but their simplicity in the unity of the Notion is inadequate to the nature of this unity； and the
Notion therefore repels itself from itself。 This repulsion is in general the resolution ＇Entschluss＇ of
the relation of the negative unity to itself； whereby it is exclusive individuality； but by this
exclusion ＇Ausschliessen＇ it resolves itself ＇sich entschliesst＇ or opens up itself ＇schliesst sich
auf＇； because this exclusion is a self…determining； as positing of its own self。 On the one hand
subjectivity in determining itself makes itself into particularity； gives itself a content which； enclosed
within the unity of the Notion； is still an inner one； but this positing； the simple reflection…into…self；
is immediately； as we have seen； also a presupposing； and in the same moment in which the
subject of the end determines itself； it is related to an indifferent； external objectivity which is to be
equated by it with the said inner determinateness； that is to say； is to be posited as something
determined by the Notion； and in the first instance as means。
B。 The Means
The first immediate positing in end is at one and the same time the positing of an internality； that
is； of something determined as posited； and the presupposing of an objective world which is
indifferent to the determination of end。 But the subjectivity of end is absolute negative unity： its
second determining is； therefore； the sublating of this presupposition altogether； this sublating is the
return…into…self in so far as by it is sublated that moment of the first negative； the positing of the
negative as against the subject； the external object。 But as against the presupposition or the
immediacy of the determining； as against the objective world； it is as yet only the first negation；
itself immediate and therefore external。 This positing is therefore not yet the realised end itself； but
only the initial step towards it。 The object thus determined is so far only the means。
The end unites itself through a means with objectivity； and in objectivity with itself。 The means is
the middle term of the syllogism。 The end； because it is finite； requires a means for its realisation…a
means； that is a middle term； that at the same time has the shape of an external existence
indifferent to the end itself and its realisation。 The absolute Notion possesses mediation within itself
in such a manner that its first positing is not a presupposing whose object would have indifferent
externality for its fundamental determination； on the contrary； the world as a creation has only the
form of such externality； but its fundamental determination is really constituted by its negativity and
positedness。 The finitude of end consists accordingly in this； that its determining is altogether
external to itself； and so its first determining； as we have seen； divides itself into a positing and a
presupposing； therefore the negation of this determining； too； is so far only in one aspect already
a reflection…into…self； in the other； it is in fact merely a first negation； in other words the very
reflection…into…self is also external to itself and a reflection outwards。
The means is therefore the formal middle term of a formal syllogism； it is external as against the
extreme of the subjective end； and therefore also to the extreme of the objective end； just as
particularity in the formal syllogism is an indifferent medius terminus that can be replaced by
others。 Further； just as this particularity is middle term only by being determinateness in relation to
one extreme and a universal in relation to the other； and therefore owes its mediating determination
to its relation to other terms； so the means； too； is only the mediating middle term； first because it is
an immediate object； secondly because it is a means by virtue of the relation it possesses
externally to the extreme of the end…a relation that is for it a form to which it is indifferent。
Notion and objectivity are therefore only externally combined in the means； which is accordingly a
merely mechanical object。 The relation of the object to the end is a premise； or the immediate
relation which with regard to the end has been shown to be reflection into itself； the means； is an
inhering predicate； its objectivity is subsumed under the determination of end which on account of
its concretion is universality。 By virtue of this determination of end present in the means； the latter
is now also subsumptive in relation to the other extreme of the initially still indeterminate
objectivity。 Conversely； in contrast to the subjective end； the means； as immediate objectivity；
has a universality of existence that the subjective individuality of the end still lacks。 The end
being thus in the first instance only an external determinateness in the means； it is itself； as a
negative unity； outside it； just as the means is a mechanical object that possesses the end only as a
determinateness； not as simple concretion of the totality。 As the unifying element； however； the
middle term must itself be the totality of the end。 It has been seen that the determination of end in
the means is at the same time reflection…into…self； it is in so far formal self…relation； since the
determinateness； as real indifference； is posited as the objectivity of the means。 But for this
very reason； this； in one respect； pure subjectivity； is at the same time also activity。 In the
subjective end the negative relation…to…self is still identical with determinateness as such； with
content and externality。 But in the incipient objectification of the end； in the becoming…other of the
simple Notion； these moments separate themselves； or conversely； it is in such separation that this
becoming…other or externality consists。
Consequently； this whole middle term is itself the totality of the syllogism； in which the abstract
activity and the external means constitute the extremes； and their middle term is constituted by that
determinateness of the object by the end； which makes it a means。 But further； universality is the
relation of the activity of the end and the means。 The means is an object； in itself the totality of
the Notion； it has no power of resistance against the end； as it has in the first instance against
another immediate object。 To the end； therefore； which is the posited Notion； it is absolutely
penetrable； and receptive of this communication； because it is in itself identical with the end。 But
now it is also posited as penetrable by the Notion； for in centrality it is an object striving towards
the negative unity； similarly in chemism； it is as a neutral and also as a different object； no longer
self…subsistent。 Its lack of self…subsistence consists precisely in its being only in itself the totality of
the Notion； but the latter is a being…for…self。 Consequently the object has the character of being
powerless against the end and of serving it； the end is the object's subjectivity or soul； that has in
the object its external side。
The object； being in this manner immediately subjected to the end； is not an extreme of the
syllogism； but this relation constitutes one of its premises。 But the means has also a side from
which it still has self…subsistence as against the end。 The objectivity that is connected with the end
in the means is still external to it； because it is only immediately so connected； and therefore the
presupposition still persists。 The activity of the end through the means is for that reason still
directed against this presupposition； and the end is activity and no longer merely an urge and a
striving； precisely because the moment of objectivity is posited in the means in its determinateness
as something external； and the simple unity of the Notion now has this objectivity as such in itself。
C。 The Realised End
1。 The end in its relation to the means is already reflected into itself； but its objective return into
itself is not yet posited。 The activity of the end through its means is still directed against objectivity
as an original presupposition； the nature of this activity is precisely this； to be indifferent to the
determinateness。 Were the activity again to consist in merely determining the immediate objectivity；
the product would again be merely a means； and so on to infinity； the outcome would be only a
means suitable to the end； but not the objectivity of the end itself。 Therefore the end which is active
in its means； in determining the immediate object must not do so as a determinant external to it；
and consequently the object must spontaneously conform to the unity of the Notion； in other
words； the former external activity of the end through its means must determine itself as mediation
and sublate its own self。
The relation of the activity of the end through the means to the external object is in the first instance
the second premise of the syllogism — an immediate relation of the middle term to the other
extreme。 It is immediate because the middle term has an external object in it and the other
extreme is another such object。 The means is effective and potent against the latter because its
own object is connected with the self…determining activity； while for the other object the immediate
determinateness that it possesses is an indifferent one。 Their process in this relation is none other
than the mechanical or chemical one； in this objective externality the previous relationships emerge
but under the dominance of the end。 These processes； however； as they themselves showed；
spontaneously return into the end。 if； therefore； in the first instance； the relation of the means to the
external object it has to work upon is an immediate one； it has already at an earlier stage exhibited
itself as a syllogism； the end having proved itself to be their true middle term and unity。 As；
therefore； the means is the object that stands on the side of the end and has within it the activity of
the end； the mechanism that is found here is at the same time the return of objectivity into itself；
into the Notion； which however is already presupposed as the end； the negative attitude of
purposive activity towards the object is thus not an external attitude； but the altera