adduced has a very convincing air。 But first of all it is to be observed that it usually happens with
such formal ratiocination that it forgets in its discourse the very point on which it has based its
argument and of which it is speaking。 It is alleged that it would be absurd to ask for the criterion of
the truth of the content of cognition； but according to the definition it is not the content that
constitutes the truth； but the agreement of the content with the Notion。 A content such as is here
spoken of； without the Notion； is something notionless； and hence without essential being；
certainly we cannot ask for the criterion of the truth of such a content； but for the very opposite
reason； not； that is； because the content； as something notionless； is not the required agreement；
but simply because it cannot be anything more than a mere truthless opinion。 Let us leave on one
side the content which causes the confusion here the confusion into which formalism falls whenever
it sets out to explain something and which makes it say the opposite of what it intends and let us
stop at the abstract view that logic is only formal and； in fact； abstracts from all content； we then
have a one…sided cognition which is not to contain any object； an empty； blank form which
therefore is no more an agreement for an agreement essentially requires two terms then it is truth。
In the a priori synthesis of the Notion； Kant possessed a higher principle in which a duality in a
unity could be cognised； a cognition； therefore； of what is required for truth； but the material of
sense； the manifold of intuition； was too strong for him and he was unable to get away from it to a
consideration of the Notion and the categories in and for themselves and to a speculative method
of philosophising。
Logic being the science of the absolute form； this formal science； in order to be true； must possess
in its own self a content adequate to its form； and all the more； since the formal element of logic is
the pure form； and therefore the truth of logic must be the pure truth itself。 Consequently this
formal science must be regarded as possessing richer determinations and a richer content and as
being infinitely more potent in its influence on the concrete than is usually supposed。 The laws of
logic by themselves （not counting the heterogeneous accretions of applied logic and the rest of the
psychological and anthropological material） are commonly restricted； apart from the law of
contradiction； to some meagre propositions concerning the conversion of judgements and the
forms of syllogisms。 Even here the forms which come up for treatment as well as their further
modifications are only； as it were； historically taken up； they are not subjected to criticism to
determine whether they are in and for themselves true。 Thus； for example； the form of the positive
judgement is accepted as something perfectly correct in itself； the question whether such a
judgement is true depending solely on the content。 Whether this form is in its own self a form of
truth； whether the proposition it enunciates； the individual is a universal； is not inherently
dialectical； is a question that no one thinks of investigating。 It is straightway assumed that this
judgement is； on its own account； capable of containing truth and that the proposition enunciated
by any positive judgement is true； although it is directly evident that it lacks what is required by the
definition of truth； namely； the agreement of the Notion and its object； if the predicate； which here
is the universal； is taken as the Notion； and the subject； which is the individual； is taken as the
object； then the one does not agree with the other。 But if the abstract universal which is the
predicate falls short of constituting a Notion； for a Notion certainly implies something more； and if；
too； a subject of this kind is not yet much more than a grammatical one； how should the judgement
possibly contain truth seeing that either its Notion and object do not agree； or it lacks both Notion
and object？ On the contrary； then； what is impossible and absurd is to attempt to grasp the truth
in such forms as the positive judgement and the judgement generally。 Just as the Kantian
philosophy did not consider the categories in and for themselves but declared them to be finite
determinations incapable of containing truth； on the wrong ground that they are subjective forms of
self…consciousness； still less did that philosophy subject to criticism the forms of the Notion which
are the content of ordinary logic； on the contrary； it has adopted a portion of them； namely； the
functions of judgement； for the determination of the categories and accepted them as valid
presuppositions。 Even if we are to see in logical forms nothing more than formal functions of
thought； they would for that very reason be worthy of investigation to ascertain how far； on their
own account； they correspond to the truth。 A logic that does not perform this task can at most
claim the value of a descriptive natural history of the phenomena of thinking just as they occur。 It is
an infinite merit of Aristotle； one that must fill us with the highest admiration for the powers of that
genius； that he was the first to undertake this description。 It is necessary however to go further and
to ascertain both the systematic connection of these forms and their value。
Division
The foregoing consideration of the Notion shows it to be the unity of being and essence。 Essence
is the first negation of being； which has thereby become illusory being； the Notion is the second
negation or the negation of this negation； and is therefore being once more； but being that has
been restored as the infinite mediation and negativity of being within itself。 Consequently； being
and essence in the Notion no longer have the same determination that they had as being and
essence； nor are they merely in a unity such that each has an illusory being in the other。 Therefore
the Notion does not differentiate itself into these determinations。 It is the truth of the relationship of
substance in which being and essence achieve the fulfilment of their self…subsistence and their
determination through each other。 The truth of substantiality proved to be the substantial identity
which is no less a positedness and only as such is substantial identity。 The positedness is a
determinate being and differentiation； consequently； in the Notion； being…in…and…for…itself has
attained a true and adequate reality； for the positedness is itself being…in…and…for…itself。 This
positedness constitutes the difference of the Notion within itself； because the positedness is
immediately being…in…and…for…itself； the different moments of the Notion are themselves the
whole Notion； universal in their determinateness and identical with their negation。
This； now； is the very Notion of the Notion。 But it is as yet only its Notion； or； this Notion is itself
only the Notion。 Because it is equally being…in…and…for…self and also a positedness； or the absolute
substance that manifests the necessity of distinct substances as an identity； this identity must itself
posit what it is。 The moments of the movement of the relationship of substantiality through which
the Notion has come to be and the reality thereby exhibited are still only in transition into the
Notion； this reality does not yet possess the determination of being the Notion's own； self…evolved
determination； it fell in the sphere of necessity； but the Notion's own determination can only be the
result of its free determining； a determinate being in which the Notion is identical with itself； its
moments also being Notions and posited by the Notion itself。
At first； therefore； the Notion is only in itself or implicitly the truth； because it is only something
inner； it is equally only outer。
It is at first simply an immediate and in this guise its moments have the form of immediate； fixed
determinations。 It appears as the determinate Notion； as the sphere of the mere
understanding。 Because this form of immediacy is still inadequate to the nature of the Notion； for
this is free； being in relation only with itself； it is an external form in which the Notion cannot
count as a being…in…and…for…self； but only as something posited or subjective。 The Notion in the
guise of immediacy constitutes the point of view for which the Notion is a subjective thinking； a
reflection external to the subject matter。 This stage； therefore； constitutes subjectivity； or the
formal Notion。 Its externality is manifested in the fixed being of its determinations each of
which appears independently as an isolated； qualitative something which is only externally
related to its other。 But the identity of the Notion； which is precisely their inner or subjective
essence； sets them dialectically in movement； with the result that their separatedness vanishes and
with it the separation of the Notion from the object； and there emerges as their truth the totality
which is the objective Notion。
Secondly； the Notion in its objectivity is the subject matter in and for itself。 Through its
necessary； progressive determination the formal Notion makes itself its subject matter and in this
way is rid of the relation of subjectivity and externality to the object。 Or； conversely； objectivity is
the real Notion that has emerged from its inwardness and passed over into determinate being。
In this identity with the object； the Notion thus has a free determinate being of its own。 But this
freedom is still only an immediate； not yet a negative； freedom。 As one with the object； the
Notion is submerged in it； its distinct moments are objective existences in which it is itself again
only the inner。 As the soul ＇Seele＇ of objective reality it must give itself the form of subjectivity
which； as formal Notion； belonged to it immediately； thus； in the form of the free Notion； a form
which in objectivity it still lacked； it opposes itself to that objectivity and in so doing makes the
identity with it which； as objective Notion it possesses in and for itself； also a posited identity。
In this consummation in which it has the