
relat