into the Notion； which however is already presupposed as the end； the negative attitude of
purposive activity towards the object is thus not an external attitude； but the alteration and
transition of objectivity in its own self into the end。
That the end relates itself immediately to an object and makes it a means； as also that through this
means it determines another object； may be regarded as violence ＇Gewalt＇ in so far as the end
appears to be of quite another nature than the object； and the two objects similarly are mutually
independent totalities。 But that the end posits itself in a mediate relation with the object and
interposes another object between itself and it； may be regarded as the cunning of reason。 The
finitude of rationality has； as remarked； this side； that the end enters into relationship with the
presupposition； that is； with the externality of the object。 In the immediate relation to the object；
it would itself enter into the sphere of mechanism or chemism and thereby be subject to
contingency and the loss of its determination as the Notion that is in and for itself。 But as it is； it
puts forward an object as means； allows it to wear itself out in its stead； exposes it to attrition and
shields itself behind it from mechanical violence。
Further； since the end is finite it has a finite content； accordingly it is not an absolute； nor simply
something that in its own nature is rational。 But the means is the external middle term of the
syllogism which is the realisation of the end； in the means； therefore； the rationality in it manifests
itself as such by maintaining itself in this external other； and precisely through this externality。 To
this extent the means is superior to the finite ends of external purposiveness： the plough is more
honourable than are immediately the enjoyments procured by it and which are ends。 The tool
lasts； while the immediate enjoyments pass away and are forgotten。 In his tools man possesses
power over external nature； even though in respect of his ends he is； on the contrary； subject to it。
But the end does not merely keep outside the mechanical process； rather it maintains itself in it and
is its determination。 The end； as the Notion that freely exists in face of the object and its process
and is a self…determining activity； is no less the absolute truth of mechanism； and therefore in
mechanism it is only meeting with itself。 The power of the end over the object is this explicit
identity and its activity is the manifestation of it。 The end as content is the determinateness that
exists in and for itself； which appears in the object as indifferent and external； but the activity of the
end is； on the one hand； the truth of the process and as negative unity the sublating of the
illusory show of externality。 From the abstract point of view； it is the indifferent determinateness
of the object that equally externally is replaced by another； but the simple abstraction of the
determinateness is in its truth the totality of the negative； the concrete Notion that posits externality
within itself。
The content of the end is its negativity as simple particularity reflected into itself； distinguished
from its totality as form。 On account of this simplicity whose determinateness is in and for itself
the totality of the Notion； the content appears as the permanently identical element in the
realisation of the end。 The teleological process is the translation of the Notion that has a distinct
concrete existence as Notion into objectivity； this translation into a presupposed other is seen to
be the meeting of the Notion with itself through itself。
Now the content of the end is this identity that has a concrete existence in the form of the identical。
In every transition the Notion maintains itself； for example； when cause becomes effect it is only
the cause meeting with itself in the effect； but in the teleological transition it is the Notion that as
such already has a concrete existence as cause； as the absolute concrete unity that is free in the
face of objectivity and its external determinability。 The externality into which the end translates
itself is itself； as we have seen； already posited as moment of the Notion； as form of its immanent
differentiation。 The end possesses； therefore； in externality its own moment； and the content； as
content of the concrete unity； is its simple form； which not merely remains implicitly self…identical
in the distinct moments of the end…as subjective end； as means and mediating activity； and as
objective end…but also has a concrete existence as the abiding self…identical。
It can therefore be said of the teleological activity that in it the end is the beginning； the consequent
the ground； the effect the cause； that it is a becoming of what has become； that in it only what
already exists comes into existence； and so forth； which means that in general all the
determinations of relationship belonging to the sphere of reflection or of immediate being have lost
their distinctions； and what was enunciated as an other； such as end； consequent； effect； etc。； no
longer has in the end relation the determination of an other； but on the contrary is posited as
identical with the simple Notion。
2。 Now examining more closely the product of the teleological activity； we see that it contains the
end only externally； in so far as it is an absolute presupposition over against the subjective end；
that is to say； in so far as we stop short at the point of view that the purposive activity through its'
means is only in a mechanical relation with the object； and instead of positing one indifferent
determinateness of the latter posits another equally external to it。 A determinateness of this kind；
which an object possesses through the end； differs in general from another merely mechanical one
by the fact that the former is moment of a unity； so that although the determinateness is indeed
external to the object； yet it is not in its own self something merely external。 The object that
exhibits such a unity is a whole； towards which its parts； its own externality； is indifferent； a
determinate concrete unity which unites within itself distinct relations and determinatenesses。 This
unity which cannot be comprehended from the specific nature of the object； and as regards
determinate content is another content than that peculiar to the object； is not by itself a mechanical
determinateness； but it is still mechanically related to the object。 Just as in this product of the
purposive activity the content of the end and the content of the object are external to each other；
so a like relation holds between the determinations of this activity in the other moments of the
syllogism…in the unifying middle term； between the purposive activity and the object which is
means； and in the subjective end； the other extreme； between the infinite form as totality of the
Notion and its content。 According to the relation by which the subjective end is united with
objectivity； both premises alike…the relation of the object determined as means to the still external
object； and the relation of the subjective end to the object which is made means…are immediate
relations。 The syllogism therefore suffers from the defect of the formal syllogism in general； that the
relations of which it consists； are not themselves conclusions or mediations； but in fact already
presuppose the conclusion for whose production they are supposed to serve as means。
If we consider one of the premises； the immediate relation of the subjective end to the object
which thereby becomes the means； then the former cannot immediately relate itself to the latter； for
the latter is no less immediate than the object of the other extreme； in which the end is to be
realised through mediation。 Since they are thus posited as diverse； it is necessary to interpolate
between this objectivity and the subjective end a means of their relation； but this means is likewise
an object already determined by the end； and between that object's objectivity and the teleological
determination a new means must be interpolated； and so on to infinity。 Thus there is posited the
infinite progress of mediation。 The same thing takes place in respect of the other premise； the
relation of the means to the as yet undetermined object。 Since they are absolutely self…subsistent；
they can only be united in a third； and so on to infinity。 Or conversely； since the premises already
presuppose the conclusion； the conclusion； being based on these merely immediate premises； can
only be imperfect。 The conclusion or the product of the purposive act is nothing but an object
determined by an end external to it； consequently it is the same thing as the means。 In such a
product； therefore； only a means； not a realised end； has resulted； or the end has not truly
attained an objectivity in it。
It is therefore a matter of complete indifference whether we regard an object determined by
external end as a realised end or only as a means； the determination here is relative； external to the
object itself and not objective。 All objects； therefore； in which an external end is realised； are
equally only a means of the end。 Whatever is intended to be used for realising an end and to be
taken essentially as means； is a means which； in accordance with its destiny； is to be destroyed。
But the object that is supposed to contain the realised end； and to represent the objectivity of the
end； is also perishable； it too fulfils its end not by a tranquil existence in which it preserves itself；
but only in so far as it is worn away； for only thus does it conform to the unity of the Notion； in that
its externality； that is； its objectivity； sublates itself in that unity。 A house； a clock； may appear as
ends in relation to the tools employed for their production； but the stones and beams； or wheels
and axles； and so on； which constitute the actuality of the end fulfil that end only through the
pressure that they suffer； through the chemical processes with air； light； and water to which they
are exposed and that deprive man of them by their friction and so forth。 Accordingly； they fulfil
their destiny only by being used