and so here； too； it is a presupposition。 In accordance with that result logic was defined as the
science of pure thought； the principle of which is pure knowing； the unity which is not abstract but
a living； concrete unity in virtue of the fact that in it the opposition in consciousness between a
self…determined entity； a subject； and a second such entity； an object； is known to be overcome；
being is known to be the pure Notion in its own self； and the pure Notion to be the true being。
These； then； are the two moments contained in logic。 But now they are known to be inseparable；
not as in consciousness where each also has a separate being of its own； it is solely because they
are at the same time known as distinct （yet not with an independent being） that their unity is not
abstract； dead and inert； but concrete。
This unity also constitutes the logical principle as element； so that the development of the
difference directly present in that principle proceeds only within this element。 For since the
division is； as we have said； the judgement of the Notion； the positing of the determination already
immanent in it； and therefore of the difference； we must not understand this positing as a resolving
of that concrete unity back into its determinations as if these had an independent self…subsistence；
for this would be an empty return to the previous standpoint； to the opposition of consciousness。
This however has vanished； the said unity remains the element； and the distinctions of the division
and of the development no longer originate outside that element。 Consequently the earlier
determinations （those used on the pathway to truth） such as subjectivity and objectivity； or even
thought and being； or Notion and reality； no matter from what standpoint they were determined；
have lost their independent and purely affirmative character and are now in their truth； that is； in
their unity； reduced to forms。 In their difference； therefore； they themselves remain implicitly the
whole Notion； and this； in the division； is posited only under its own specifications。
Thus what is to be considered is the whole Notion； firstly as the Notion in the form of being；
secondly； as the Notion； in the first case； the Notion is only in itself； the Notion of reality or
being； in the second case； it is the Notion as such； the Notion existing for itself （as it is； to name
concrete forms； in thinking man； and even in the sentient animal and in organic individuality
generally； although； of course； in these it is not conscious； still less known； it is only in inorganic
nature that it is in itself）。 Accordingly； logic should be divided primarily into the logic of the Notion
as being and of the Notion as Notion — or； by employing the usual terms （although these as least
definite are most ambiguous） into 'objective' and 'subjective' logic。
But in accordance with the fundamental element of the immanent unity of the Notion； and hence
with the inseparability of its determinations； these latter； when distinguished from each other in the
positing of the Notion in its difference； must at least also stand in relation to each other。 There
results a sphere of mediation； the Notion as a system of reflected determinations； that is； of
being in process of transition into the being…within…self or inwardness of the Notion。 In this way；
the Notion is not yet posited as such for itself； but is still fettered by the externality of immediate
being。 This is the doctrine of essence which stands midway between the doctrine of being and that
of the Notion。 In the general division of logic in the present work it has been included in objective
logic because although essence is already the inwardness of being； the character of subject is to be
expressly reserved for the Notion。
Recently Kant has opposed to what has usually been called logic another； namely； a
transcendental logic。 What has here been called objective logic would correspond in part to
what with him is transcendental logic。 He distinguishes it from what he calls general logic in this
way； （a） that it treats of the notions which refer a priori to objects； and consequently does not
abstract from the whole content of objective cognition； or； in other words； it contains the rules of
the pure thinking of an object； and （g） at the same time it treats of the origin of our cognition so far
as this cognition cannot be ascribed to the objects。 It is to this second aspect that Kant's
philosophical interest is exclusively directed。
His chief thought is to vindicate the categories for self…consciousness as the subjective ego。 By
virtue of this determination and its opposition； and besides the empirical element of feeling and
intuition it has something else left over which is not posited and determined by thinking
self…consciousness； a thing…in…itself； something alien and external to thought — although it is easy
to perceive that such an abstraction as the thing…in…itself is itself only a product of thought； and of
merely abstractive thought at that。 If other disciples of Kant have expressed themselves concerning
the determining of the object by the ego in this way； that the objectifying of the ego is to be
regarded as an original and necessary act of consciousness； so that in this original act there is not
yet the idea of the ego itself — which would be a consciousness of that consciousness or even an
objectifying of it — then this objectifying act； in its freedom from the opposition of consciousness；
is nearer to what may be taken simply for thought as such。 ＇2＇
＇footnote＇
1。 I would mention that in this work I frequently refer to the Kantian philosophy （which to many may seem
superfluous） because whatever may be said； both in this work and elsewhere； about the precise character of
this philosophy and about particular parts of its exposition； it constitutes the base and the starting point of
recent German philosophy and that its merit remains unaffected by whatever faults may be found in it。 The
reason too why reference must often be made to it in the objective logic is that it enters into detailed
consideration of important； more specific aspects of logic； whereas later philosophical works have paid little
attention to these and in some instances have only displayed a crude — not unavenged — contempt for them。
The philosophising which is most widespread among us does not go beyond the Kantian results； that Reason
cannot acquire knowledge of any true content or subject matter and in regard to absolute truth must be
directed to faith。 But what with Kant is a result； forms the immediate starting…point in this philosophising； so
that the preceding exposition from which that result issued and which is a philosophical cognition； is cut away
beforehand。 The Kantian philosophy thus serves as a cushion for intellectual indolence which soothes itself
with the conviction that everything is already proved and settled。 Consequently for genuine knowledge； for a
specific content of thought which is not to be found in such barren and arid complacency； one must turn to
that preceding exposition。
2。 If the expression 'objectifying act of the ego' suggests other products of spirit； e。g。 fantasy； it is to be
observed that we are speaking of a determining of an object in so far as the elements of its content do not
belong to feeling and intuition。 Such an object is a thought； and to determine it means partly； first to produce it；
partly； in so far as it is something presupposed； to have further thoughts about it； to develop it further by
thought。
But this act should no longer be called consciousness； consciousness embraces within itself the
opposition of the ego and its object which is not present in that original act。 The name
consciousness gives it a semblance of subjectivity even more than does the term thought； which
here； however； is to be taken simply in the absolute sense as infinite thought untainted by the
finitude of consciousness； in short； thought as such。
Now because the interest of the Kantian philosophy was directed to the so…called transcendental
aspect of the categories； the treatment of the categories themselves yielded a blank result； what
they are in themselves without the abstract relation to the ego common to all； what is their specific
nature relatively to each other and their relationship to each other； this has not been made an
object of consideration。 Hence this philosophy has not contributed in the slightest to a knowledge
of their nature； what alone is of interest in this connection occurs in the Critique of Ideas。 But if
philosophy was to make any real progress； it was necessary that the interest of thought should be
drawn to a consideration of the formal side； to a consideration of the ego； of consciousness as
such； i。e。 of the abstract relation of a subjective knowing to an object； so that in this way the
cognition of the infinite form； that is； of the Notion； would be introduced。 But in order that this
cognition may be reached； that form has still to be relieved of the finite determinateness in which it
is ego； or consciousness。 The form； when thus thought out into its purity； will have within itself the
capacity to determine itself； that is； to give itself a content； and that a necessarily explicated
content in the form of a system of determinations of thought。
The objective logic； then； takes the place rather of the former metaphysics which was intended to
be the scientific construction of the world in terms of thoughts alone。 If we have regard to the final
shape of this science； then it is first and immediately ontology whose place is taken by objective
logic — that part of this metaphysics which was supposed to investigate the nature of ens in
general； ens comprises both being and essence； a distinction for which the German language has
fortunately preserved different terms。 But further； objective logic also comprises the rest of
metaphysics in so far as this attempted to comprehend with the forms of pure thought particular
substrata taken primarily from figurate conception； namely the soul； the world and God； and the
determinations of thought constituted what was essential in the mode of consid