y made the determining ground of this judgement by virtue of our consciousness of its resting simply upon reflection and the universal； though only subjective； conditions of the harmony of that reflection with the knowledge of objects generally； for which the form of the object is final。 This is why judgements of taste are subjected to a critique in respect of their possibility。 For their possibility presupposes an a priori principle； although that principle is neither a cognitive principle for understanding nor a practical principle for the will； and is thus in no way determinant a priori。 Susceptibility to pleasure arising from reflection on the forms of things （whether of nature or of art） betokens； however； not only a finality on the part of objects in their relation to the reflective judgement in the subject； in accordance with the concept of nature； but also； conversely； a finality on the part of the subject； answering to the concept of freedom； in respect of the form； or even formlessness of objects。 The result is that the aesthetic judgement refers not merely； as a judgement of taste； to the beautiful； but also； as springing from a higher intellectual feeling； to the sublime。 Hence the above…mentioned Critique of Aesthetic judgement must be divided on these lines into two main parts。
VIII。 The Logical Representation of the Finality of Nature。
There are two ways in which finality may be represented in an object given in experience。 It may be made to turn on what is purely subjective。 In this case the object is considered in respect of its form as present in apprehension （apprehensio） prior to any concept； and the harmony of this form with the cognitive faculties； promoting the combination of the intuition with concepts for cognition generally； is represented as a finality of the form of the object。 Or； on the other hand； the representation of finality may be made to turn on what is objective； in which case it is represented as the harmony of the form of the object with the possibility of the thing itself according to an antecedent concept of it containing the ground of this form。 We have seen that the representation of the former kind of finality rests on the pleasure immediately felt in mere reflection on the form of the object。 But that of the latter kind of finality； as it refers the form of the object； not to the subject's cognitive faculties engaged in its apprehension； but to a definite cognition of the object under a given concept； bas nothing to do with a feeling of pleasure in things； but only understanding and its estimate of them。 Where the concept of an object is given； the function of judgement； in its employment of that concept for cognition； consists in presentation （exhibitio）； i。 e。； in placing beside the concept an intuition corresponding to it。 Here it may be that our own imagination is the agent employed； as in the case of art； where we realize a preconceived concept of an object which we set before ourselves as an end。 Or the agent may be nature in its technic （as in the case of organic bodies）； when we read into it our own concept of an end to assist our estimate of its product。 In this case what is represented is not a mere finality of nature in the form of the thing； but this very product as a natural end。 Although our concept that nature； in its empirical laws； is subjectively final in its forms is in no way a concept of the object； but only a principle of judgement for providing itself with concepts in the vast multiplicity of nature； so that it may be able to take its bearings； yet； on the analogy of an end； as it were a regard to our cognitive faculties is here attributed to nature。 Natural beauty may； therefore； be looked on as the presentation of the concept of formal； i。 e。； merely subjective； finality and natural ends as the presentation of the concept of a real； i。e。； objective； finality。 The former of these we estimate by taste （aesthetically by means of the feeling of pleasure）； the latter by understanding and reason （logically according to concepts）。 On these considerations is based the division of the Critique of judgement into that of the aesthetic and the teleological judgement。 By the first is meant the faculty of estimating formal finality （otherwise called subjective） by the feeling of pleasure or displeasure； by the second； the faculty of estimating the real finality （objective） of nature by understanding and； reason。 In a Critique of judgement the part dealing with aesthetic judgement is essentially relevant； as it alone contains a principle introduced by judgement completely a priori as the basis of its reflection upon nature。 This is the principle of nature's formal finality for our cognitive faculties in its particular （empirical） laws…a principle without which understanding could not feel itself at home in nature： whereas no reason is assignable a priori； nor is so much as the possibility of one apparent from the concept of nature as an object of experience； whether in its universal or in its particular aspects； why there should be objective ends of nature； i。 e。； things only possible as natural ends。 But it is only judgement that； without being itself possessed a priori of a principle in that behalf； in actually occurring cases （of certain products） contains the rule for making use of the concept of ends in the interest of reason； after that the above transcendental principle has already prepared understanding to apply to nature the concept of an end （at least in respect of its form）。 But the transcendental principle by which a finality of nature in its subjective reference to our cognitive faculties； is represented in the form of a thing as a principle of its estimation； leaves quite undetermined the question of where and in what cases we have to make our estimate of the object as a product according to a principle of finality； instead of simply according to universal laws of nature。 It resigns to the aesthetic judgement the task of deciding the conformity of this product （in its form） to our cognitive faculties as a question of taste （a matter which the aesthetic judgement decides； not by any harmony with concepts； but by feeling）。 On the other hand； judgement as teleologically employed assigns the determinate conditions under which something （e。 g。； an organized body） is to be estimated after the idea of an end of nature。 But it can adduce no principle from the concept of nature； as an object of experience； to give it its authority to ascribe a priori to nature a reference to ends； or even only indeterminately to assume them from actual experience in the case of such products。 The reason of this is that； in order to be able merely empirically to cognize objective finality in a certain object； many particular experiences must be collected and reviewed under the unity of their principle。 Aesthetic judgement is； therefore； a special faculty of estimating according to a rule； but not according to concepts。 The teleological is not a special faculty； but only general reflective judgement proceeding； as it always does in theoretical cognition； according to concepts； but in respect of certain objects of nature； following special principles…those； namely； of a judgement that is merely reflective and does not determine objects。 Hence； as regards its application； it belongs to the theoretical part of philosophy； and on account of its special principles； which are not determinant； as principles belonging to doctrine have to be； it must also form a special part of the Critique。 On the other hand； the aesthetic judgement contributes nothing to the cognition of its objects。 Hence it must only be allocated to the Critique of the judging subject and of its faculties of knowledge so far as these are capable of possessing a priori principles； be their use （theoretical or practical） otherwise what it may…a Critique which is the propaedeutic of all philosophy。
IX。 Joinder of the Legislations of Understanding and Reason by means of Judgement。
Understanding prescribes laws a priori for nature as an object of sense； so that we may have a theoretical knowledge of it in a possible experience。 Reason prescribes laws a priori for freedom and its peculiar causality as the supersensible in the subject； so that we may have a purely practical knowledge。 The realm of the concept of nature under the one legislation； and that of the concept of freedom under the other； are completely cut off from all reciprocal influence； that they might severally （each according to its own principles） exert upon the other； by the broad gulf that divides the supersensible from phenomena。 The concept of freedom determines nothing in respect of the theoretical cognition of nature； and the concept of nature likewise nothing in respect of the practical laws of freedom。 To that extent； then； it is not possible to throw a bridge from the one realm to the other。 Yet although the determining grounds of causality according to the concept of freedom （and the practical rule that this contains） have no place in nature； and the sensible cannot determine the supersensible in the subject； still the converse is possible （not； it is true； in respect of the knowledge of nature； but of the consequences arising from the supersensible and bearing on the sensible）。 So much indeed is implied in the concept of a causality by freedom； the operation of which； in conformity with the formal laws of freedom； is to take effect in the word。 The word cause； however； in its application to the supersensible only signifies the ground that determines the causality of things of nature to an effect in conformity with their appropriate natural laws； but at the same time also in unison with the formal principle of the laws of reason…a ground which； while its possibility is impenetrable； may still be completely cleared of the charge of contradiction that it is alleged to involve。* The effect in accordance with the concept of freedom is the final end which （or the manifestation of which in the sensible world） is to exist； and this presupposes the condition of the possibility of that end in nature （i。 e。； in the nature of the subject as a being of the sensible world； namely； as man）。 It is so presup