within itself the whole Notion； the Notion is the omnipresent soul in it； which remains simple
self…relation and remains a one in the multiplicity belonging to objective being。 This multiplicity； as
self…external objectivity； has an indifferent subsistence； which in space and time； if these could
already be mentioned here； is a mutual externality of wholly diverse and self…subsistent elements。
But in life externality is at the same time present as the simple determinateness of its Notion； thus
the soul is an omnipresent outpouring of itself into this multiplicity and at the same remains
absolutely the simple oneness of the concrete Notion with itself。 The thinking that clings to the
determinations of the relationships of reflection and of the formal Notion； when it comes to
consider life； this unity of its Notion in the externality of objectivity； in the absolute multiplicity of
atomistic matter； finds all its thoughts without exception are of no avail； the omnipresence of the
simple in manifold externality is for reflection an absolute contradiction； and as reflection must at
the same time apprehend this omnipresence from its perception of life and therefore admit the
actuality of this Idea； it is an incomprehensible mystery for it； because it does not grasp the
Notion； and the Notion as the substance of life。 This simple life； however； is not only omnipresent；
it is absolutely the subsistence and immanent substance of its objectivity； but as subjective
substance it is the urge； and moreover t ' he specific urge； of the particular difference； and no
less essentially the one and universal urge of the specialised difference that reduces this its
particularisation into unity and maintains it therein。 It is only as this negative unity of its objectivity
and particularisation that life is a self…related life that is for itself； a soul。 As such it is essentially an
individual； which relates itself to objectivity as to an other； to a non…living nature。
Consequently the original judgment of life consists in this； that it detaches itself as an individual
subject from objectivity； and in constituting itself the negative unity of the Notion； makes the
presupposition of an immediate objectivity。
Life is therefore first to be considered as a living individual that is for itself the subjective totality
and is presupposed as indifferent to an objectivity that confronts it as indifferent。
Secondly； it is the life process； the process of sublating its presupposition； positing as negative the
objectivity that is indifferent to it and actualising itself as that objectivity's power and negative unity。
By so doing it makes itself into the universal that is the unity of itself and its other。
Hence life is thirdly the genus process； the process of sublating its individualisation and relating
itself to its objective existence as to itself。 Accordingly； this process is on the one hand the return
to its Notion and the repetition of the first diremption； the becoming of a new individuality and the
death of the first； immediate one； but on the other hand； the Notion of life that has withdrawn
into itself is the becoming of the Notion that is in relationship with itself and exists universally and
freely for itself…the transition into cognition。
A The Living Individual
B The Life Process
C The Genus ＇Kind＇
Chapter 2 The Idea of Cognition
Life is the immediate Idea； or the Idea as its Notion not yet realised in its own self。 In its
judgement； the Idea is cognition in general。
The Notion is； as Notion； for itself in so far as it freely exists as abstract universality or as genus。
As such； it is its pure self…identity； which inwardly differentiates itself in such a manner that the
differentiated moment is not an objectivity； but is likewise liberated into subjectivity or the form of
simple selflikeness； and hence the object of the Notion is the Notion itself。 Its reality in general is
the form of its determinate being and the point of interest is the determination this form； on this
determination rests the difference between what the Notion is in itself or as subjective and what
it is when submerged in objectivity； and then in the Idea of life。
In the latter it is indeed distinguished from its external reality and posited for itself； yet this its
being…for…self it possesses only as the identity that is a relation to itself as submerged in its
subjugated objectivity； or to itself as indwelling； substantial form。 The elevation of the Notion
above life means that its reality is the Notion form liberated into universality。 Through this
judgement the Idea is duplicated into the subjective Notion whose reality is the Notion itself； and
into the objective Notion that is in the form of life。 Thinking； spirit； self…consciousness； are
determinations of the Idea where it has itself for object； and its determinate being； that is； the
determinateness of its being； is its own difference from itself。
The metaphysics of the spirit； or； as it was more commonly expressed； of the soul revolved
round the determinations of substance； simplicity； immateriality … determinations in which the
general idea of spirit taken from empirical consciousness； was laid down as subject； and it was
then asked； What predicates agree with our observations？ This kind of procedure could get no
further than the procedure of physics； which reduces the world of phenomena to general laws and
reflective determinations since it too was based on spirit merely in its phenomenal aspect； in fact
this procedure was bound to fall short even of the scientific character of physics。
Since spirit is not only infinitely richer than nature； but also； its essence is constituted by the
absolute unity of opposites in the Notion； it exhibits in its phenomenal aspect and relation to
externality contradiction in its extreme form。 Consequently； it must be possible to adduce an
experience in support of each of the opposed reflective determinations； or starting from experience
it must be possible to arrive at opposite determinations by way of formal syllogistic reasoning。
Since the predicates immediately yielded by spirit's phenomenal aspect in the first instance still
belong to empirical Psychology； there only remain； strictly speaking； for the metaphysical
consideration； the wholly inadequate determinations of reflection。 Kant； in his criticism of rational
psychology adheres to this metaphysics； insisting that； in so far as rational psychology purports to
be a rational science； the smallest addition from observation to the general idea of
selfconsciousness would transform that science into an empirical one and mar its rational purity
and its independence of all experience。 Consequently； on this view； nothing is left but the simple
representation； 'I'； a representation devoid of any content of its own； of which we cannot even say
that it is a notion but a mere consciousness that accompanies every notion。 Now according to
the further Kantian conclusions； by this 'I'； or if you like； it （the thing） that thinks； nothing further is
represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts = x； which is cognised only through the
thoughts which are its predicates； and of which； taken in its isolation； we can never have the least
conception。 In this context； the 'I' has the inconvenience； to use Kant's own expression that we
must already make use of it whenever we want make any judgement about it； for it is not so
much a single representation by which a particular object is distinguished； but rather a form of
representation in general in so far as this is to be called cognition。 Now the paralogism committed
by rational psychology； says Kant； consists in this； that modes of self…consciousness in thinking are
converted into notions of the understanding as applied to an object； that the 'I think' is taken as
a thinking being； a thing…in…itself； and that in this way； from the fact that I always occur in
consciousness as a subject； and that too as a singular subject； identical in all the multiplicity of
representation； and distinguishing myself from the latter as from something external to me； the
unjustified inference is drawn that the 'I' is a substance； and further a qualitatively simple being；
and a one； and something that has a real existence independently of the things of time and space。
I have drawn out this exposition in some detail； because it shows clearly the nature of the previous
metaphysics of the soul and especially； too； the nature of the criticism by which it was made
obsolete。 The former aimed at determining the abstract essence of the soul； in doing so； it started
originally from observation and converted the empirical universality of observation and the wholly
external reflective determination attaching to the individuality of the actual； into the form of the
above…mentioned determinations of essence。 Kant in his criticism had generally in mind only the
state of the metaphysics of his time； which in the main adhered to these abstract； one…sided
determinations wholly devoid of dialectic； the genuinely speculative ideas of older philosophers on
the notion of spirit he neither heeded nor examined。 In his criticism then of those determinations； he
followed quite simply Hume's style of scepticism； that is to say； he holds fast to the 'I' as it appears
in self…consciousness； from which； however； since it is its essence … the thing…in…itself … that we are
to cognise； … everything empirical must be omitted； nothing then is left but this phenomenon of the
'I think' that accompanies every representation … of which 'I think' we have not the slightest
conception。
Certainly； it must be conceded that we have not the least conception the 'I'； or of anything
whatever； not even of the Notion itself； so long as we do not really think； but stop short at the
simple； fixed general idea and the name。 It is an odd thought … if it can be called a thought at all …
that I must already make use of the 'I' in order to judge of the 'l'； the 'I' that makes use of
selfconsciousness as a means in order to judge； this is indeed an x of which； as well as of the
relationship of such 'making use'； we cannot have the s