introduction to the metaphysic of morals- 第5部分

required　to　establish　such　a　right；　considered　according　to　moral

laws。

　　An　action　is　called　an　act…　or　moral　deed…　in　so　far　as　it　is

subject　to　laws　of　obligation；　and　consequently　in　so　far　as　the

subject　of　it　is　regarded　with　reference　to　the　freedom　of　his

choice　in　the　exercise　of　his　will。　The　agent…　as　the　actor　or　doer　of

the　deed…　is　regarded　as；　through　the　act；　the　author　of　its　effect；

and　this　effect；　along　with　the　action　itself；　may　be　imputed　to

him；　if　be　previously　knew　the　law　in　virtue　of　which　an　obligation

rested　upon　him。

　　A　person　is　a　subject　who　is　capable　of　having　his　actions　imputed

to　him。　Moral　personality　is；　therefore；　nothing　but　the　freedom　of

a　rational　being　under　moral　laws；　and　it　is　to　be　distinguished

from　psychological　freedom　as　the　mere　faculty　by　which　we　become

conscious　of　ourselves　in　different　states　of　the　identity　of　our

existence。　Hence　it　follows　that　a　person　is　properly　subject　to　no

other　laws　than　those　he　lays　down　for　himself；　either　alone　or　in

conjunction　with　others。

　　A　thing　is　what　is　incapable　of　being　the　subject　of　imputation。

Every　object　of　the　free　activity　of　the　will；　which　is　itself　void　of

freedom；　is　therefore　called　a　thing　（res　corporealis）。

　　Right　or　wrong　applies；　as　a　general　quality；　to　an　act　（rectum

aut　minus　rectum）；　in　so　far　as　it　is　in　accordance　with　duty　or

contrary　to　duty　（factum　licitum　aut　illicitum）；　no　matter　what　may　be

the　subject　or　origin　of　the　duty　itself。　An　act　that　is　contrary　to

duty　is　called　a　transgression　（reatus）。

　　An　unintentional　transgression　of　a　duty；　which　is；　nevertheless；

imputable　to　a　person；　is　called　a　mere　fault　（culpa）。　An

intentional　transgression…　that　is；　an　act　accompanied　with　the

consciousness　that　it　is　a　transgression…　constitutes　a　crime　（dolus）。

　　Whatever　is　juridically　in　accordance　with　external　laws　is　said

to　be　just　（jus；　instum）；　and　whatever　is　not　juridically　in

accordance　with　external　laws　is　unjust　（unjustum）。

　　A　collision　of　duties　or　obligations　（collisio　officiorum　s。

obligationum）　would　be　the　result　of　such　a　relation　between　them　that

the　one　would　annul　the　other；　in　whole　or　in　part。　Duty　and

obligation；　however；　are　conceptions　which　express　the　objective

practical　necessity　of　certain　actions；　and　two　opposite　rules

cannot　be　objective　and　necessary　at　the　same　time；　for　if　it　is　a

duty　to　act　according　to　one　of　them；　it　is　not　only　no　duty　to　act

according　to　an　opposite　rule；　but　to　do　so　would　even　be　contrary

to　duty。　Hence　a　collision　of　duties　and　obligations　is　entirely

inconceivable　（obligationes　non　colliduntur）。　There　may；　however；　be

two　grounds　of　obligation　（rationes　obligandi）；　connected　with　an

individual　under　a　rule　prescribed　for　himself；　and　yet　neither　the

one　nor　the　other　may　be　sufficient　to　constitute　an　actual　obligation

（rationes　obligandi　non　obligantes）；　and　in　that　case　the　one　of

them　is　not　a　duty。　If　two　such　grounds　of　obligation　are　actually

in　collision　with　each　other；　practical　philosophy　does　not　say　that

the　stronger　obligation　is　to　keep　the　upper　hand　（fortior　obligatio

vincit）；　but　that　the　stronger　ground　of　obligation　is　to　maintain　its

place　（fortior　obligandi　ratio　vincit）。

　　Obligatory　Laws　for　which　an　external　legislation　is　possible　are

called　generally　external　laws。　Those　external　laws；　the

obligatoriness　of　which　can　be　recognised　by　reason　a　priori　even

without　an　external　legislation；　are　called　natural　laws。　Those

laws；　again；　which　are　not　obligatory　without　actual　external

legislation；　are　called　positive　laws。　An　external　legislation；

containing　pure　natural　laws；　is　therefore　conceivable；　but　in　that

case　a　previous　natural　law　must　be　presupposed　to　establish　the

authority　of　the　lawgiver　by　the　right　to　subject　others　to　obligation

through　his　own　act　of　will。

　　The　principle　which　makes　a　certain　action　a　duty　is　a　practical

law。　The　rule　of　the　agent　or　actor；　which　he　forms　as　a　principle　for

himself　on　subjective　grounds；　is　called　his　maxim。　Hence；　even　when

the　law　is　one　and　invariable；　the　maxims　of　the　agent　may　yet　be　very

different。

　　The　categorical　imperative　only　expresses　generally　what　constitutes

obligation。　It　may　be　rendered　by　the　following　formula：　〃Act

according　to　a　maxim　which　can　be　adopted　at　the　same　time　as　a

universal　law。〃　Actions　must　therefore　be　considered；　in　the　first

place；　according　to　their　subjective　principle；　but　whether　this

principle　is　also　valid　objectively　can　only　be　known　by　the　criterion

of　the　categorical　imperative。　For　reason　brings　the　principle　or

maxim　of　any　action　to　the　test；　by　calling　upon　the　agent　to　think　of

himself　in　connection　with　it　as　at　the　same　time　laying　down　a

universal　law；　and　to　consider　whether　his　action　is　so　qualified　as

to　be　fit　for　entering　into　such　a　universal　legislation。

　　The　simplicity　of　this　law；　in　comparison　with　the　great　and

manifold　consequences　which　may　be　drawn　from　it；　as　well　as　its

commanding　authority　and　supremacy　without　the　accompaniment　of　any

visible　motive　or　sanction；　must　certainly　at　first　appear　very

surprising。　And　we　may　well　wonder　at　the　power　of　our　reason　to

determine　the　activity　of　the　will　by　the　mere　idea　of　the

qualification　of　a　maxim　for　the　universality　of　a　practical　law；

especially　when　we　are　taught　thereby　that　this　practical　moral　law

first　reveals　a　property　of　the　will　which　the　speculative　reason

would　never　have　come　upon　either　by　principles　a　priori；　or　from

any　experience　whatever；　and　even　if　it　had　ascertained　the　fact；　it

could　never　have　theoretically　established　its　possibility。　This

practical　law；　however；　not　only　discovers　the　fact　of　that　property

of　the　will；　which　is　freedom；　but　irrefutably　establishes　it。　Hence

it　will　be　less　surprising　to　find　that　the　moral　laws　are

undemonstrable；　and　yet　apodeictic；　like　the　mathematical

postulates；　and　that　they；　at　the　same　time；　open　up　before　us　a　whole

field　of　practical　knowledge；　from　which　reason；　on　its　theoretical

side；　must　find　itself　entirely　excluded　with　its　speculative　idea

of　freedom　and　all　such　ideas　of　the　supersensible　generally。

　　The　conformity　of　an　action　to　the　law　of　duty　constitutes　its

legality；　the　conformity　of　the　maxim　of　the　action　with　the　law

constitutes　its　morality。　A　maxim　is　thus　a　subjective　principle　of

action；　which　the　individual　makes　a　rule　for　himself　as　to　how　in

fact　he　will　act。

　　On　the　other　hand；　the　principle　of　duty　is　what　reason

absolutely；　and　therefore　objectively　and　universally；　lays　down　in

the　form　of　a　command　to　the　individual；　as　to　how　he　ought　to　act。

　　The　supreme　principle　of　the　science　of　morals　accordingly　is

this：　〃Act　according　to　a　maxim　which　can　likewise　be　valid　as　a

universal　law。〃　Every　maxim　which　is　not　qualified　according　to　this

condition　is　contrary　to　Morality。

　　Laws　arise　from　the　will；　viewed　generally　as　practical　reason；

maxims　spring　from　the　activity　of　the　will　in　the　process　of

choice。　The　latter　in　man　is　what　constitutes　free…will。　The　will

which　refers　to　nothing　else　than　mere　law　can　neither　be　called

free　nor　not　free；　because　it　does　not　relate　to　actions

immediately；　but　to　the　giving　of　a　law　for　the　maxim　of　actions；　it

is　therefore　the　practical　reason　itself。　Hence　as　a　faculty；　it　is

absolutely　necessary　in　itself；　and　is　not　subject　to　any　external

necessitation。　It　is；　therefore；　only　the　act　of　choice　in　the

voluntary　process　that　can　be　called　free。

　　The　freedom　of　the　act　of　will；　however；　is　not　to　be　defined　as　a

liberty　of　indifference　（libertas　indifferentae）；　that；　is；　as　a

capacity　of　choosing　to　act　for　or　against　the　law。　The　voluntary

process；　indeed；　viewed　as　a　phenomenal　appearance；　gives　many

examples　of　this　choosing　in　experience；　and　some　have　accordingly

so　defined　the　free…will。　For　freedom；　as　it　is　first　made　knowable　by

the　moral　law；　is　known　only　as　a　negative　property　in　us；　as

constituted　by　the　fact　of　not　being　necessitated　to　act　by　sensible

principles　of　determination。　Regarded　as　a　noumenal　reality；

however；　in　reference　to　man　as　a　pure　rational　intelligence；　the

act　of　the　will　cannot　be　at　all　theoretically　exhibited；　nor　can　it

therefore　be　explained　how　this　power　can　act　necessitatingly　in

relation　to　the　sensible　activity　in　the　process　of　choice；　or

consequently　in　what　the　positive　quality　of　freedom　consists。　Only

thus　much　we　can　see　into　and　comprehend；　that　although　man；　as　a

being　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　exhibits…　as　experience

shows…　a　capacity　of　choosing　not　only　conformably　to　the　law　but　also

contrary　to　it；　his　freedom　as　a　rational　being　belonging　to　the　world

of　intelligence　cannot　be　defined　by　reference　merely　to　sensible

appearances。　For　sensible　phenomena　cannot　make　a　super…sensible

object…　such　as　free…will　is…　intelligible；　nor　can　freedom　ever　be

placed　in　the　mere　fact　that　the　rational　subject　can　make　a　choice　in

conflict　with　his　own　law…giving　reason；　although　experience　may　prove

that　it　happens　often　enough；　notwithstanding　our　inability　to

conceive　how　it　is　possible。　For　it　is　one　thing　to　admit　a

proposition　as　based　on　experience；　and　another　thing　to　make　it　the

defining　principle　and　the　universal　differentiating　mark　of　the　act

of　free…will；　in　its　distinction　from　the　arbitrium　brutum　s。

servum；　because　the　empirical　proposition　does　not　assert　that　any

particular　characteristic　necessarily　belongs　to　the　conception　in

question；　but　this　is　requisite　in　the　process　of　definition。

Freedom　in　relation　to　the　internal　legislation　of　reason　can　alone　be

properly　called　a　power；　the　possibility　of　diverging　from　the　law

thus　given　is　an　incapacity　or　want　of　power。　How　then　can　the

former　be　defined　by　the　latter？　It　could　only　be　by　a　definition

which　would　add　to　the　practical　conc