a necessary function of reason。 Because dialectic was held to be merely the art of practising
deceptions and producing illusions； the assumption was made forthwith that it is only a spurious
game； the whole of its power resting solely on concealment of the deceit and that its results are
obtained only surreptitiously and are a subjective illusion。 True； Kant's expositions in the
antinomies of pure reason； when closely examined as they will be at length in the course of this
work； do not indeed deserve any great praise； but the general idea on which he based his
expositions and which he vindicated； is the objectivity of the illusion and the necessity of the
contradiction which belongs to the nature of thought determinations： primarily； it is true； with the
significance that these determinations are applied by reason to things in themselves； but their
nature is precisely what they are in reason and with reference to what is intrinsic or in itself。
This result； grasped in its positive aspect； is nothing else but the inner negativity of the
determinations as their self…moving soul； the principle of all natural and spiritual life。？
But if no advance is made beyond the abstract negative aspect of dialectic； the result is only the
familiar one that reason is incapable of knowing the infinite； a strange result for — since the infinite
is the Reasonable — it asserts that reason is incapable of knowing the Reasonable。
It is in this dialectic as it is here understood； that is； in the grasping of opposites in their unity or of
the positive in the negative； that speculative thought consists。
It is the most important aspect of dialectic； but for thinking which is as yet unpractised and unfree it
is the most difficult。 Such thinking； if it is still engaged in breaking itself of the habit of employing
sensuously concrete terms and of ratiocination； must first practise abstract thinking； hold fast
Notions in their determinateness and learn to cognise by means of them。 An exposition of logic to
this end would； in its method； have to keep to the division of the subject above…mentioned and
with regard to the more detailed contents； to the definitions given for the particular Notions without
touching on the dialectical aspect。 As regards its external 'structure； such an exposition would
resemble the usual presentation of this science； but it would also be distinguished from it with
respect to the content and still would serve for practice in abstract thinking； though not in
speculative thinking； a purpose which can never be realised by the logic which has become
popular through the addition of psychological and anthropological material。 It would give to mind
the picture of a methodically ordered whole； although the soul of the structure； the method （which
dwells in the dialectical aspect） would not itself appear in it。
Finally； with respect to education and the relation of the individual to logic； I would further remark
that this science； like grammar； appears in two different aspects or values。 It is one thing for him
who comes to it and the sciences generally for the first time； but it is another thing for him who
comes back to it from these sciences。 He who begins the study of grammar finds in its forms and
laws dry abstractions； arbitrary rules； in general an isolated collection of definitions and terms
which exhibit only the value and significance of what is implied in their immediate meaning； there is
nothing to be known in them other than themselves。 On the other hand； he who has mastered a
language and at the same time has a comparative knowledge of other languages； he alone can
make contact with the spirit and culture of a people through the grammar of its language； the same
rules and forms now have a substantial； living value。 Similarly； he who approaches this science at
first finds in logic an isolated system of abstractions which； confined within itself； does not embrace
within its scope the other knowledges and sciences。 。。。
On the contrary； when contrasted with the wealth of the world as pictorially conceived； with the
apparently real content of the other sciences； and compared with the promise of absolute science
to unveil the essential being of this wealth； the inner nature of mind and the world； the truth； then
this science in its abstract shape； in the colourless； cold simplicity of its pure determinations looks
as if it could achieve anything sooner than the fulfilment of its promise and seems to confront that
richness as an empty； insubstantial form。 The first acquaintance with logic confines its significance
to itself alone； its content passes only for a detached occupation with the determinations of
thought； alongside which other scientific activities possess on their own account a matter and
content of their own； on which logic may perhaps have a formal influence； though an influence
which comes only from itself and which if necessary can of course also be dispensed with so far as
the scientific structure and its study are concerned。
The other sciences have on the whole discarded the correct method； that is； a sequence of
definitions； axioms； theorems and their proofs； etc。； so…called natural logic now has its own validity
in the sciences and manages to get along without any special knowledge of the nature of thought
itself。 But the matter and content of these sciences is held to be completely independent of logic
and also has more appeal for sense； feeling； figurate conception； and practical interest of any kind。
At first； therefore； logic must indeed be learnt as something which one understands and sees into
quite well but in which； at the beginning； one feels the lack of scope and depth and a wider
significance。 It is only after profounder acquaintance with the other sciences that logic ceases to be
for subjective spirit a merely abstract universal an reveals itself as the universal which embraces
within itself the wealth of the particular — just as the same proverb； in the mouth of a youth who
understands it quite well； does not possess the wide range of meaning which it has in the mind of a
man with the experience of a lifetime behind him； for who； the meaning is expressed in all its
power。 Thus the value of logic is only apprehended when it is preceded by experience of the
sciences； it then displays itself to mind as the universal truth； not as a particular knowledge
alongside other matters and realities； but as the essential being of all these latter。 ？
Now although the mind is not conscious of this power of logic at the beginning of its study； it none
the less receives within itself through such study the power which leads it into all truth。 The system
of logic is the realm of shadows； the world of simple essentialities freed from all sensuous
concreteness。 The study of this science； to dwell and labour in this shadowy realm； is the absolute
culture and discipline of consciousness。 In logic； consciousness is busy with something remote
from sensuous intuitions and aims； from feelings； from the merely imagined world of figurate
conception。 Considered from its negative aspect； this business consists in holding off the
contingency of ordinary thinking and the arbitrary selection of particular grounds — or their
opposites — as valid。
But above all； thought acquires thereby self…reliance and independence。 It becomes at home in
abstractions and in progressing by means of Notions free from sensuous substrata； develops an
unsuspected power of assimilating in rational form all the various knowledges and sciences in their
complex variety； of grasping and retaining them in their essential character； stripping them of their
external features and in this way extracting from them the logical element； or what is the same
thing； filling the abstract basis of Logic acquired by study with the substantial content of absolute
truth and giving it the value of a universal which no longer stands as a particular alongside other
particulars but includes them all within its grasp and is their essence； the absolutely True。
GENERAL DIVISION OF LOGIC
From what has been said about the Notion of this science and where its justification is to be
found； it follows that the general division of it here can only be provisional； can be given； as it
were； only in so far as the author is already familiar with the science and consequently is
historically in a position to state here in advance the main distinctions which will emerge in the
development of the Notion。
Still； the attempt can be made to promote an understanding beforehand of what is requisite for
such a division； even though in doing so we must have recourse to an application of the method
which will only be fully understood and justified within the science itself。 We must therefore point
out at the start that we are presupposing that the division must be connected with the Notion； or
rather must be implicit in the Notion itself。 The Notion is not indeterminate but is in its own self
determinate； the division； however； expresses this its determinateness as developed； it is the
judgement of the Notion； not a judgement about some object or other picked up from outside；
but the judging； that is； determining； of the Notion in its own self。
The quality of being right…angled； acute…angled or equilateral； according to which triangles are
classified； is not implicit in the determinateness of the triangle itself； that is； not in what is usually
called the Notion of the triangle； just as little as there is implicit in what passes for the Notion of
animal as such； or of the mammal； bird； etc。 the determinations governing the classification into
mammal； bird； etc。； and the subdivision of these classes into other species。 Such determinations
are taken from elsewhere and are annexed to such so…called Notion from outside。 In the
philosophical treatment of classification or division； the Notion itself must show that it is itself the
course of those determinations。
But in the Introduction； the Notion of logic was itself stated to be the result of a preceding science；
and so here； too； it is a presupposition。 In accordance with that result logic was defined as the
scienc