y familiar enough with its object。 It is true that we no longer notice any decided pleasure in the comprehensibility of nature； or in the unity of its divisions into genera and species； without which the empirical concepts； that afford us our knowledge of nature in its particular laws； would not be possible。 Still it is certain that the pleasure appeared in due course； and only by reason of the most ordinary experience being impossible without it； bas it become gradually fused with simple cognition； and no longer arrests particular attention。 Something； then； that makes us attentive in our estimate of nature to its finality for our understanding…an endeavour to bring； where possible； its heterogeneous laws under higher； though still always empirical； laws…is required； in order that； on meeting with success； pleasure may be felt in this their accord with our cognitive faculty； which accord is regarded by us as purely contingent。 As against this； a representation of nature would be altogether displeasing to us； were we to be forewarned by it that； on the least investigation carried beyond the commonest experience； we should come in contact with such a heterogeneity of its laws as would make the union of its particular laws under universal empirical laws impossible for our understanding。 For this would conflict with the principle of the subjectively final specification of nature in its genera； and with our own reflective judgement in respect thereof。 Yet this presupposition of judgement is so indeterminate on the question of the extent of the prevalence of that ideal finality of nature for our cognitive faculties； that if we are told that a more searching or enlarged knowledge of nature； derived from observation； must eventually bring us into contact with a multiplicity of laws that no human understanding could reduce to a principle； we can reconcile ourselves to the thought。 But still we listen more gladly to others who hold out to us the hope that the more intimately we come to know the secrets of nature； or the better we are able to compare it with external members as yet unknown to us； the more simple shall we find it in its principles； and the further our experience advances the more harmonious shall we find it in the apparent heterogeneity of its empirical laws。 For our judgement makes it imperative upon us to proceed on the principle of the conformity of nature to our faculty of cognition； so far as that principle extends； without deciding…for the rule is not given to us by a determinant judgement…whether bounds are anywhere set to it or not。 For； while in respect of the rational employment of our cognitive faculty； bounds may be definitely determined； in the empirical field no such determination of bounds is possible。
VII。 The Aesthetic Representation of the Finality of Nature。
That which is purely subjective in the representation of an object； i。e。； what constitutes its reference to the subject； not to the object； is its aesthetic quality。 On the other hand； that which in such a representation serves； or is available； for the determination of the object （for or purpose of knowledge）； is its logical validity。 In the cognition of an object of sense； both sides are presented conjointly。 In the sense…representation of external things； the quality of space in which we intuite them is the merely subjective side of my representation of them （by which what the things are in themselves as objects is left quite open）； and it is on account of that reference that the object in being intuited in space is also thought merely as phenomenon。 But despite its purely subjective quality； space is still a constituent of the knowledge of things as phenomena。 Sensation （here external） also agrees in expressing a merely subjective side of our representations of external things； but one which is properly their matter （through which we are given something with real existence）； just as space is the mere a priori form of the possibility of their intuition； and so sensation is； none the less； also employed in the cognition of external objects。 But that subjective side of a representation which is incapable of becoming an element of cognition； is the pleasure or displeasure connected with it； for through it I cognize nothing in the object of the representation； although it may easily be the result of the operation of some cognition or other。 Now the finality of a thing； so far as represented in our perception of it； is in no way a quality of the object itself （for a quality of this kind is not one that can be perceived）； although it may be inferred from a cognition of things。 In the finality； therefore； which is prior to the cognition of an object； and which； even apart from any desire to make use of the representation of it for the purpose of a cognition； is yet immediately connected with it； we have the subjective quality belonging to it that is incapable of becoming a constituent of knowledge。 Hence we only apply the term final to the object on account of its representation being immediately coupled with the feeling of pleasure： and this representation itself is an aesthetic representation of the finality。 The only question is whether such a representation of finality exists at all。 If pleasure is connected with the mere apprehension （apprehensio） of the form of an object of intuition； apart from any reference it may have to a concept for the purpose of a definite cognition； this does not make the representation referable to the object； but solely to the subject。 In such a case； the pleasure can express nothing but the conformity of the object to the cognitive faculties brought into play in the reflective judgement； and so far as they are in play； and hence merely a subjective formal finality of the object。 For that apprehension of forms in the imagination can never take place without the reflective judgement； even when it has no intention of so doing； comparing them at least with its faculty of referring intuitions to concepts。 If； now； in this comparison； imagination （as the faculty of intuitions a priori） is undesignedly brought into accord with understanding （as the faculty of concepts）； by means of a given representation； and a feeling of pleasure is thereby aroused； then the object must be regarded as final for the reflective judgement。 A judgement of this kind is an aesthetic judgement upon the finality of the object； which does not depend upon any present concept of the object； and does not provide one。 When the form of an object （as opposed to the matter of its representation； as sensation） is； in the mere act of reflecting upon it； without regard to any concept to be obtained from it； estimated as the ground of a pleasure in the representation of such an object； then this pleasure is also judged to be combined necessarily with the representation of it； and so not merely for the subject apprehending this form； but for all in general who pass judgement。 The object is then called beautiful； and the faculty of judging by means of such a pleasure （and so also with universal validity） is called taste。 For since the ground of the pleasure is made to reside merely in the form of the object for reflection generally； consequently not in any sensation of the object； and without any reference； either； to any concept that might have something or other in view； it is with the conformity to law in the empirical employment of judgement generally （unity of imagination and understanding） in the subject； and with this alone； that the representation of the object in reflection； the conditions of which are universally valid a priori； accords。 And； as this accordance of the object with the faculties of the subject is contingent； it gives rise to a representation of a finality on the part of the object in respect of the cognitive faculties of the subject。 Here； now； is a pleasure which…as is the case with all pleasure or displeasure that is not brought about through the agency of the concept of freedom （i。e。； through the antecedent determination of the higher faculty of desire by means of pure reason）…no concepts could ever enable us to regard as necessarily connected with the representation of an object。 It must always be only through reflective perception that it is cognized as conjoined with this representation。 As with all empirical judgements； it is； consequently； unable to announce objective necessity or lay claim to a priori validity。 But； then； the judgement of taste in fact only lays claim； like every other empirical judgement； to be valid for every one； and； despite its inner contingency this is always possible。 The only point that is strange or out of the way about it is that it is not an empirical concept； but a feeling of pleasure （and so not a concept at all）； that is yet exacted from every one by the judgement of taste； just as if it were a predicate united to the cognition of the object； and that is meant to be conjoined with its representation。 A singular empirical judgement； as for example； the judgement of one who perceives a movable drop of water in a rock…crystal； rightly looks to every one finding the fact as stated； since the judgement has been formed according to the universal conditions of the determinant judgement under the laws of a possible experience generally。 In the same way； one who feels pleasure in simple reflection on the form of an object； without having any concept in mind； rightly lays claim to the agreement of every one； although this judgement is empirical and a singular judgement。 For the ground of this pleasure is found in the universal； though subjective； condition of reflective judgements； namely the final harmony of an object （be it a product of nature or of art） with the mutual relation of the faculties of cognition （imagination and understanding）； which are requisite for every empirical cognition。 The pleasure in judgements of taste is； therefore； dependent doubtless on an empirical representation； and cannot be united a priori to any concept （one cannot determine a priori what object will be in accordance with taste or not…one must find out the object that is so）； but then it is only made the determining ground of this judgement by virtue of our consciousness of its resting simply