e。； in the nature of the subject as a being of the sensible world； namely； as man）。 It is so presupposed a priori； and without regard to the practical； by judgement。 This faculty； with its concept of a finality of nature； provides us with the mediating concept between concepts of nature and the concept of freedom…a concept that makes possible the transition from the pure theoretical ＇legislation of understanding＇ to the pure practical ＇legislation of reason＇ and from conformity to law in accordance with the former to final ends according to the latter。 For through that concept we cognize the possibility of the final end that can only be actualized in nature and in harmony with its laws。
*One of the various supposed contradictions in this complete distinction of the causality of nature from that through freedom is expressed in the objection that when I speak of hindrances opposed by nature to causality according to laws of freedom （moral laws） or of assistance lent to it by nature； I am all the time admitting an influence of the former upon the latter。 But the misinterpretation is easily avoided； if attention is only paid to the meaning of the statement。 The resistance or furtherance is not between nature and freedom； but between the former as phenomenon and the effects of the latter as phenomena in the world of sense。 Even the causality of freedom （of pure and practical reason） is the causality of a natural cause subordinated to freedom （a causality of the subject regarded as man； and consequently as a phenomenon）； and one； the ground of whose determination is contained in the intelligible； that is thought under freedom； in a manner that is not further or otherwise explicable （just as in the case of that intelligible that forms the supersensible substrate of nature。）
Understanding； by the possibility of its supplying a priori laws for nature； furnishes a proof of the fact that nature is cognized by us only as phenomenon； and in so doing points to its having a supersensible substrate； but this substrate it leaves quite undetermined。 judgement by the a priori principle of its estimation of nature according to its possible particular laws provides this supersensible substrate （within as well as without us） with determinability through the intellectual faculty。 But reason gives determination to the same a priori by its practical law。 Thus judgement makes possible the transition from the realm of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom。 In respect of the faculties of the soul generally； regarded as higher faculties； i。e。； as faculties containing an autonomy； understanding is the one that contains the constitutive a priori principles for the faculty of cognition （the theoretical knowledge of nature）。 The feeling pleasure and displeasure is provided for by the judgement in its independence from concepts and from sensations that refer to the determination of the faculty of desire and would thus be capable of being immediately practical。 For the faculty of desire there is reason； which is practical without mediation of any pleasure of whatsoever origin； and which determines for it； as a higher faculty； the final end that is attended at the same time with pure intellectual delight in the object。 judgement's concept of a finality of nature falls； besides； under the head of natural concepts； but only as a regulative principle of the cognitive faculties…although the aesthetic judgement on certain objects （of nature or of art） which occasions that concept； is a constitutive principle in respect of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure。 The spontaneity in the play of the cognitive faculties whose harmonious accord contains the ground of this pleasure； makes the concept in question； in its consequences； a suitable mediating link connecting the realm of the concept of nature with that of the concept of freedom； as this accord at the same time promotes the sensibility of the mind for or moral feeling。 The following table may facilitate the review of all the above faculties in their systematic unity。*
*It has been thought somewhat suspicious that my divisions in pure philosophy should almost always come out threefold。 But it is due to the nature of the case。 If a division is to be a priori it must be either analytic； according to the law of contradiction…and then it is always twofold （quodlibet ens est aut A aut non A）…Or else it is synthetic。 If it is to be derived in the latter case from a priori concepts （not； as in mathematics； from the a priori intuition corresponding to the concept）； then； to meet the requirements of synthetic unity in general； namely （1） a condition； （2） a conditioned； （3） the concept arising from the union of the conditioned with its condition； the division must of necessity be trichotomous。
List of Mental Faculties Cognitive Faculties Cognitive faculties Understanding Feeling of pleasure Judgement and displeasure Reason Faculty of desire
A priori Principles Application Conformity to law Nature Finality Art Final End Freedom
SEC1｜BK1 FIRST PART CRITIQUE OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT SECTION I。 ANALYTIC OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT。 BOOK I。 Analytic of the Beautiful。
FIRST MOMENT。 Of the Judgement of Taste*： Moment of Quality。
*The definition of taste here relied upon is that it is the faculty of estimating the beautiful。 But the discovery of what is required for calling an object beautiful must be reserved for the analysis of judgements of taste。 In my search for the moments to which attention is paid by this judgement in its reflection； I have followed the guidance of the logical functions of judging （for a judgement of taste always involves a reference to understanding）。 I have brought the moment of quality first under review； because this is what the aesthetic judgement on the beautiful looks to in the first instance。
SS 1。 The judgement of taste is aesthetic。
If we wish to discern whether anything is beautiful or not； we do not refer the representation of it to the object by means of understanding with a view to cognition； but by means of the imagination （acting perhaps in conjunction with understanding） we refer the representation to the subject and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure。 The judgement of taste； therefore； is not a cognitive judgement； and so not logical； but is aesthetic…which means that it is one whose determining ground cannot be other than subjective。 Every reference of representations is capable of being objective； even that of sensations （in which case it signifies the real in an empirical representation）。 The one exception to this is the feeling of pleasure or displeasure。 This denotes nothing in the object； but is a feeling which the subject has of itself and of the manner in which it is affected by the representation。 To apprehend a regular and appropriate building with one's cognitive faculties； be the mode of representation clear or confused； is quite a different thing from being conscious of this representation with an accompanying sensation of delight。 Here the representation is referred wholly to the subject； and what is more to its feeling of life…under the name of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure…and this forms the basis of a quite separate faculty of discriminating and estimating； that contributes nothing to knowledge。 All it does is to compare the given representation in the subject with the entire faculty of representations of which the mind is conscious in the feeling of its state。 Given representations in a judgement may be empirical； and so aesthetic； but the judgement which is pronounced by their means is logical； provided it refers them to the object。 Conversely； be the given representations even rational； but referred in a judgement solely to the subject （to its feeling）； they are always to that extent aesthetic。
SS 2。 The delight which determines the judgement of taste is independent of all interest。
The delight which we connect with the representation of the real existence of an object is called interest。 Such a delight； therefore； always involves a reference to the faculty of desire； either as its determining ground； or else as necessarily implicated with its determining ground。 Now； where the question is whether something is beautiful； we do not want to know； whether we； or any one else； are； or even could be； concerned in the real existence of the thing； but rather what estimate we form of it on mere contemplation （intuition or reflection）。 If any one asks me whether I consider that the palace I see before me is beautiful； I may； perhaps； reply that I do not care for things of that sort that are merely made to be gaped at。 Or I may reply in the same strain as that Iroquois sachem who said that nothing in Paris pleased him better than the eating…houses。 I may even go a step further and inveigh with the vigour of a Rousseau against the vigour of a great against the vanity of the of the people on such superfluous things。 Or； in fine； I may quite easily persuade myself that if I found myself on an uninhabited island； without hope of ever again coming among men； and could conjure such a palace into existence by a mere wish； I should still not trouble to do so； so long as I had a hut there that was comfortable enough for me。 All this may be admitted and approved； only it is not the point now at issue。 All one wants to know is whether the mere representation of the object is to my liking； no matter how indifferent I may be to the real existence of the object of this representation。 It is quite plain that in order to say that the object is beautiful； and to show that I have taste； everything turns on the meaning which I can give to this representation； and not on any factor which makes me dependent on the real existence of the object。 Every one must allow that a judgement on the beautiful which is tinged with the slightest interest； is very partial and not a pure judgement of taste。 One must not be in the least prepossessed in favour of the real existence of